Introduction

The advent of social media has impacted various sociopolitical and economic spaces including journalism.  In the past, matters of official governance of people were largely a preoccupation of governments and organised civil society.  Individuals have found relief in social media in terms of mass communication of its programs including holding governments to account.  Social media has helped to amplify voices of individuals and the civil society, giving both unprecedented abilities to communicate efficiently and rapidly.  Civil society has also been able to organise protests, in short notices and in spaces that were impossible to utilize in the past. 

Social media has also introduced new sociopolitical actors and new modes of communication.  Governments, likewise, have also increased their use social media to pursue their own sociopolitical and economic objectives.  Social media has largely become the main communication platform used to respond to matters impacting both government and civil society.  When the State of Qatar was blockaded by its neighbors for an example in 2017, ^[1]it resorted largely to social media in response.  Similarly, when it was faced with a barrage of bad publicity during the 2022 FIFA World Cup, it resorted into social media for its defense once again.  United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have also both increased their use of social media, they have resorted to social media to deal with bad publicity against their leaders and governments.  However, the introduction of new sociopolitical actors and new modes of communication on social media has not been without challenges.  There are increasing numbers of cases involving social media actors, particularly those on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram accused of inflicting harm and violating basic rights of others.  Uncontrolled defamation of characters on these platforms continues unabated including paddling of misinformation and fake news.  There has been as a result growing calls for government to regulate and impose measures against the misuse of social media platforms. 

Consequently, many governments throughout the world are engaged in discussions on how to regulate the social media and how to prevent abuse of individuals and governments.  Some governments however have relied on existing laws to deal with social media violations.  This has invited criticism as many of these laws are not appropriate nor were they designed to deal with social media.  Saudi Arabia has been most notable in applying existing laws of the country to deal with social media violations.  Nourah bint Saeed al-Qahtani was sentenced to 45 years in prison for her social media posts.  The Saudi Specialized Criminal Court charged al Qahtani of "using the internet to tear the (Saudi) social fabric" and "violating public order by using social media" (1).  There has been widespread criticism of Saudi Arabia following this sentence.

This chapter will look at the interference and the impact of the social media in the domestic affairs of Gulf states.  It will give the background of the rise of social media and its evolution into becoming a critical platform used by various actors in the domestic affairs of states.  Second, notwithstanding challenges associated with the advent of various social media platforms, social media has enabled governments, civil society and general populace to communicate speedily, efficiently and at times direct with each other.  It has brought down boundaries.  Third, this chapter will look at how states, individuals and civil society have weaponized social media using different strategies and tactics.  Furthermore, it will highlight the perils of ignoring social media by governments; it will argue that the neglect of social media as a communication platform by the state could impact on service delivery and general communication.  Social media has become an early alert system for government, they are now able to learn about social disgruntlements timeously before becoming protests and at times revolutions.  This chapter will also argue that social media has advanced ambitions and objectives of democratic principles.  It will conclude by proposing solutions, particularly on how states should deal with social media.  It will argue against state regulation and self-regulations of social.  It will propose a hybrid solution involving independent groups with experience in law and users of social media.  This chapter will be limited in scope, it will mainly look Gulf particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as it attempts to make its case.

The rise of social media and its evolution into becoming an instrument of interference in domestic affairs of Gulf states.

The term social media refers to interactions people use to communicate and share information using various virtual platforms.  These platforms, largely founded in the US, have changed how people and governments communicate.  There are dozens of social media platforms however dominating the space is Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and WhatsApp.  Facebook was established in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, Andrew McCollum, Chris Hughes, Eduardo Saverin and Dustin at Cambridge, Massachusetts, US.  It has over 800 million monthly active users around the world.  Twitter was founded by Jack Dorsey, Evan Williams, Noah Glass and Biz Stone in San Francisco, US in 2006.   It has over 380 million active monthly users.  Instagram is one of the big social media platforms.  It is owned by Meta Platforms, who also owns Facebook and WhatsApp. Instagram was founded by Kevin Systrom and Mike Krieger in 2010.  Instagram has over 1.4 billion users across the globe making one of the most influential platforms on earth.  TikTok is a relatively new player in the social media space one of the few social media platforms from outside the US.  TikTok was established by the Chinese company ByteDance in 2016.  It has over 1 billion users around the world.  WhatsApp is the most used social media platform in the world.  WhatsApp is own by Meta Platform making Meta the most influential organisation in the social media sphere.  WhatsApp has over 2 billion users across the world.

These are amongst the largest and most popular media platforms in the world.  Their influence has changed how the world communicate; they have also impacted on the cost of communications worldwide.  They have subsequently destroyed traditional communication businesses which dominated the market in the past.  Social media is also rapidly replacing the dominance of traditional news media i.e., magazines, television, radio and newspapers.  Large numbers of people now get their news from social media.   The audiences in the Middle East, particularly the Gulf, are not exempted from this phenomenon.  According to Digital 2020 July Global Statshot report by Datareportal, 3.96 billion people use social media today, accounting for roughly 51 percent of the global population.  Moreover, social media has been effective in gauging its reach of audiences.  These platforms can provide accurate statistics of the number of audiences reached and engaged daily, something that was impossible in the past.  Social media uses algorithms to calculate its daily reach and engagement of audiences.  Algorithms is a method used by computers to calculate and solve problems.  It has revolutionised computations, as people can gauge the impact and effectiveness of their messages in real time.  They are also able to receive responses from targeted audiences immediately.  However, what has been most effective in the advent of social media has been the creation of “Followers” and “Like” clicks.  Communicators can know immediately know how audiences feel about their messages through the aggregation of the number of “likes” from their “followers”.

The evolution of media - new forms and modes of activism in the social media ^[2]

Large number of followers of individual social media actors in various platforms has led to the proliferation and emergence of social media “Influencers”.  These are individuals and organizations who have large followership and a certain specialised knowledge.  Their opinions impact tremendously on the public matters involving domestic affairs of states.   Awad al-Qarni a prominent pro-reform law professor from Saudi Arabia is one case in point.  Al Qarni has over 2 million followers on Twitter making him one of the most influential person in the Gulf.  Al Qarni was sentenced to death by courts in Saudi Arabia for having a Twitter account and using WhatsApp to share news considered “hostile” to the kingdom, according to court documents seen by the Guardian (2).  What has been concerning for governments about the rise of social media influencers has been their domestic and global media outreach.  The international outreach has raised the level of concern.   Some influencers have openly sold their “influence” to companies and at times to governments.  A growing body of scholarship reveals influencers are emerging as a new force in shaping public discourse and raising public awareness of socio-political agendas in the digital public sphere (3) .  This has introduced new threats to governments where influencers are used to discredit governments and at times pursue a certain narrative against governments.

When the phenomenon of influencers started, they presented themselves as experts on topics such as fashion, sports, or gaming.  They used their status to cooperate with brands for marketing purposes. However, over time there has been a growing number of influencers who have turned influence towards politics.  Governments have retaliated by targeting these individuals as it was the case in al Qarni’s instance.  Governments accuse influencers such as al Qarni of being the enemies of the state in order to limit their influence.  Iran has also been cracking down on influencers leading the protests in the country.  The ongoing protests in Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini, a young girl who died at the hands of the so-called morality police is another case in point.  The Iranian government has not only implemented restrictions on internet and social media but have also accused the protestors and social media influencers, of getting help and working with the enemies of Iran particularly the US and Israel.  Accusations by Iran, if at all correct, highlights the global nature and reach of influencers and how they have social media has been entrenched in the domestic affairs of the state.  Iran's supreme leader has blamed the US and Israel for the protests sweeping the country following the death of a woman whilst in police custody. (4).  The rapid spread of protests in Iran is a proof of the impact of social media in propagating sociopolitical causes online and the level of impact it has on domestic affairs of states. 

Most traditional media in the Gulf is controlled and largely influenced by states.  The advent of social media has shaken the status quo.  Social media influencers are playing an important role in changing how traditional media acts. Social media influencers have also changed the process of news gathering and publication, they control and decide what goes on their posts and they also decide when and what to publish.  This in the traditional media has been the responsibility of editors.  Social media has done away with editors.  However, what has been concerning is the lack of professionalism and ethics that have over the years regulated traditional media, accountability hardly exists in social media.  Subsequently unverified online posts, fake news and deep fakes i.e., manipulation of pictures and other forms of misinformation has proliferated.  Moreover, the ability to assume multiple identities, anonymity and using fake names on social media has added to misinformation and harming of others.  The introduction of Blue Checkmarks, a new paying service by Twitter is meant to minimize harm by its anonymous users.  Blue Checkmarks also known as Twitter verification on the profiles of it account users are meant to ensure that posts are from persons and organisations claimed to be represented. This is one step of trying to reduce the unaccountability from its subscribers particularly^[3] the spreading of harmful information generated by anonymous and faceless individuals. 

Way forward – to regulate or not to regulate

Most people agree that social media needs to be regulated particularly as cases involving fake media, defamation of characters, deep fakes continue to rise.  However, there is an equal measure of skepticism on whether governments will be fair in implementing laws that govern social media.  Concerns are that governments have always acted harsh in dealing with freedom of expression in the region.  The common reaction whenever governments are faced with challenges from the media has been to restrict internet and social media.  They have done this notwithstanding the negative impact associated with social media restrictions and suppression of internet.  There are various schools of thoughts on how government must deal with the negative impact of social media in the society.  One school of thought favors self-regulation, in other words social media users devising ways and means of ensuring that individual rights are protected and ensuring the introduction of ethics governing social media, including implementing punitive measures against those violating basic rights of groups and individuals.   The proponents of this school of thought, most of whom are young, argue that self - regulation will ensure that the trappings of establishing laws “about us without us” is avoided.  Secondly, because social media involves largely young people, it is therefore logical that they must be involved in the establishment of laws governing social media.  It is an argument that has gained traction especially after the interview of Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg by the US congressional panel in 2018.  Notwithstanding the preparedness of the congressional panel, mostly middle aged; the quality of questions by the panel demonstrated the lack of understanding of how social media works. 

However, self-regulation could also prove problematic in the long run.  Self - regulation could promote self-interests and further perpetuate cultures that are harmful to society and state.   Although self-regulation could prevent the repeat of past arbitrary actions by governments on media including shutting down the internet and restricting the use of the internet.   However, there is always a risk of “tragedy of the commons” when individuals push their interests over those of others.  Tragedy of the commons refers to a situation where a group of people with access to a ^[4]platform or resource, unhampered by regulations to that resource or platform end up causing depletion or harm to the resource or platform due to their unregulated self-interest.   Unfortunately such attitude in the long term, destroy the environment that made them successful in the first place.  Interestingly self-regulation works best when the is a threat of government to regulate (5).  The other school of thought suggests an intervention by independent parties, preferably with proper understanding of laws of the country, to draft regulations that will govern social media.  Over an above the understanding of the law, these individuals must be active on social media.

