Un análisis completo a los top salones de juego en línea de España

Los casinos en línea gozan de mucha fama en el presente. Muchos de ellos no solo brindan tragamonedas y juegos de tablero, incluso usan tecnología de transmisión de alta resolución para emitir a los usuarios juegos populares como el 21 o el póquer. 

Las partidas se transmiten en tiempo real e incluso se llevan a cabo en salas de juego equipadas para dar a los jugadores una experiencia de juego única y auténtica. 

Este nivel de profesionalismo explica en parte la fama de los modernos clubes de juego entre los jugadores en España. Cada día, los analistas de https://znaki.fm/es/casinos/, askgamblers.com y Casino.org monitorizan todas las novedades del sector y escriben reseñas detalladas para dar contenido útil tanto a los usuarios como a los futuros jugadores, con la esperanza de que la participación en el juego resulte favorable.

Una recopilación de los mejores casinos online de territorio español con el analista Alfredo Álvarez.

El grupo de Znaki.FM, dirigido por el editor en jefe Alfredo Álvarez, analiza los casinos online a diario en lugar de mostrarte algo que quizás no sea la opción ideal.

Todos los casinos de la clasificación de los Top Casinos Españoles ha sido valorado en profundidad según elementos como la seguridad, la variedad de juegos, las promociones y recompensas, las opciones de pago, el servicio al usuario y más detalles.

Es bien sabido lo crucial que es la seguridad y la reputación al elegir una plataforma de juegos online en territorio español. Por eso, las plataformas de juego en España que figuran en el listado cuentan con regulación y certificados por entidades reguladoras de prestigio, garantizando una experiencia de juego justa y transparente. Los casinos en línea en España son visitados bastantes jugadores de México, Estados Unidos, Argentina. En 2024, los casinos en línea de España destacan por su seguridad. La plataforma en las plataformas de apuestas es de primer nivel.

El sitio evalúa esta información:

  • a gusto con los datos;
  • estudio de distintos juegos;
  • multifuncionalidad del recurso;

Confiabilidad en los casinos virtuales de España

El equipo de https://znaki.fm/es/ es un comparador de casinos online en territorio español independiente, abierto y seguro. Los profesionales entienden la importancia de proporcionar a sus lectores las mejores opciones de juego online, por lo que eligen meticulosamente los top casinos de España en 2024.

Tal como sucede en otros países, hay en España casinos virtuales de alta gama. Por supuesto, como en cualquier sitio, existen portales con contenido menos atractivo, así como portales que, en consecuencia, no han pasado la pericia del embajador Alfredo Álvarez.

Cabe resaltar que los top casinos virtuales del país en 2024 se han destacado debido a su oferta en dispositivos móviles. Prácticamente todos los casinos online según los rankings de 2024 cuentan con una versión local para apostar en Android o iOS.

¿Cómo optar por el mejor casino para españoles?

Inscribirse en un casino puede implicar riesgos si desconocen las normas que se aplican para analizar la seguridad y calidad del sitio. Este pasaje abordará las estrategias empleadas por los analistas para localizar y prevenir los casinos de baja fiabilidad.

Es importante considerar que las promociones en los portales de apuestas tienen una relevancia considerable. Generalmente, ponga atención al bono de bienvenida y al bono sin depósito.

Al decidir sobre un casino virtual asegúrese la existencia de una licencia DGOJ. Podrá consultar más información sobre este tema en nuestra plataforma.

Lea las recomendaciones

Cuando busque un buen sitio, primero debería obtener una visión general de qué incluye la industria del juego online. Aunque la oferta de sitios de juego crece y evoluciona constantemente, en cuanto a los grandes casinos aún no hay tantas opciones.

Cada plataforma de juegos online incluye algunas opiniones. Puede conocerlas a través de varios expertos, entre ellos Alfredo Álvarez.