It can be concluded from above paragraphs therefore that regulating the social media by governments and self-regulation by social media actors pose unique additional challenges.  Social media actors face the possibility of tragedy of the commons whilst government could be prone to restricting the internet and suppress individuals’ rights and freedoms.  Independent groups or judges on the other hand could likely represent what is best for the society and could issue judgements fit to the size of violations.  Moreover, as civil legal actions increase against those violating rights on the social media; judges could be best positioned to apply appropriate just laws.  Alternatively, there could perhaps be a hybrid solution involving all actors on social media, including governments, civil society and independent groups such as judges.

Social media - bridging the communication gap between governments and citizens

Notwithstanding the regular pull and push between social media users and governments; social media has enabled a new engaging environment in the Gulf.  In the past, governments used media platforms as their own tools of propaganda.  The instantaneousness of social media in responding to messaging from its users has enabled a new communication environment.   Social media is bridging the communication gap between civil society and governments allowing an environment where government communicate directly with social media users.   Social media users are no longer just consumers of information as it has been in the past with other media, they are also producing information often back to governments for consumption.  Consequently, governments can measure public responses immediately on economy and socio-political matters.  ^[5]

Importantly, there has been an increased number of politicians and governments in the region who are using social media platforms to improve their own personal brands as stated earlier.  This has largely helped to debunk certain held beliefs about these leaders and their governments.  Middle Eastern regimes are aggressive users of social media. They exploit these platforms against their enemies and rivals targeting dissidents, spreading disinformation, and otherwise trying to embarrass and weaken one another.(6).  Qatar’s attitude towards the social media on the other hand has facilitated a social media friendly environment, which assisted Qatar against the bad publicity towards the beginning and during the FIFA World Cup.  The strong army of social media subscribers in Qatar were largely effective, they did pushback the negative commentary.  There were 2.95 million social media users in Qatar in January 2022. The number of social media users in Qatar at the start of 2022 was equivalent to 99.8 percent of the total population (7).  The case of Qatar demonstrates very important development in the evolution of social media and its impact in the domestic affairs of states. 

Furthermore, in a conservative society such as the Gulf where families of politicians particularly women where hardly seen in public, social media has changing certain culture.  Politicians are now posting pictures of themselves and their families adding a soft human touch to their personal images.  Social media has become common place where pictures of smiling, casually attired politicians with families are posted for public to view and comment. This was never the case.  Some governments in the Gulf are using social media to enhance their political statures over and above personal branding.  In Qatar social media played a key role in promoting solidarity with the state and enhancing the image of the Emir.  In one of the first incidences in regional politics where social media nearly caused a regional war, fake news were paddled about Qatar pushing the region to the brink of war.  In May 2017, the Qatari News Agency was allegedly hacked and comments posted in which Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani appeared to praise Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Israel (8).  What followed were several posts on social media condemning Qatar and a sizeable interaction inside Qatar defending the state.  The emergence of Tamim almajd or Tamim the Glorious, became a symbol of resistance in Qatar in favor of the Emir.  It was a form of personal branding which produced great unintended result for the Emir and state of Qatar.  Tamim almajd is an art depicting the face of the Emir which was widely distribution on social media.  It was created by a Qatari artist Ahmed al Maadheed days after the blockade started.  Copies of the portrait were subsequently pasted on cars, buildings, buses and clothing regalia.  Tamim almajd was very impactful during one of its most difficult times in the history of the country.  Importantly, it also communicated the level of support the Emir enjoyed inside the country from both the citizens of Qatar and expats living in the country some of whom originated from the blockading nations.  Tamim almajd also emboldened the leadership in Qatar, it was the gauge of support for the government of Qatar and indeed utilized to communicate a message to the adversaries of Qatar inside and abroad (9). 

 

Weaponization of the social media and its impact on domestic affairs of states

However, social media has also become a weapon to those seeking to create political instability and inflict harm on others.  The manipulation of information, images and videos have led to political instabilities and at times led countries to the brink of war as mentioned earlier.  Former US President Donald Trump has decried fake news, however in 2020 he found himself s^[6]paddling fake news to advance his own political agenda.  Spreading fake news to his supporters on the validity of 2020 national elections has altered politics in the US.  On January 06, 2021, thousands of pro-Trump supporters stormed the US Capitol seeking to harm and forcibly remove members of the Senate and the House from their positions.  They were also screaming hate speech intending to harm the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and former Vice President Mike Pence. 

There are millions of posts on social media every day that are intended to cause harm on individuals, governments and organisations.  The weaponization of social media is progressing to use other tools which never existed before involving people and robots, also known as Bots.  Bots have become the biggest actors on social media, they are used by groups, individuals and largely governments against other states and political dissidents.  The high usage of social media in the Gulf has also led to the proliferation of bots.  Every time users of social media click like, follow or add any emoji to posts on the web and social media, a digital footprint is left behind.  Digital footprint enables computational propaganda, a technology that leverages your online activities combined with the power of big data, supercomputing and artificial intelligence. Automated bots that make hyper-fast calculations deliver targeted misinformation to people who are inclined to believe it and spread it across communities.(10)  Using Artificial Intelligence (AI), messages are then converted repeatedly based on how that messages has been used or what task it has been performing.  Accordingly, computational propaganda and social media manipulation usage has increased by 150% in recent times. 

There is also a rise of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, although largely practiced by China; more and more governments are adopting and using this form of social media warfare against dissidents and critics.  The term was coined from the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2.   Wolf warrior diplomacy is known to be combative and often defensive, using confrontational and combative methods on social media to counter criticism and at times violence against those disagreeing with government policies.  The Key Board Army is perhaps the most widely used method in the social media by groups, individuals and governments for all sorts of campaigns including active peddling of lies and fake news.  As the name suggests, these are groups of individual who are paid to use the internet and social media to advance a certain agenda.  The other method which has seen the been used to weaponise social media has been troll farms.  Troll farms sometimes referred to as Troll factories are paid group of trolls which are used to influence certain political opinions, Russia has been accused of being the founder of Troll Farms.  Trolls are persons who instigate conflict deliberately in order to further a certain purpose online and on the social media.  The Gulf has become the centre place in which all these tactics on social media are utilised against individuals, groups and governments.  The high level of youth population on social media and the wide spread of these practices has led to heightened levels of obliviousness by perpetrators.  People actually do not know the difference anymore and simply do not think of the impact of what they post, if it bleeds it must be forwarded irrespective of facts and truth behind it.

Does social media advance democratic principles in the Gulf?^[7]

One of the main tenets of democracy is freedom of expression, the ability for the citizens to exercise their right to free speech.  Mass media communication particular print media and electronic media have been used traditionally to advance freedom of expression in the region, albeit with a level of control and censorship by governments.  Government used different forms of restrictions to suppress freedom of expression particularly media accreditation for media organisations and journalists.  Media accreditation is one form of restriction that has been used by governments to restrict the movement of journalists and free speech.  There have been many instances in the past where journalists were accused of violation of laws as a pretext to strip them of their accreditation subsequently preventing them from carrying out their work.  Although media accreditation still exists including when journalists cover conferences and special events; social media reporting has enabled journalists to bypass media accreditation requirements.  Anyone can now report and broadcast from anywhere without following the requirements accreditation.  This has undoubtedly helped has helped to promote freedom of action in the region.

Second, the proliferation of social media platforms that are free of charge have helped in advancing freedom of expression and democratic principles.  Facebook for an example has enabled millions of people across the globe to publish their own stories in their own languages.  Social media has not only promoted freedom of speech around the world, but it has also increased the level of literacy.  A study by the Canadian Paediatric Society revealed that 20% of adolescents would never read a book- fiction, non-fiction or otherwise, but almost 50% will frequently read blogs. But, a blog however is a quick fix of literary indulgence, think of it as fast food for bookworms. Either way, the results are undeniable (11). 

However, the fact that most social media platforms are owned and controlled by US based companies continue to raise concerns especially on matters of personal data storage.  The US’s monopoly of social media presents a high threat of manipulation of personal data.  Countries such as China continue to raise question around US’s bona fides in protecting personal data of individuals.  On the other hand, the US has had similar concerns with China as well.   Congressional critics argue that the Chinese government can use TikTok to get Americans’ personal data.  That is because Beijing introduced a law a few years ago that requires all Chinese companies to co-operate with its security forces (12).  Moreover, the fact that owners of these platforms could singularly restrict access and decide who participates in their platforms in a whim also remains a great concern.  The suspension of the social media accounts of Trump by US owned companies is one case in point that has triggered a debate about the independence of social media platforms and their monopoly. ^[8]    On 08 January 2022 following the storming of the congress by Trump’s supporters, Twitter permanently barred Donald Trump from its service “due to the risk of further incitement of violence,” effectively cutting him off from his favourite megaphone. (13).  The banning of Trump by Twitter and Facebook also highlights the trappings of information centralism and dissemination.  Power, control and censorship of the media has simply moved from state to few powerful individuals.  Elon Musk, the owner and CEO of Twitter, Mark Zuckerberg and others have unprecedented powers, not only in terms of wealth but also in determining and controlling freedom of expression of individuals.

How has Gulf states benefited from their interaction on social media?

Paragraphs above briefly discuss how politicians and government institutions are growingly using social media for communication, branding, marketing and spinning.  Global pressures from various fronts for governments in the Middle East to democratize has led to lax attitude by governments toward social media.  What this has also done in some countries is that it has turned social media into propaganda tools for governments.

The Prime Minister and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Prince Mohammed bin Salman for an example has been very active on social media.  MBS, as he is known, continues to battle negative image in the region and abroad following the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey in 2018.  Almost all reports that have been produce in this regard have blame MBS of ordering the murder of Khashoggi.  MBS has consequently upped his presence on social media, particularly on Facebook and on Instagram.  As early as his teenage years, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was an obsessive social media user. He was especially drawn to Twitter, the Saudis’ go-to platform and one they have long preferred over Facebook. (14).  These posts are not coincidental, they are meant to portray a different side of MBS.  The objective of increased presence of MBS on social media it to push back the bad publicity and introduce a different MBS, not a murderer as most social media post portrays him.  Qatar’s Emir, Sheik Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, has also upped his presence on social media.  Like MBS, bin Hamad has been posting pictures showing him attired casually sometimes with his children.  These posts are also meant to communicate a certain type of messaging particularly to his young followers in the region.  Moreover, family members of leading politicians and rulers of the Gulf are also on social media as already stated, competing for space and attention with ordinary citizens.  The advent of social media has eroded exclusivity of the media, it has provided a platform for everyone to have a voice and to be seen.  It has become a digital wallpaper to be seen, importantly it has allowed politicians to craft their own personas different to that which traditional domestic and international media portrayed over the years. 

Having said that, social media is also increasingly used by governments to monitor people’s movements and activities.  Gulf countries have the largest users of Twitter and other social media platforms majority of whom are young.  Therefore, in countries such as Saudi Arabia, where the median age is about 29 years old, controlling social media is a very high stakes affair (15).  Social media is being used by governments as an early alert system; rumblings of civil unrest and political dissatisfactions are now detected in the social media platforms.

Summary  ^[9]

The jury is still out on how states should deal with social media, however the political experiences and public opinion in the Gulf supports efforts by governments to embrace social media.  Social media has enabled engagements and has bridged the gap between governments and citizens.  The Gulf has the world’s highest youth populations, more than 33% of the GCC population is under 25 years old, the majority of whom are on social media.  Moreover, the GCC also has one of the largest smart mobile phone distributions in the word.  Access to mobile phones has therefore made access to the internet and social media easy, pushing most to subscribe to various social media platforms. This has tremendously shaped the manner youth in the region communicate, not only with each other, but also with society in general and with their governments. (16).

However, the political attitude of Gulf states towards content distributed and freedoms on social media been differential.  Qatar and Saudi Arabia are amongst the highest-ranking countries in the world in terms of social media subscribers and yet they continue to deal differently with freedoms on social media.  Whilst they both have allowed its proliferation; they have embraced different political attitude towards its freedom. 

There have been hundreds of cases of citizens jailed and punished for social media posts that governments deem wrong and/or harmful to the state.  Governments also continue to clampdown on social media users whenever there are political domestic issues.  Criticism of the war on Yemen which involved countries in the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) hardened member country’s’ attitudes towards social media.  The war in Yemen has been one of the most detrimental for the image of the GCC in the social media particularly the image of Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist based in Turkey, further hardened the attitude against Saudi Arabia on social media in the region and around the world.  The backlash against MBS has been huge.  The President of the US Joe Biden went to an extend vowing to “make Saudi Arabia a pariah” state after that incident.  During a Democratic debate in November 2019 Biden said “  I would make it very clear we were not going to in fact sell more weapons to them,” Biden said. “We were going to in fact make them pay the price, and make them in fact the pariah that they are.”(17) .  Subsequently, when he visited attended the GCC summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia he did not shake the hand of MBS instead he gave him a fist bump, a sign of irreconcilable differences.  Saudi Arabia has since gone on a charm offensive as stated in the previous paragraphs in terms of presenting a different image of itself and that of MBS on social media.  The country has organised several entertainment functions including musical concerts in Riyadh and plans to organise more.  Music events in Saudi Arabia will rise by up to 600 per cent from 2019, according to the kingdom’s Assistant Minister for Tourism, Princess Haifa bint Mohammed al Saud (18).  The promotion of these events has been widely reported on social media and the government has used the exposure to advance its own political objectives and to present Saudi Arabia as a modern society. 

The government of the UAE has also intensified its engagement on social media.  Like other countries in the region, the UAE has used its presence on social media to strengthen and improve personal brands of its leadership.  When the court in London found Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai to have been responsible for the abduction and forced return of two of his daughters Sheikha Shamsa and Sheikha Latifa; the government resorted to social media for damage control.  There have since been several posts from bin Maktoum mingling with his girl children on social media.  Again, these are meant to present a different image of bin Maktoum.

In conclusion, social media has become part and parcel of domestic politics of countries in the region.  It is encouraging that; most countries have allocated space for social media within their governments.  Large contingent of social media personnel forms part of marketing and communications departments of all governments in the region. 

Finally, social media interference into affairs of states is inevitable.  Gulf countries must be prepared for its continuation.  Governments in the Gulf must work with the global community as efforts begin of putting systems and user-friendly regulations begin.  They must be part of the discussion and solution in this regard.  Unilateral and out of sync with reality reactions regarding social media regulation could backlash and further isolate the region.  The region is known as one of the worse places in the world for freedom of expression, constructive engagement on social media regulations could be one positive step towards changing that image.  ^[10]

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The African continent comprises of 54 countries, each of which has its own politics, economic and foreign policy. However, slow economic growth and weak governance have compelled African countries to combine their collective powers in dealings with the developed world. As the African Union (AU) has been very effective in coordinating the sociopolitical and economic needs of the continent it has been used as a vehicle to promote the continent’s interests with the rest of the world.  The unfortunate consequence of this is that most countries continue to approach dealing with Africa as if dealing with a single entity. They have therefore developed straitjacket economic and political approaches to African dealings, despite African nations’ different levels of political and economic development. This is evident from the many country-specific economic conferences that have taken place with Africa over the years, including the India-Africa Forum Summit, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the Turkey Africa Summit.  Notwithstanding the benefits of the AU bloc dealings with the world on behalf of African countries, some African countries, particularly those with relatively strong political and economic infrastructure, have begun to express disapproval of such an approach. South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria, among others, have been encouraging increased individual economic initiatives. This has resulted in several beneficial visits from developed nations. For example, a recent visit by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to South Africa, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo, during which several bilateral agreements were concluded, demonstrated clear recognition of these countries beyond their participation in the AU.

Although there has been some shift in the tendency of developed countries to view Africa as a homogenous entity, this has not been the case with Iran.  Iran’s perception of Africa, which approaches the continent as a collective entity, with two distinct regions, namely North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, rather than a collection of different countries, has long been evident.  Iran-Africa relations are further complicated by Iran’s perceptions of North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Like many countries, Iran tends to distinguish between North Africa, which it views as Muslim and primarily Arab, and sub-Saharan Africa, which it views as largely black and underdeveloped. This perception has led to the execution of a one-size-fits-all approach when it comes to economic and political dealings with sub-Saharan Africa. Although Iran has experienced relative economic and political success in some countries in Africa, particularly South Africa, its engagements with many west and east African countries have stagnated.

This chapter will examine Iran’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and consider the opportunities and challenges of Iran’s foreign policy engagement with the continent.  This  report will examine Africa’s foreign relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran after December 1979. It will argue that varying socio-political and economic interventions by different presidents of Iran towards Africa have led to political inconsistencies that have largely failed to yield results.  This chapter will also look at external factors that continue to impede Iran’s foreign policy engagement in Africa including sanctions by western nations, the roles of Saudi Arabia and Israel in Africa, Shia expansionism and general perceptions of Iran in Africa.

Finally, it will argue that Iran’s success in Africa is largely dependent on the success of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement that was reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU) on the Iranian nuclear programme.

Towards understanding Iran’s foreign policy in Africa

Iran’s foreign policy towards Africa has been heavily influenced by respective Iranian leaders. Before the revolution, Iran’s foreign policy towards Africa was consistent.  For example, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, enjoyed good relations with Africa, particularly apartheid South Africa.  Iran cancelled its relationship with South Africa after the Iranian revolution and only renewing relations with the sub-Saharan African nation after South Africa’s new democratic government was installed in 1994.  According to Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, in his article Iran scramble for sub-Saharan Africa “Iranian policy toward sub-Saharan Africa under the Shah focused mainly on South Africa along with Ethiopia and Somalia in the horn of Africa”.  However, post revolution, despite established, government-agreed foreign policies for various African countries, almost all post revolution Iranian presidents have applied different foreign relations and politics in Africa, throwing Iran-Africa relations into chaos.  

President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was one of the first post revolution president to visit Africa.  However his visit to Africa was not part of Iran’s foreign policy nor was it intended to pursue meaningful relations with Africa, it was  unplanned and reactionary. They came as Iran’s ties with Europe deteriorated following the Mykonos affair involving the assassination of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Germany^[i](1).  This was perhaps the first indication of political miscalculation, opportunism and undermining of Africa by foreign policy of Iran.

^[1]

To determine whether political and economic relations between Iran and Africa were always as haphazard, it is necessary to consider the history of Iran-Africa engagement.  Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the leader of Iran before the revolution in 1979, undertook an extensive project to modernise Iran in the 1950s. This modernisation angered many Iranians who disapproved of the extravagant spending of state resources amid widespread poverty. Large parts of spending also went towards modernisation of the army which.  Pahlavi also used those funds to murder more than 50 000 people.  This number  is based on estimates of the dead quickly buried after street massacres and compiled throughout the year. (2) The opposition against Pahlavi and his family intensified and led to his eventual deposition in 1979. When the United States (US) gave Pahlavi and his family refuge, the subsequent storming of the US Embassy in Tehran resulted in a refugee crisis involving 52 US citizens and diplomats. On 2 November 1979 the Iranian college students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line stormed the US embassy in Tehran and took hostages. It was the start of hostilities between Iran and the US that have yet to heal. Iran’s troubled relationship with the US spilled over to Africa affecting Iran’s relationship with the continent. While Pahlavi had enjoyed a good relationship with Africa, particularly apartheid South Africa, most African countries gave in to US pressure and rescinded their political and economic relationships with Iran.

Iran has yet to successfully revive its relationship with Africa equal to that which it had during the tenure of Pahlavi.  However, various presidents of Iran have been showing signs of reengaging Africa, albeit opportunistically. In 2010 Iran organised the Iran-Africa summit to discuss economic and political partnerships between itself and the continent. It used the summit to claim consensus amongst African nations’ regarding Iran, even though the nations attending that conference were second- and third-tier African nations with limited influence in the AU and with other African nations. Iran has continued this strategy in its attempts to re-engage with Africa, most recently under the current President of Iran, Ebrahim Raisi. Since taking office he has engaged with Mozambique, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau, rather than countries in the Horn Africa which are regarded strategic. 

Despite having an observer status in the AU, Iran has not taken advantage of that status to advance meaningful relationships with African countries as other observer-status countries have done. Iran’s nemesis Israel, which was recently admitted to the AU, has taken full advantage of this status within the union, going so far as to use its position to lobby African nations against Iran.   Saudi Arabia, another of Iran’s rivals in Africa, has also intensified efforts to improve relations with Africa going so far as to create a dedicated post within its cabinet to promote Saudi Arabia-Africa relations.

In 2018, the former Saudi Ambassador to Egypt, Ahmed Kattan, was granted the post of Minister of State for African Affairs of the kingdom and became responsible for coordinating Saudi diplomatic efforts on the continent.  Iran’s relationship with Africa was further complicated by attacks on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in January 2016. Protesters in Tehran attacked and burned the embassy following the killing of 47 activists in Saudi Arabia including a prominent Shia cleric, Nimr al Nimr, who was critical of the Kingdom’s treatment of its Shia minority. The attack led to the expulsion of the Iranian Embassy from Saudi Arabia. Several African nations also withdrew their ambassadors in solidarity with Saudi Arabia including Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti. The fallout from this event is that Iran has struggled to regain its former position in some parts of Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa.