Autorización

Cada plataforma de apuestas destacada debe tener licencia expedida por un organismo del mundo del juego, lo que es un indicio claro de que la plataforma está regulada. Lo más recomendable en este sentido es una certificación otorgada por una entidad europea, como la UKGC (United Kingdom Gambling Commission).

Por otro lado, hay casinos online que poseen licencia en países offshore. Dichos portales obtienen licencias de Curaçao o de la MGA (Autoridad de Juegos de Malta). España dispone de una entidad encargada de regular la calidad de los casinos y facultada para emitir licencias de apuestas: la Dirección General de Regulación del Juego.

Es importante que recuerde que si juega en casinos sin licencia, corre un gran riesgo, porque si hay algún problema no tendrá a nadie que defienda sus intereses. Las leyes no le favorecerán, y arriesga perder mucho dinero.

Seguridad

La protección y la seguridad van de la mano en el mundo de los casinos virtuales. Como apostador, merece un entorno de juego confiable y seguro. Aquí presentamos algunos puntos importantes para medir la seguridad de un casino online en España:

Distintos modos de pago. Un sitio de apuestas seguro colabora con sistemas de pago fiables, lo que demuestra su adhesión a la normativa vigente así como la claridad de sus operaciones financieras.

Cifrado SSL: este certificado garantiza la protección de sus datos mientras juega en línea. La mayoría de los sitios que requieren transacciones financieras cuentan con sistemas para impedir que terceros accedan a datos confidenciales.

Software de juego aprobado. Certificadoras como eCOGRA aseguran la integridad de los juegos. Un casino que ofrece y utiliza software de casino certificado ha pasado varias pruebas de integridad.

Las críticas de casinos en línea son relevantes para los jugadores de competiciones. Este es un aspecto que no debe ignorar.

Las legislaciones nacionales también juegan un papel importante. En materia de seguridad, la Ley 13/2011 es la relevante en España, del 27 de mayo, sobre la regulación del juego. Las reglas del juego empezaron a aplicarse en 2011 en España.

Selección de juegos de los casinos online en España

El secreto para obtener dinero real en los casinos en línea es utilizar estrategias inteligentes: opte por los juegos con mejores pagos, sepa bien las reglas y gestione su bankroll con eficacia.

Las mejores plataformas de juegos en línea en España tienen una rica oferta de juegos, con juegos de mesa como blackjack o ruleta, junto a slots virtuales y juegos con crupieres en vivo. Si bien muchos casinos online tienen juegos parecidos, la calidad de los mismos depende de sus asociaciones con distintos proveedores.

Los portales de apuestas de más alta calidad en España suelen estar afiliados a diferentes proveedores de juegos, lo cual les da acceso a una gran variedad de juegos de alta calidad. A continuación algunos de los proveedores más reconocidos por la calidad y seguridad de sus juegos:

  • Net Entertainment - el principal creador de tragaperras online;
  • Microgaming Corp - especializado en juegos de tragamonedas;
  • Playtech PLC - especializado en juegos de mesa como blackjack;
  • Evolution Gaming Ltd - el líder de plataformas de juego en vivo;
  • Play'n GO - gráficos avanzados en slots;
  • Pragmatic Play Software - popular compañía desarrolladora de tragaperras.

Estos variados fabricantes son celebrados por su original creación de juegos y su notable índice de ganancia al jugador (RTP), que ofrece a los jugadores una excelente posibilidad de ganar. Sumado a esto, muchos desarrolladores presentan premios progresivos. De este modo, elegir un local de apuestas que colabore con los top fabricantes del nicho garantiza no únicamente un entretenimiento de alto nivel, sino que también juegos honestos.

No se olvide evaluar su temple en establecimientos de juego locales de buena fama. Dentro de ellos se sitúa el Casino Sardinero. Se considera que es de una marca de apuestas regional valorada en todo Europa. Indudablemente, se considera como particularmente notoria en España.