Iran’s success stories in Africa

First, South Africa has been one of Iran’s staunchest African supporters going so far as to support Iran’s right to continue its nuclear program for peaceful purposes. South Africa’s relationship with Iran, as already mentioned above, can be traced back to the apartheid era. In fact, in 1941 when former Iranian Shah Ali Reza Pahlavi was forced by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 to abdicate, he was exiled in South Africa. He remained in South Africa until he died in 1944. After the toppling of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979, Iran rescinded its relationship with South Africa. When South Africa gained its freedom in ^[2]1994, Iran was among the first countries to recognize South Africa and restored full diplomatic relations. Trade has been an integral element of this relationship, with Iranian officials estimating the value of Iranian foreign direct investment in South Africa in 2018 at roughly $135 billion (3). Moreover, sizeable number of South Africa’s refineries were Iranian designed largely dependent on Iran’s technical capability. South Africa has been importing up to 30% of its energy imports from Iran before sanctions. Lessening its dependence on Iranian oil took very serious consideration for South Africa.  However, as the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has continued over the years, South Africa has strengthened its relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has invested in a multi-billion-dollar oil refinery on the southeast coast of South Africa, an investment that will translate into thousands of jobs.  Saudi Arabia has undertaken ^[3]to build the $18-billion,  300 000-barrel-per-day refinery, which will supply as much as half of South Africa’s needs, by 2028 (4) The investment is likely to strengthen South Africa’s increasing preference for trade with Saudi Arabia over Iran.  However, besides oil importation from Iran, South Africa is one of the big players in Iranian telecommunications. South Africa telecommunication giant MTN has a huge market share in that country.  MTN Holdings owns 49% stake in the Iran cell consortium while Kowsar Sign Paniz holds 51%.  Irancell is amongst the top 50 largest companies in Iran.  

Second, Iran’s involvement in Nigeria and influence in Nigeria’s Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) led by Ibraheem El-Zakzaky also remains one of the most notable and troubling influences in Africa.  It is regarded as one of the greatest challenge for Nigeria outside Boko Haram. IMN leader Zakzaky studied in Iran and is inspired by the politics of the Iranian revolution.  He seeks to replace the Nigerian government with an Islamist state similar to the clerical regime in Tehran (5) The rise and actions of the IMN have also increased the interests of Saudi Arabia in Nigeria and the continent, as efforts to counter Shia expansionism continue. 

As Saudi Arabia concentrates its relations with East Africa, this has left a vacuum for Iran to challenge the Sunni hegemony in West Africa using the influence of leaders such as Zakzaky.

 Zakzaky is providing Tehran with the ability to disrupt key Sunni states in the region, as well as ensuring the creation and development of valuable proxy groups (6)

Third, Iran has always maintained good relations with Senegal, one of the African countries with a high rate of Iranian trade and investments, it has also intensified investment in Senegal over the years. In 2008 car maker Iran Khodro announced plans to assemble cars in Senegal through a local joint venture Seniran Auto, which is 60% Iranian owned (7). In February 2021, President Rouhani told the Senegalese ambassador to Iran in Tehran that Senegal could be a major country in Africa and that Iran could use the country as a gateway to build its relationships with other African nations.

 

Iran’s differential foreign policy – Relations with Africa under Ahmadinejad ^[4]

The Ahmadinejad presidency was arguably the administration that reset Iran-Africa relations. Ahmadinejad is regarded as the first president of Iran post the revolution to have invested time reviving relations between Iran and African nations. The previous President, Mohammad Khatami, who had grown critical of Iran’s neglect of Africa, only visited Africa towards the end of his tenure.  He visited Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Mali, Benin, Zimbabwe, and Uganda in 2005. However, the eight African nation tour came too late in his tenure to revive relationships.  In addition, falling oil prices had already led to the closure of a number of Iran’s embassies in Africa during Khatami’s tenure in office (8). Therefore besides the intent, his presidency failed to resuscitate the relationship.  Ahmadinejad on the other hand kick-started better relations with Africa by inviting African countries into bilateral discussions. The first meeting between Ahmadinejad and African nations was during the AU meeting in Banjul, Gambia in 2006.  He helped to facilitate the growth of the Iranian Red Crescent Society, the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation clinics and other medical programmes across the continent (9).  At the time of the AU conference in Banjul, oil prices were relatively high, enabling Ahmadinejad to engage in a charm offensive.

Iran’s interest in Africa, much like that of its nemesis Israel, is largely about securing multilateral support for Iran in its continued opposition battles, such as that of its stance on Israel. Although Ahmadinejad’s advances in Africa had re-opened engagement to some extent, his statement a year earlier about “wiping Israel off the map” presented obstacles for Iran in Africa as Israel intensified its campaign to isolate Iran.

Ahmadinejad made the statement in 2005 during the World Without Zionism conference in Iran. The statement has become shorthand for Iran's belligerent - some would say genocidal - posture toward Israel (10)

 Following that statement, Israel and the US began exerting pressure on African countries to cease relations with Iran. This was a turning point in Iran’s relations with the world and remains a justification for the continued isolation of Iran till today by both Israel and the US. It is also partly what has led to a consensus on Iran as a threat to the region between Saudi Arabia and Israel.  They have subsequently increased calls for further sanctions against Iran. Thus, while Ahmadinejad did open dialogue with Africa and remains perhaps the only post revolution Iranian president to have done so, his statement on Israel was devastating to Iran’s relationship with Africa and indeed the world.

Rouhani’s JCPOA focus ^[5]

Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president from 2013 to 2021, spent most of his tenure working towards the success of the JCPOA. The 2015 JCPOA agreement presented a window of opportunity for Iran to rejoin the international community. However, the agreement collapsed in 2016 following US President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the agreement. His decision to pull out of the JCPOA was influenced by several factors. First, the desire to reverse President Obama’s achievements. He also felt pressure from Israel. Afterall, his son-in-law and Middle East special advisor Jared Kushner is a Jew and a friend of Israeli former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with very close ties to Israel.  Moreover, Trump felt pressure from the Saudis, in particular Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who rejected the JCPOA arguing, like Israel that a financially empowered Iran is dangerous to the region. Despite the collapse of the JCPOA, Iran did take advantage of the relief on sanctions the agreement had afforded and improved its relations with Africa in a very short space of time. By the time Trump pulled out of the deal and sanctions were reimposed, Iran had crisscrossed Africa multiple times to strike barter deals, circumventing US restrictions on banking transactions.  (11).  By 2018, Iran had doubled its trade with the continent of Africa to $1.7billion.  While Iranian embassies continued with their efforts to promote Iranian culture and Shia expansionism activities in countries such as Nigeria; Iran, under the leadership of President Rouhani, did not hold any meaningful meetings with heads of state from any African countries beyond coincidental meetings at the United Nations General Assembly.

^[6]

Rouhani was essentially elected to clean up the political mess left behind by President Ahmadinejad, in particular the backlash that was caused by the devastating statement on Israel. Rouhani, together with his foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Rouhani pushed a very aggressive foreign policy with western countries.

There was a level of optimism in Iran as JCPOA negotiations continued, with many Iranians believing that the easing of sanctions that had affected the country’s economy and politics would have a positive impact on the country. However, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 spoilt Iran’s prospects. The tenure of Rouhani, which had set about remedying Iran’s relations with Africa and reviving its economy, was rendered irrelevant by the election of Trump. Iran suddenly found itself sidelined in international news. If it was in the news at all, it was for wrong reasons, such as its support of the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Bashar al Assad in Syria. Africa took an even more peripheral position in Iran’s prioritization of external engagements except occasional visits to Iran by second-tier politicians, particularly those politicians with personal business interests in that country.  

What is at stake as Iran recalibrates its relations with Africa?  

President Ebrahim Raisi seems set to push ahead with the JCPOA. At the same time there are indications that he will also focus on improving relations with Africa. Since the beginning of his presidency, Raisi has called for increasing cooperation with Africa and has recognised the significance of natural resources in Africa and how Iran’s skills in developing and doing business with Africa, particularly Mozambique as it begins the process of gas explorations in its shores.

However, the war in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions instituted against Russia are likely to influence Iran’s progress in Africa.  Moreover, as Russia intensifies formation of alliances to counter US and Western hegemony in the world; Iran is likely to join that alliance.  Importantly, Iran might join Russia in its underground tactics to circumvent sanctions. If indeed Iran decides to fall for Russia’s political charm offensive, it may still fail to capture hearts and minds in Africa.

Regarding the JCPOA negotiations, the process is too advanced to be jeopardised at this stage.  Nonetheless, Iran will be wary of US’s commitment considering that when the new president assumed power in 2016, he annulled those commitments. Moreover, Iran has indicated intentions to join BRICS, this if realized, could be an important step towards re-establishing relations with Africa.  South Africa is currently the only African nation to form part of BRICS, it could be soon joined by other African countries.  Accordingly, BRICS could be a strategic platform at which Iran could calibrate its relationship with Africa.  According to BRICS International Forum President Purnima Anand, Egypt has also indicated its intention to join BRICS.  BRICS group of nations have indicated that they would like to expand the bloc to include more countries. Expansion of BRICS is likely to alter the attitude and image of Iran and interaction between Iran and African countries increases.

Furthermore, Iran’s success in Africa will largely depend on its economic interventions, politics alone will yield little results. However, it is unlikely that Iran will make any inroads in Africa while sanctions remain in place. Therefore, successful JCPOA is key as it looks at improving relations with Africa. It is therefore probable that Iran could adopt a parallel approach as opportunities present themselves, both approaches could impact positively on Iran-Africa relations.  First it will certainly entertain opportunities presented by BRICS and Russia respectively.  It might also want to join China and other nations in countering Western and US hegemony in Africa.  Second, it will continue engaging JCPOA and hope that it succeeds in order to continue facilitating it political and economic recalibration in Africa.

Ultimately, Raisi is likely to invest further in public diplomacy in Africa through the increased number of Iranian embassies that were recently opened.  However, he will face additional impediments in his efforts to improve relations with Africa especially as countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia continue to push back Iran’s influence in the continent. Israel’s continued efforts to establish relations with Africa pose a renewed challenge for Iran. Israel has established a reciprocal relationship with Africa largely relying on Africa’s multilateral platform support in return for providing essential technology, particularly water-related technology, as well as other much-needed material support for African countries. Israel exports chemical products, machinery and agricultural technology, being one of the leading exporters in this regard.  This has attracted many students from Africa to Israel to acquire new knowledge and skills.  Saudi Arabia on the other hand continue to make substantial investment in Africa particularly in South Africa.

 

The future of Africa Iran Relations

Israel has continued to use Ahmadinejad’s statement that Israel “should be wiped off the map” to justify why the world should still isolate Iran notwithstanding subsequent spin by the Iranians that the statement was taken out of context.  Furthermore, although Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and meant to augment its energy needs; the country has failed to convince the world of its intentions. Saudi Arabia has argued that Iran will use its new economic gains to continue creating instability in the region, particularly by support political and militant organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi movement in Yemen. These two stumbling blocks will continue impeding foreign relations between Iran and Africa.  Iran continues to display confidence despite biting sanctions; however, it is desperate to have sanctions lifted and successful JCPOA is the only way out.

^[7]

Despite criticism and sanctions, Iran continues to support groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and promote expansionism of Shia as a desirable dominant politics in the world .(12).  This attitude, combined with Iran’s track record of supporting radicalism and encouragement of undiplomatic actions, including storming of nations’ embassies in Tehran, has raised serious concerns of whether Iran could be trusted.

Moreover, the promotion of Iranian cultural activities and Shia Islam expansionism, particularly in countries with Shia presence is also another concern for African countries. The ^[8]Iranian revolution emboldened Iran to engage in “construction and development crusade” (jihad-e-sāzandegi) projects in Africa.  Consequently, African countries such as Nigeria remain particularly disconcerted about the prospects of a financially viable Iran in Africa.  

While such concerns are valid, a financially empowered Iran could have significant benefits for Africa as well. The lifting of sanctions could enable Iran to establish new oil import corridors, particularly with African countries along the Indian Ocean.  Iran is positioned on the Persian Gulf which has a much easier access to the Indian Ocean.  This could reduce oil prices across Africa.  Iran could also play an important role in Mozambique as the country begin its gas exploration in its northern provinces.   President Raisi met with Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi during the sixth Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Doha, Qatar recently. Raisi said that Iran is ready to expand trade and economic cooperation with African states, especially Mozambique, and share experiences and technical know-how with these countries (13). Both countries could benefit greatly from Mozambique’s gas exploration projects, especially if Iran is allowed to participate in the development of bulk infrastructure in Mozambique, a technical area which Iran has immense experience. Such cooperative efforts could establish Mozambique as a likely avenue for Iran’s reengagement with Africa.

Having said that, other Africa has seen huge traffic of countries lining for its resources including Gulf countries investing heavily in the Horn of Africa. Introducing another global player into the African political scene could further complicate the continent’s political playing fields.

Conclusion^[9]

The political tenure of President Ahmadinejad may have had its shortcomings, but Ahmadinejad was the first Iranian president to demonstrate real interest in meaningful engagement with Africa.  His tenure culminated into meetings with African leaders, summits and conferences.  Ahmadinejad sponsored several conferences between Iran and Africa, of which the two-day Iran-Africa summit in 2010 was perhaps the most important indication of his strategic interest in Africa as it brought together heads of state, diplomats, business leaders, and cultural representatives from over 40 African nations to discuss a plethora of issues and subsequent Iranian presidents demonstrated comparatively little interest in Africa accounting for Iran’s historically limited interactions in Africa.  Additionally, to a general lack of interest from Iranian leaders, the success of Iran’s engagements in Africa has been influenced by its dealings in the Arab world particularly in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and others. The continuing support of what a^[ii]re deemed to be terrorist organisations in these countries has not eased Iran’s efforts in Africa. Saudi Arabia, which conflicts with Houthi-backed Iran in Yemen, continues to use its influence to block Iran from thriving in Africa. It has used Iran’s support of these organisations as a warning to African countries considering improving relations with Iran. If these inducements are not enough, the occasional friction between the government of Nigeria and the IMN in Kaduna state is yet another reminder why normalising and improving relations with Iran could pose a risk for African countries. As developed nations, including Israel, Turkey, the US, Saudi Arabia and others continue to dominate politics in Africa, it will take a great deal of effort for the proliferation of Iran’s foreign policy in Africa, irrespective of the renewed efforts of its current president, to thrive in Africa.

^[10]

If Africa continues to be affected by Islamic terrorism and Iran is perceived to be a sponsor of that terrorism, African countries are likely to be skeptical in dealing with Iran, particularly those countries that are home to Muslim minorities. Moreover, African countries have strong and deep relationships with Western countries, they are also addicted to western goods and services, this reality could certainly hamper Iran’s efforts in trying to revive relations with the continent.  Moreover sanctions against Iran are likely to continue preventing Africans from openly engaging with Iran.

In conclusion, besides bilateral relations Iran enjoys with several countries; sanctions continue to prevent the country from competing for global economic opportunities.  Successful JCPOA could be a game changer for Iran in Africa notwithstanding other challenges mentioned above.  In the absence of a successful JCPOA, sanctions will continue to affect Iran’s ability to deal openly in business and interact politically with Africa. Second, the success of its foreign policy in Africa will also depend largely on how it deals with negative public perception as the main exporter of terrorism and global instability. It would also have to demonstrate that it does not intend to promote or support organisations that have propensity to destabilize Africa.  Shia expansionism in Africa continue to send the wrong messages about Iran’s intention in the continent. The bombing of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran has been bad for Iran’s political prospects in Africa. Third, Israel and Saudi Arabia has taken every opportunity to isolate Iran and emphasize the possible risks of an empowered Iran in Africa. Saudi Arabia’s investment in a refinery in South Africa is likely to entrench its position and influence in Africa and could weaken ties between South Africa and Iran.  

Finally, Iran has a mountain to climb in recalibrating relations with Africa.  It will have to prioritize it public diplomacy efforts. Continuing with its Shia expansionist projects will likely backlash.  The country must relook at its general communications strategies in Africa. Importantly it must drop its hyper religious and Iranian culture specific public diplomacy efforts in Africa if it is to succeed.

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Pham, J. Peter, Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, accessed January, 26, 2023 (8)

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The relationship between Qatar and Afghanistan started in earnest around 2009 amid suggestions that Taliban leaders should relocate to a country from which to engage in peace negotiations.  The Taliban's preferred venue was Qatar because they considered it a neutral location. They see Qatar as a country that has balanced relations with all sides and has a prestigious status in the Islamic world. (1) This view of Qatar emerges from the country’s work over the years both to modernise its society and to embrace politics that differ from its neighbours. Qatar has welcomed a number of dissident organisations, among them Hamas and a large contingent of Muslim Brotherhood members.

The Taliban also approved of Qatar’s interpretation of Islam. Like its neighbour Saudi Arabia, Qatar adheres to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, a conservative understanding close to the Deobandi interpretation of Islam followed by the Taliban. Strict Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam are heathens and enemies. Critics say that Wahhabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to extremists such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. (2)

Though 2009 was a watershed year, the Taliban and Qatar enjoyed cordial relations from the 1980s. Qatar was among the Gulf countries that provided the financial wherewithal for the US to support the mujahideen guerrillas against the Soviets from 1980 until the latter withdrew in 1989.(3)  The relationship went deeper: thousands of Gulf Arabs went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets – but often could not return home because their own countries feared they now held “jihadist” ideals. So, many settled in Afghanistan and joined the Taliban; others were recruited by at the time new Islamist extremist organisations like al-Qaeda.

Fast forward to 2013, when the Taliban opened offices on the outskirts of Doha. Its move to Qatar was not well received by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of whom bid to host the Taliban’s offices in their respective capitals.  Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE felt short changed by the Taliban given that both countries were in the forefront in supporting the Taliban during the civil war in that country and assisted in the push back of the Soviets in the 1990’s.  Qatar’s political fortunes benefited hugely from the Taliban’s arrival. It was given the opportunity to feature on various international stages on all matters involving Afghani politics. The tiny state with an ambitious foreign policy started engaging with various countries around the world; diplomats from around the globe flocked to Qatar.  It wasn’t all good news: relations between Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia deteriorated.

This chapter will explore the historical and current relationship between the Taliban and the state of Qatar. It will consider how Qatar has become a mediator in regional disputes and has juggled a number of contradictory relationships.  The chapter will also detail various stages and challenges of the negotiations process which eventually led to the Taliban retaking Afghanistan in August 2021. It will conclude by looking at the political and diplomatic benefits Qatar received as a result of its persistence and pragmatic foreign policy in Afghanistan.

Historical relations

When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996 only Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Pakistan recognised its government.  The Taliban has been fighting various factions in Afghanistan during a civil war in that country following the fall of the Soviet backed government in 1992.  The Taliban was and still is regarded by most countries across the world as a terrorist organisation. Therefore few countries were willing to recognise the Taliban when it finally managed to take power.  The Taliban’s reputation as a terrorist organisation was further cemented when the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan after terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001.  The refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden let to the invasion of Afghanistan by the US and its allies and the ousting of the Taliban government in December 2001.   Osama bin laden is regarded as the mastermind behind the attacks of 11 September 2001.  He was killed on 02 May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Following the invasion some leaders of the Taliban were arrested and sent to the US’s detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Other leaders of the Taliban were scattered around the region, particularly in Pakistan. Some went to the Gulf countries as labourers, including to Qatar. Many, however, decided to stay in Afghanistan and waged a war against the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces. The election of Barack Obama as US President in 2008 accelerated the US’s withdrawal from Afghanistan; although Obama temporarily increased the number of US troops in Afghanistan, he remained committed to a complete withdrawal by the end of 2014. In 2011, the US began the process of pulling its troops out of Afghanistan. This strategy was coupled with plans to gradually hand over security responsibilities to the Afghan military and police.

The US and its allies were concerned about leaving a vacuum in Afghanistan; they feared doing so could once again lead to war. Negotiation with the Taliban was therefore crucial. In June 2011 Obama confirmed that the US was holding preliminary peace talks with Taliban leaders. A friendly venue was crucial – one the US and its allies could visit without attracting attention and one that could guarantee security, comfort and proper infrastructure. Qatar was to be that country: in January 2012, the Taliban struck a deal to open an office in Doha.

It wasn’t all smooth sailing. The Taliban had its own flag and preferred to refer to its offices as the Embassy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Afghani President Hamid Karzai objected to the office’s existence and its given name. Eventually the Taliban was forced to remove the flag from its office along with the plaque inscribed with the unpopular name.

 

A political opportunity

Qatar foreign policy is very ambitious and at best keen on promoting peaceful mediation and resolution to conflicts.  Qatar’s offer to host the office of the Taliban went beyond its foreign policy primary aims and objectives. For one, it noticed how Egypt and Jordan gained political leverage for their mediating roles in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Arguably, Egypt and Jordan would have not ordinarily gained the political leverage and reputation as serious political players were it not for their mediation efforts in the Middle East.  Qatar wanted to achieve similar leverage.