Observemos en este punto los distintos tipos de actividades y los superiores sitios de juego que los proporcionan.

Las máquinas tragamonedas se sitúan entre los tipos de juego más conocidos de los locales de apuestas digitales por su gama y facilidad de diversión. Los más destacados sitios virtuales proporcionan una amplia gama de tragaperras con variados temas, premios progresivos y atractivas incentivos.

Formato móvil de los casinos españoles en línea

¿Te preguntas si puedes participar en directo en su dispositivo móvil y ni en su equipo - PC de Windows o Mac OS? La indicación es clara: correcto, puede. La ventaja de los juegos de apuestas es que se puede conectarte a tales juegos a mediante su móvil, realmente, en cualquier sitio y en cualquier momento. Los desarrollos en tecnología de los últimos tiempos han posibilitado a los clientes experimentar de los juegos en pantallas pequeñas y llevables. Los locales de apuestas online no son una anomalía, y la gran parte de los gestores proporcionan ahora una plataforma móvil plenamente adaptada con artículos compactos como móviles y pantallas tablet. Los participantes no son atados a sus ordenadores. Hoy en día tienen la posibilidad de experimentar de la misma vivencia de juego mientras conducen al oficina, esperan en el consultorio o en cualquier lugar. Todo requieres es una red a la red de alta velocidad y elegir su actividad de predilección.

Transacciones veloces en los superiores locales de apuestas virtuales de la nación española

Al decidir sobre un sitio de juego digital, la velocidad del pago es un factor crucial a consideración. En el momento en que que haya sus beneficios, es completamente normal https://znaki.fm/es/casinos/ que busque disfrutarlas lo más velozmente posible.

Sin embargo, los periodos de abono son susceptibles de en función de diversos aspectos, como la rapidez de manejo de abonos del sitio de juego y el sistema de abono que elija para sumar y cobrar. Por ello es fundamental decidir un modalidad de cobro que sea eficaz y, preferiblemente, un sitio de juego que promueva las retiradas eficientes. A continuación se presentan algunos de los tipos de abono más eficaces para los clientes de España:

  • Teleingreso;
  • PayPal;
  • Paysafecard;
  • Skrill;
  • Neteller.

Teleingreso.com es el dominante absoluto en el ámbito de modalidades de abono de salas de juego digitales en el territorio español. Debido a esto, su participación en los top rangos de la lista tiene lógica a la hora de considerar los mejores sitios en línea en en lo que respecta a formas de remuneración.

Bonificaciones en los casinos de territorio español

Algo que semeja a los casinos españoles a sus concurrentes tradicionales es que brindan incentivos extremadamente interesantes para utilizar en cada uno los títulos del repertorio, algo sumamente importante para los jugadores que desean potenciar su fuerza financiero en el lugar.

Los casinos habitualmente ofrecer a los jugadores en la modalidad de promociones, giros sin costo o descuentos en su primero abono, y en ocasiones también en algunos de los subsiguientes. La naturaleza de las ofertas cambia de un lugar a otro, por lo que es arduo explicarlas con fidelidad.

Varios clubes brindan bonos sin requerir ingreso para que los jugadores tengan la oportunidad de testear los títulos sin comprometer su individual capital. La restitución de recursos efectivo es otra manera común de bonificación que actúa como una modalidad de garantía, devolviendo un fracción de las derrotas soportadas por el jugador.

Para solicitar su recompensa, simplemente tiene que apuntarse abriendo una inscripción de plataforma y, normalmente, efectuar un abono. Allí se le entregará de forma automática su promoción de introducción, a habitualmente posteriormente a su primero depósito.

¿Es posible ganar dinero real en los casinos en online?

Sin duda, las mayores recompensas aguardan a los participantes en Yocasino y en Playuzu. Por esta razón muchos jugadores https://znaki.fm/es/casinos/ eligen estos casinos de diversión. Podrá localizar más noticias al respecto a esto en la aplicación Facebook.