Importantly, Qatar helped to introduce the leadership of the Taliban to proper politics and certain comforts that accompany political establishment. Consequently, the Taliban in Doha has been criticised for compromising on certain issues – due, critics say, to the comfortable standard of living they enjoy there. Leaders of the Taliban and their family members were accommodated in some of the best hotels in the world, including the Ritz Carlton, St. Regis and the Sheraton in Doha. Over the years, more Taliban leaders have moved to Qatar, among them the former Guantanamo prisoner and Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, who arrived in Qatar with his family in 2011 after his name was removed from the international sanctions list.

2011: a key year

The year 2011 was key in Afghanistan’s political contemporary history.  Ten years on after the devastating attacks of 11September 2011; the US and its allies in Afghanistan were not making meaningful progress in fighting the Taliban.  Consequently, dozens of countries and organisations involved in Afghanistan met in Bonn, Germany, to devise a roadmap of cooperation that would extend beyond international troops’ withdrawal in 2014.(4)   However for the withdrawal to be successful, it was crucial to get the buy in of the Taliban.  However, key leaders of the Taliban were scattered throughout the region, the US and Afghanistan’s government established a strategy to locate and recruit them to the negotiations.   .

The US agreed that Germany and Qatar would lead the negotiations between the Taliban, the US and the Afghan government. The US also agreed to appoint the former US Ambassador in the United Nations (UN) and Afghani-born diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad as a lead negotiator.

There were two issues on the table when discussions began. The Taliban demanded the release of senior Taliban leaders from Guantanamo Bay; the US, meanwhile, insisted that the Taliban must sever ties with al-Qaeda and release US Army sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.  The immediate breakthrough in negotiations was the release of a group who became known as the Taliban Five: five Afghan detainees at Guantanamo Bay and former high-ranking members of the Taliban government who, after being held since 2002 (indefinitely and without charge) were exchanged in 2014 for Bergdahl. This deal was significant in building confidence in the negotiation process.

Final push

The election of Donald Trump as US President in 2016 changed the situation again.  Although Trump’s tenure started with certain hiccups, which slightly impacted negotiations, it ensured that avoided any decisions that could disturb the negotiations.  For an example; when Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt started a blockade against Qatar, Trump initially criticised Qatar and sided with the blockading nations.  In 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt led a land, sea and air blockade against Qatar.  It was only after the realisation that Qatar was hosting the largest US military base in the region and that Qatar was leading negotiations between Afghanistan government that the he changed his tune regarding the blockade. 

Trump was committed to end the US mission in Afghanistan, however he was frustrated in his efforts particularly by the Afghan government.  He later bypassed the Afghan government to negotiate directly with the Taliban (5).   However the process stalled after the blockading of Qatar   Qatar focused its diplomatic and political efforts on ending the blockade; Afghanistan would have to wait.  However during that time the Taliban was making significant gains in the battlefield in Afghanistan.  Then on 4 January 2021, days before Joe Biden was inaugurated as US President, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt ended the blockade against the state of Qatar without conditions.  Afghanistan once again took centre stage in Qatar’s diplomatic efforts.  Almost immediately, several meetings between the Taliban and the Afghanistan government were reported to have taken place.

By then Trump’s deadline for the US to pull out of Afghanistan was in place. In the negotiations with the Taliban Trump’s administration agreed to free 5,000 imprisoned Taliban soldiers and set 1 May 2021 as the date for final withdrawal.  The US and the Taliban signed a deal which became known as the 2020 Doha Peace Agreement.  Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the founding members of the Taliban leading its representation in Qatar as political chief negotiator led the negotiations and later signed the agreement on behalf of the Taliban. The direct negotiations, which were delayed for months over a prisoner swap proposed in the earlier U.S.-Taliban deal, began after the Afghan government completed the release of five thousand Taliban prisoners. (6). While negotiations were taking place in Doha, the Taliban continued gaining ground in the fight against the Afghan army.  The Taliban eventually entered Kabul on 15 August 2021 taking control of the capital and government.  The US was disappointed and infuriated by the lack of will of the Afghan soldiers in fighting the Taliban as it advanced towards Kabul. Despite money, training and human resources being invested in the army by the US over the years, soldiers put up little resistance.  Hours before the Taliban took power the government had collapsed and President Ashraf Ghani fled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) via Uzbekistan.

The details contained in the 2020 Doha Agreement introduced new reality on the ground.  It also shifted matters on the agenda; negotiations started concentrating on discussions about practical issues i.e. evacuations and safety issues of foreign nationals who were still in Afghanistan.  Qatar’s role also changed. It started immediately providing logistical support and preparing to the political transition in Afghanistan.  Member of the Afghan civil society and government officials were invited to Doha.  Representatives of the Taliban, the Afghan government and civil society met face to face for the first time in Doha, Qatar, after nearly 20 years of war.

Qatar’s diplomatic efforts yield results and acknowledgement

After the collapse of the government in Afghanistan, the situation became very precarious for foreigners in Afghanistan.  Being the only country most Europeans could communicate with, Qatar was pushed to facilitate discussions with the Taliban regarding safety guarantees of foreign personnel remaining in Afghanistan.  It was a difficult task for Qatar; no one could for certain, including the Taliban leadership in Doha, guarantee safety of foreign personnel.  The Doha based Taliban had limited control of their rank-and-file members who entered Kabul.  When the Taliban entered Kabul and declared itself victorious, it was taking commands from the leadership on the ground not from Doha it was later established.  What made matters worse was years of disconnect between the ordinary fighters on the ground in Afghanistan and the leadership in Doha.  The lack of proper communications channels and indeed enabling technology to facilitate communications further exacerbated the challenges.  It was therefore difficult for the Qataris and the Taliban in Doha to provide absolute guarantees.  Notwithstanding, the majority of foreign personnel were given safe passage out of Kabul through the efforts of Qatar.

Qatar assumed an additional role in the negotiation process – and its aftermath – once US troops had been withdrawn from Afghanistan. The chaos that followed the withdrawal, particularly at the Kabul airport as foreign nationals were evacuated, was largely calmed by Qatar’s intervention. Thousands of the evacuees were flown to Qatar from Afghanistan for processing before being taken abroad.  Many Afghans – especially those who worked for foreign governments and institutions – wanted to leave Afghanistan because of the unknown future under the new Taliban government. Qatar’s Al Udeid army base was the first stop for many of those people. Qatar had to navigate a very delicate political process: it had to guarantee the safety of those who were evacuated, work closely with foreign governments before forwarding people to the correct destinations, and consider allowing some Afghans into Qatar.  Qatar and Turkey sent essential personnel into Kabul to manage and run the Kabul International Airport.  Qatar airways is currently the main commercial airline that is doing business in Afghanistan.

Qatar’s role has not been restricted to only transporting people out of Afghanistan into Al Udeid and As Sayliyah military bases. It also performed a critical administrative role of registering all people leaving Afghanistan and creating a database.

Ultimately, Qatar’s foreign policy consistency in Afghanistan was acknowledged by the world.  The US President Biden personally called Qatar’s emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, to thank them.  Biden’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, was quoted by The Economist as saying: “No country has done more than Qatar.”  Qatar was also given an unprecedented role by the US in Kabul after the US withdrawal.  It will, according to Blinken, establish a US interest section in its embassy in Afghanistan to provide some consular services and “monitor the condition and security of U.S. diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan”.  The best accolade for the state of Qatar came on 10 March 2022 when Biden designated Qatar as a major non-NATO ally of the United States. Although Qatar is not the first country to receive such a status, it is significant:  Qatar has carved itself a special place in international diplomacy and mediation. Moreover, the “major non-NATO ally” is important for the security of the state against future aggression from any country in the region and abroad.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Qatar’s involvement in Afghanistan has impacted on its status as an important player in international politics, something it wanted to achieve in the first place.  It has also enable the country to strengthened its relationships with a number of countries around the world.  In the aftermath of the collapse of government in Afghanistan for an example; the foreign minister of the Netherlands, Sigrid Kaag announced that her country was moving its embassy from Afghanistan to Qatar.  Importantly,  Qatar’s involvement in Afghanistan has also presented economic opportunities especially as the country begins to rebuild.  Doha news, Qatar based publication reports that “Afghanistan’s has been struggling with an electricity shortage, with up to 1,600 megawatts  of power needed on an annual basis. The country’s domestic power sources, including hydropower plants, solar panels and fossil fuels, meet around just 22% of the country’s needs.” (7) Consequently, Qatar seem set to assist Afghanistan to meeting its energy needs.  On 12 December 2021 the acting Afghan Minister of Water and Power, Mullah Abdul Latif Mansoor tweeted that “Qatar has set its eyes on investing in Afghanistan’s solar power generation”. 

However, huge expectations still lies ahead for Qatar-Afghan relations as the Taliban continues to battle ultra-conservatism within its ranks.  Whilst there are some within the Taliban who wish to “loosen up”, the majority is still hellbent on preserving the status quo particularly on issues pertaining to women and girls. According to Human Rights Watch “Afghan women and girls are facing both the collapse of their rights and dreams and risks to their basic survival”.  The Taliban seems to have renegaded on its commitments to allow girls to school including women participation in economic activities.  The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has slammed the Taliban’s “broken” promises to Afghan women and girls,  (8) The Taliban is under pressure to provide for its people, however donor countries remain hesitant in providing funds directly to the Taliban given its position on gender issues.  President Joe Biden decided to split the $7bn Afghan’s reserves which have been frozen in US banks to humanitarian organisations instead of releasing the funds directly to the Taliban.  Some of those funds were also allocated to the American victims of terrorism including relatives of 11 September 2022. 

The economic conditions in Afghanistan continue to deteriorate, the political decisions on women and children have not been helpful. These are the main stumbling blocks amongst a plethora of political challenges facing Afghanistan. Many countries and donor agencies have insisted on political transformation in Afghanistan as a conditionality before they could invest in the country.  Qatar’s role in trying to convince the Taliban to embrace a different trajectory towards women and children is key, if it succeeds it could be yet another great diplomatic milestone for the state of Qatar in Afghanistan.

References

• BBC, How Qatar came to host the Taliban, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23007401, 29 April 2022

• PBS Frontline, Analysis Wahhabism, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/wahhabism.html, 29 April 2022
• Gulf International Forum, How Instability in Afghanistan endangers the Gulf, https://gulfif.org/how-instability-in-afghanistan-endangers-the-gulf/, 29 April 2022
• CFR, The US. War in Afghanistan, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan, 29 April 2022
• Ron Elving, NPR, Withdrawing from Afghanistan may be the one thing Biden and Trump agree on, https://www.npr.org/2021/08/18/1028607717/strange-bedfellows-indeed-the-trump-biden-consensus-on-afghanistan, 29 April 2022
• CFR, The US. War in Afghanistan, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan, 29 April 2022
• Asmahan Qarjouli, Doha News, Qatar eyes investments in Afghanistan’s energy sector, https://dohanews.co/qatar-eyes-investments-in-afghanistans-energy-sector-afghan-official/, 29 April 2022
• Al Jazeera, UN Chief slams “broken” Taliban promises made to women and girls, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/11/un-chief-slams-broken-taliban-promises-made-to-women-girls, 29 April 2022

This report forms part of the chapter in a book Evolving situation in Afghanistan international and regional perspective.  The book was commissioned and published by the Centre for Afghanistan Middle East and Africa (CAMEA) and Institute for Security Studies Islamabad (ISSI)

On 24 February 2022 (1), Russia invaded Ukraine. The invasion kick-started a flurry of international political and military conversations and, in April 2022 (2), the United Nations’ General Assembly voted on a resolution to suspend Russia’s participation in the UN Human Rights Council. This, after allegations that Russian forces had committed atrocities against Ukrainian civilians. South Africa abstained. The resolution was ultimately passed.

Since South Africa became a democracy in 1994, it has been a strong proponent of not trying to influence the international affairs of sovereign states and, in line with the principles of the African Union (AU), has adhered to the doctrine of the inviolability of borders. Additionally, the nation has been strongly opposed to regime change imposed on countries by external powers and has encouraged negotiation and dialogue among warring parties to arrive at a settlement. Given this approach, its abstention at the UN seems especially jarring.

This paper will explore South Africa's foreign policy objectives – and the erosion of its foreign policy values, using the invasion of Libya, the annexation of Crimea and the Russia/Ukraine conflict as examples. It will also expand on the country’s UN history and unpack the possible consequences of South Africa’s abstention from the April resolution.

History of South Africa’s foreign policy

Although a Western concept, notions of sovereignty (3) were warmly embraced by the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia following the Second World War and into the 1960s. The African Union’s (AU’s) predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963, adopted principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the inviolability of African borders drawn up by Europeans in 1884 (it would have been too much effort and cause too many ethnic or cultural issues, to redraw Africa’s borders). South Africa’s new democracy upheld the OAU’s values, integrating them into its foreign policy. In 1994 (4), new President Nelson Mandela and the governing African National Congress (ANC) stressed that human rights were their core concern; namely, the economic, political, environmental and social rights of all South Africans. Other principles included respect for international law, the support of disarmament and peace and universality. For the democratic government, liberation from the apartheid regime was, in many ways, a struggle for human rights. So, it would make sense for the new government to covet human rights as a fundamental basis for its emerging foreign policy.

Additionally, South Africa’s new government was eager to join and be active in the international community. The contrast between the apartheid government and the ANC was indicated by foreign representation (5). By 1990 the apartheid government had 30 international missions; by 1996, Mandela’s government had 130 with membership in 45 international organisations. South Africa’s new democratic government gained further prominence by hosting and chairing several international bodies such as the Commonwealth, the World Trade Organization and WAM. However, following spat over human rights with Nigeria, the newly formed democratic government changed gears. South Africa made the harsh misstep of aligning with western values over the African dogma it so proudly preaches. South Africa, under Mandela’s leadership, tried to impose sanctions onto Nigeria in order to quell power from its dictator. Rather than focusing on human rights through the lens of Western acceptability, the ANC government began to focus on conventions specific to context, culture and creed. It didn’t entirely abandon human rights as its core foreign policy concern – rather, it interpreted the principle in terms of good governance and democracy.

SA’s foreign policy (6) in the early to mid-2000s, under then-President Thabo Mbeki’s leadership, prioritised the consolidation of the African agenda, the promotion of South-South cooperation, north-south dialogue and global governance. An important element of Mbeki’s approach to policymaking was explicitly ideological: Africanist, anti-imperialist and democratic. The focus was on indefinite commitments to law and international conduct between states, international peace, internationally agreed-upon conflict resolution and a commitment to Africa’s place in world affairs.

From South Africa’s democratic inception, it faced a major hurdle: idealism. Mandela’s government, initially, appeared to be Africa’s saviour. It was a shining light for political, social and economic achievement. The new government acted as a buffer between the international community and Africa, gaining much praise and applause. Additionally, the state was Africa’s economic powerhouse. In 2004 (7) the nation's GDP was at $228.6 billion versus its closest economic rival Nigeria’s $136.4 billion. Plus, SA under both Mandela’s and Mbeki’s leadership, peacefully negotiated resolutions between conflicting nations, for example between New Zealand and Canada. Democratic SA entered the international community in a blaze of glory; the drawn-out liberation struggle placed great weight on SA’s aspirations for political, economic and social success. And so, having successfully and peacefully navigated its way out of the apartheid regime, the ANC government believed it could successfully – and without reproach – tackle the world's affairs. 

Under President Cyril Ramaphosa, SA’s foreign affair (8) objective structurally, carries the values of the first democratic government but also echoes the Mbeki era’s sentiments. In its five-year plan (9) , the country strives for a united and cohesive continent that works towards shared aspirations of sustainable development and prosperity, enhanced regional trade and relations in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the promotion of peace, stability and security across the continent. It has also committed to using its membership of and engagement in the international community to further Africa’s agenda.

The policy also states, that considering the UN’s near-universal membership and vast agenda, it remains the most important multilateral institution and global governance centre. “As such, engagements with the UN, and active participation in its processes, are of vital importance to South Africa and the advancement of the country’s foreign policy priorities.” (DIRCO, 2022)

South Africa’s UN participation history

South Africa was one of the 51 founding members of the United Nations in 1945 (10). Today the UN has 193 member states.

In 1964 South Africa was suspended from participating in the UN General Assembly because of international opposition to the country’s apartheid policies. It was readmitted when it became a democracy in 1994. Twelve years later it was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time, between 2007-2008; it again attained this status in 2011-2012 and in 2019-2020. In all three instances it received heavy endorsement from SADC and the AU.

But South Africa’s global standing has declined (11). Its reputation as Africa’s economic leader and voice in international affairs, earned through post-apartheid international respect and driven by value-based and innovative foreign policy, has been replaced by a more transactional and tactic driven approach (alliances, power bidding) , sparking first African and now international criticism. 

The annexation of Crimea

Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution (12) ended in late February 2014, with former President Victor Yanukovych fleeing to Kyiv and eventually to Russia. The Rad, Ukraine’s parliament, appointed an acting president and prime minister and made clear its intention to strengthen ties with the European Union (EU) by signing an association agreement with it.

Almost immediately thereafter, armed men began occupying facilities and checkpoints on the Crimean Peninsula. Russian President Vladimir Putin first denied knowing who the men were but later admitted that they came from Russia and commended their commanders. By March, Russian troops had seized the entire peninsula; in March 2018, Crimean and Russian officials signed the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia. President Putin ratified the treaty three days later.

Elements of Russia’s civil society historically align with the progressive anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, strongly opposing Western economic and political imperialism. South Africa had gone so far as to characterise the interim government  (13) in Kyiv as fascist and as a junta, arguing that the West’s support of the Maidan protest was a breach of the non-interference principle. 

South Africa, in determining its response to Crimea, had to consider several issues. Although relations between Russia and SA were not initially a priority for either, this changed when SA joined the then-BRIC bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China). It did not wish to upset its fellow BRICS member, Russia. However, South Africa should have been more forthcoming in condemning Russia for its military actions in Crimea as well as its unilateral changes to the border of a sovereign state. SA’s credibility as an advocate of certain values and processes is eroded by the adoption of equivocal positions. After all, the country's soft power is fashioned on building legitimate and accountable processes for resolving conflict. 

The Libyan evolution

In September 1969 (14), a 27-year-old captain of the Libyan Air Force, Muammar Gaddafi, and his cohorts from the Free Officers Union, successfully staged a military coup, seizing control of Libya from King Idris 1. Gaddafi assumed leadership of the nation as head of the Revolutionary Command Council, which was composed of his fellow military officers. Qaddafi shifted the nation's political and economic power from the Sanusi (the former royal empire) base in Cyrenaica to the east, to Tripolitania in the northwest.

Then came February 2011 (15) and a spate of protests that precipitated the Libyan revolution, many of them beginning in Benghazi, Cyrenaica’s unofficial capital before spreading to surrounding areas. 17 February became known as the Day of Rage: it officially signified a turning point for Gaddafi’s regime and the revolution. Initial military attempts to defuse the situation were non-lethal; soon, though, live ammunition was fired into the crowds, killing more than 150 civilians (16) over the three days that followed. Gaddafi’s forces seized control of Benghazi by 22 February but lost most of Cyrenaica to rebel forces. By mid-March, an authorised international intervention order by the UNSC Resolution 1973 limited the state to a no-fly zone and allowed the use of “by all means necessary” to protect civilians and civilian populated areas.

The UNSC resolution 1973 created the legal basis for military intervention in the first Libyan War. The resolution demanded an immediate ceasefire and authorised a no-fly zone over the nation. Although the resolution was proposed by the UK, France and Lebanon, it was voted in the affirmative by ten other states, including South Africa (17). However, following the approval of the NATO force's intervention in the region, South Africa – a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council at that stage – backtracked and urged international players to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Libya. This further dented its credibility in the international political arena. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine

On 24 February 2022 (18), Russian President Vladimir Putin unleashed the biggest assault Europe has seen since the Second World War. Putin argued that modern, West-leaning Ukraine was a constant threat, and that Russia could not feel safe, develop or exist in its presence. Putin’s goal was to overrun Ukraine, ending its government and crushing the nation's aspirations of joining the Western defensive alliance, NATO. At the dawn of the invasion, Putin told the Russian people that his goal was to “de-militarise and de-Nazify Ukraine” (19), to protect the people from years of bullying and genocide committed by the Ukrainian government.

Moscow went so far as to allege that Ukraine was building a dirty plutonium-based bomb. However, the tides have turned: while there is no evidence for Russia’s claims about Ukraine, the international community has widely alleged that genocide and human rights violations are occurring in Ukraine at Russian forces’ hands.

Months into the invasion and Putin is aiming for the “liberation of Donbas” (20), Ukraine's eastern region. Despite the Russian force's withdrawal from areas around Kyiv, Putin alleges that Russia has completed the first stage of the invasion. Russia is now focusing on seizing two large regions to the east, creating a land corridor from Crimea to the Russian border. It is unclear if Russia wishes to control the entire southern region of Ukraine’s Black Sea Coast. However, Putin has said he is open to peace talks. 

In early April, the UNGC convened for a resolution to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. South Africa abstained. The resolution, prompted by photos and videos from the Ukrainian suburb of Bucha in Kyiv, which showed hundreds of civilians left dead in the streets or dumped in mass graves following the withdrawal of Russian forces, was passed by 93 UNGA members. SA justified its neutrality – as evidenced by its abstention – by arguing that the resolution was premature.

Xolisa Mabhongo, South Africa’s deputy ambassador to the UN in New York, stressed that SA would maintain its neutral position and would not proclaim Russia the aggressor. The country has also maintained that the resolution does not provide a conducive environment for diplomacy, dialogue or mediation. It does affirm that it is deeply concerned by the escalating violence in Ukraine. This is the same hymn sheet it’s sung from for years: the country does not want to incur the wrath of its fellow BRICS member. It appears South Africa has not learned from the backlash against its stance on the Crimean annexation.

The consequences of South Africa’s abstention

South Africa barely has a leg to stand on. It is evident from the Crimea situation that it will not outwardly cause strife with Russia. The nation has had a turbulent foreign policy history that appears to be recurring. Its foreign policy objective, in essence, is to mediate conflict. However, it has a track record of picking and choosing who is subject to its foreign policy principles. This temperamental and unpredictable approach has cost it international respect in foreign policy circles. If it sticks to this approach, it will certainly lose the confidence of many of its peers in the international arena.

Reference list

• The Visual Journalism Team. 2022. Ukraine war in maps: Tracking the Russian invasion. BBC News (online). Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682 . Accessed: April 19, 2022.

• Fabricius, P. 2022. South Africa abstains from voting on Russia’s UN Human Rights Council suspension. The Daily Maverick (online). Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-04-08-south-africa-abstains-from-voting-on-russias-un-human-rights-council-suspension/ Accessed: April 19, 2022.
• Sidiropoulos, E. 2014. South Africa’s response to the Ukrainian crisis. NOREF (online) Available at: https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/pbei/noref/0031410/f_0031410_25447.pdf Accessed: April 19, 2022.
• Barber, J., 2005. The new South Africa's foreign policy: principles and practice. International Affairs, 81(5), pp.1079-1096.
• Ibid, 5
• The South African Government. 2005. Fundamental Principles and Guidelines for South Africa's Foreign Policy in the Strategic Foreign Policy Document. DIRCO (online). Available at: wdirco.gov.za/docs/2005pq/pq1817.htm Accessed: April 19, 2022.
• Data commons. 2004. South Africa. Data commons: Page explore (online). Available at: https://datacommons.org/place/country/ZAF?utm_medium=explore&mprop=amount&popt=EconomicActivity&cpv=activitySource%2CGrossDomesticProduction&hl=en Accessed: April 19, 2022
• The South African government. 2022. International relations. DIRCO (online). Available at: https://www.gov.za/about-sa/international-relations Accessed: April 19, 2022.
• Ibid, 8
• The South African government. 2021. DIRCO (online). Available at: https://www.southafrica-usa.net/pmun/#:~:text=South%20Africa%20was%20one%20of,to%20the%20policy%20of%20apartheid Accessed: April 20, 2022.
• Bradlow, D., Sidiropoulos, E. 2020. Value, Interests and Power: South African policy in uncertain times. SAIIA (online). Available at: https://saiia.org.za/news/values-interests-and-power-south-african-foreign-policy-in-uncertain-times/ Accessed: April 19, 2022.
• Ibid, 3
• Pifer, S. 2020. Crimea: 6 years after illegal annexation. Brookings (online). Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/ Accessed: April 20, 2022.
• Ibid,3
• Bell, Anthony, and David Witter. ROOTS OF REBELLION: PART I. Institute for the Study of War, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07869 . Accessed 21 Apr. 2022.
• Ibid, 14
• Ibid, 14
• Neethling, T. (2012) Reflections on norm dynamics: South African foreign policy and the no-fly zone over Libya, South African Journal of International Affairs, 19:1, 25-42, DOI: 1080/10220461.2012.670381 Accessed: April 20, 22
• Kirby, P. 2022. Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and What does Putin want. BBC (online). Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589 Accessed: April 20, 2022.
• Ibid, 18

 

Introduction

The announcement that a malaria vaccine (1) has been approved for use in children has been met with huge excitement - and a bit of skepticism. In the main, this is a good story for the mother continent, which is, figures remind us, ground zero for malaria, particularly among children. Malaria remains one of the primary causes of childhood illness and death on this continent, killing over 250 000 children and toddlers annually.  The vaccine could also not have come at a better time as a boost to the inoculation debate that’s raging across the planet because of the global Covid-19 vaccination rollout.  When the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommended the widespread use of the malaria vaccine known as RTS,S, its head, Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, described this as a long awaited “breakthrough”.  He said: “This is a historic moment. The long-awaited malaria vaccine for children is a breakthrough for science, child health and malaria control. Using this vaccine on top of existing tools to prevent malaria could save tens of thousands of young lives each year.”   Amid the jubilation, though, questions are being asked about why it took so long to reach this point. Dr Matshidiso Moeti, the regional director of the WHO in Africa, said: “For centuries, malaria has stalked sub-Saharan Africa, causing immense personal suffering. We have long hoped for an effective malaria vaccine and now for the first time ever, we have such a vaccine recommended for widespread use. Today’s recommendation offers a glimmer of hope for the continent which shoulders the heaviest burden of the disease, and we expect many more African children to be protected from malaria and grow into healthy adults.”   The deadly parasite malaria comes in the main via blood sucking mosquito bites; it destroys white blood cells, reproducing itself as it does so. A multi-pronged approach has been used over the years to prevent the disease from spreading. Bed-nets that protect children from being bitten while they are asleep, and insecticides designed to kill mosquitoes, are among the main prevention strategies.  Despite these efforts, malaria cases remain alarmingly high. WHO stats report 229 million cases annually around the globe – 94% of those in Africa and a worldwide 409 000 death toll per year.

 

The RTS,S vaccine targets Plasmodium falciparum, the deadliest of all malaria-causing parasites (2) and the most prevalent in Africa. The WHO says the RTS,S vaccine will help 4 in 10 cases of malaria and 3 out of 10 in severe cases.  Africans can be proud because the RTS,S vaccine is a result of more than 30 years of research and development by the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) as well as African research centres. The health ministries of Ghana, Kenya and Malawi, where 2,3 million doses have been administered, produced pilot data on the drug’s feasibility, safety and implementation. This was a global collaborative effort by the Vaccine Alliance, Unitaid, Gavi, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provided catalytic funding at the critical late development stage between 2011 and 2015.  WHO will lead the implementation programme together with international partners UNICEF, GSK and the three pilot in-country coordinators. The pharmaceutical giant has already donated more than 10 million doses.  This is all good news, at first glance. But, as we have seen in recent months with Covid-19, the RTS,S rollout comes with its own set of complexities.

Pressure on health systems and budgets?

For instance, for the malaria vaccine to be deemed effective, it requires four doses (3). The first three doses need to be administered a month apart (when babies are 5, 6 and 7 months old); the fourth, a booster, is given at 18 months. This will certainly stretch African countries’ already fragile health systems infrastructure.  And some are already pointed to constrained health budgets, worried that these will make such an extensive rollout difficult.  At a potential cost of about $5 per dose, some researchers suggest the vaccine rollout, including its distribution, would cost around $325 million to administer each year across ten African countries with a high incidence of malaria. They point out that in some of these countries, other malaria measures have faltered because of a lack of support.  A 2019 study concluded that around $630 million would be needed per annum to vaccinate 41 endemic countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 

What are African researchers saying?

At Mali’s university of Bamako, malaria researcher Alassane Dicko said this about a discussion with the country’s health minister soon after the WHO’s announcement regarding the use of RTS,S: “I told her we need to push as a country, at the highest levels of our government, to make this vaccine available at an affordable cost as soon as possible,” he said.  But not all the continent’s researchers are convinced.  Badara Cisse, a researcher from the Institute for Health Research and Epidemiological Surveillance and Training in Senegal’s capital Dakar, expressed his concerns: “I respect the researchers involved with this massive effort, but the reality is that so much money has been poured into this vaccine, even when the results from studies are disappointing.”  Also, in Cisse’s corner is a Ugandan epidemiologist at the Malaria Consortium in London, James Tibenderana. He said that the RTS,S vaccine could be impactful in some regions, but stressed the need for extensive mass communication campaigns, to prevent misinformation (4)from hindering the rollout.  “People will wonder why a 30-year-old, partially effective vaccine is suddenly being introduced during a pandemic…. and targeted only at Africans.”  Tibenderana warned: “The misinformation around Covid-19 vaccines should teach us that we can’t take community trust for granted.”  However, he did acknowledge that in light of the devastation caused by Covid-19, “it’s uplifting to see some positive news”.  Dr. Dorcas Wilson (5), a paediatric neurologist based in Johannesburg, South Africa, has seen children, mostly younger than five, suffering from cerebral malaria. She told Africa Asia Dialogues it is imperative that critical care reaches those who need it the most in the shortest possible time frames. That may mean vaccines need to be produced locally here in Africa.  She said: “We welcome this breakthrough but in order for it to have a high impact on the ground, where most of these children are presenting in under-resourced hospitals, we may reach a stage, quite like the Covid-19 vaccine now being produced locally in Africa, also for the malaria vaccine production line to get closer to the people it is meant to serve.”

Conclusion

Fit for all?

The WHO itself has been criticised for taking a “one size fits all” approach.  In a blog, the Center for Global Development (CGD) (6) said the WHO “should avoid issuing a sweeping global recommendation and encourage instead national and subnational assessments to inform decision-making processes”.  “In short, any WHO policy recommendation concerning the implementation of new interventions for the prevention and treatment of malaria should consider value for money and sustainable financing as well as encourage countries to still conduct their own assessments and decide for themselves what is best for their populations. The best way to make progress is with firm, locally led steps,” the independent research and analysis centre added.

Better days ahead

Having suffered from the deadly disease myself, when I was bitten by a determined mosquito in South Sudan (pre-secession) and ended up in hospital for a couple of weeks with high fever and debilitating body aches, I can safely say this is a step in the right direction. However, as outlined above, there are many hurdles to overcome even at this euphoric moment. There are other vaccines that are still in pilot stage, like the Oxford vaccine (7) which is being piloted in Burkina Faso. Initial reports said it has a 73% efficacy, but a lot more work still needs to be done.

References

1. https://www.who.int/news/item/06-10-2021-who-recommends-groundbreaking-malaria-vaccine-for-children-at-risk

2. https://cgdev.org/blog/malaria-vaccine-WHO-three-key-considerations-wider-use

3. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-58810551

4. https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cvenzmgylxwt/malaria

5. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02755-5

6. https://www.malariavaccine.org/

7. https://www.medicalnetwork.co.za/Profile/39457/Dr-Dorcas-Wilson

 

About the Author

Milton Nkosi Milton Nkosi is a chairman of MMN International Consulting, specialising in media, advisory and reputation. He is the former  BBC News Africa Bureaux Chief and South Asia Bureaux Editor. He served as a trustee on the board of Warwick University's Warwick in Africa Programme.