Conseguir fondos efectivo en los establecimientos en línea no es confirmado, pero la forma de participar puede afectar a tus chances de lograr. Estos son algunos sugerencias que le colaborarán a mejorar su trayectoria de juego en los plataformas en línea.

Elija los juegos adecuados. Los casinos en internet disponibilizan muchos productos, pero no cada juego tienen las similar probabilidades de conseguir. Los juegos de tablero, como el veintiuno, el baccarat y la ruleta, habitualmente tener más chances de lograr, mientras que las máquinas brindan mayores beneficios potenciales, pero con una posibilidad inferior de lograr.

Opte por ofertas con demandas de participación bajos o sin especificaciones de inversión. Este modelo de incentivo le proporciona una chance más práctica de convertir su recompensa en ganancias efectivas.

Observe en cuenta el índice de retorno de cada producto, ya que señala las chances de conseguir en ciertos títulos.

Juegue en establecimientos que obtenido una licencia de azar de organizaciones de prestigio. No se olvide atender atención a las centros que colaboran a luchar contra la dependencia. Entre ellas existen las Centros CITA.

Medite en el juego no como una modalidad de conseguir dinero, sino como un hobby. Conozca que antes de iniciar a jugar, debe reconocer el principio de que tiene la posibilidad de salir en negativo.

Decida establecimientos que se cumplan a las reglas y fundamentos del azar ético. En tales establecimientos, podrá vivir tranquilo y, en supuesto de que quiera ayuda, el casino le ofrecerá opciones inmediatas. Detalles fresca a julio de 2024.

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China, Russia and the US’s top officials scramble for appointments with Africa

The Brief No. 41

23 January 2023

Last week the new Foreign Minister of China, Qin Gang made his first international tour as the foreign minister to Africa.  The visit was significant, it was symbolic in a way; it emphasized China’s foreign policy priorities. 

This week two very senior officials from Russia and the US will be in Africa almost the same time.  The US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen kicked started her visit in Senegal on Saturday.  Her visit comes to as Biden’s administration continues to advance its charm offensive in Africa. 

Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of Russia will also be in Africa this week, his second tour since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.  He is likely going to try to convince Africa why Russia went to war.  The destruction the war is causing in Ukraine, mayhem and human suffering is negatively impacting Africa’s opinion of Russia’s involvement in the war.  Lavrov is also likely to provide certain guarantees to Africa including uninterrupted food supply particularly grain and energy supply. 

What are other reasons behind these visits?

  • For China and Russia, these tours are part of a recruitment drive for more African countries to join BRICS ahead of the BRICS Summit in South Africa later this year.
  • To intensify efforts to influence AU’s foreign policy consensus as US pushes ahead with its invigorated foreign policy in Africa. President Joe Biden has proposed that the AU becomes a permanent member of the G20.
  • The visits also mark a new scramble by China, Russia and the US as the competition development alternative energy infrastructure in Africa begins. Africa, led by South Africa, has committed to transition to clean energy harnessing its fast natural energy resources in this regard.
  • Afrasid is available for analysis and commentary.

www.afrasid.org

War In ukraine
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War in Ukraine, Putin High Alerts Russian Nuclear Forces

The Brief, No 19

28 February 2022

President Putin puts Russia’s military on a nuclear high alert.  This means that Mr. Putin is putting Russia’s nuclear forces, those trained to execute nuclear war, on a standby.

The latest announcement by Mr. Putin is concerning and could lead to his demise.  This announcement also presents new scenarios moving forward:

  • The seriousness of this announcement is likely to trigger secret discussions between concerned military top brass from both NATO and Russia. They are likely to establish private discussions to prevent a global disaster.
  • There is likely to be senior military defections from the Russian army, particularly as the demise of Mr. Putin becomes more apparent.
  • There is likely to be an “Intra Russian revolution” led by the Russian elite as their wealth dwindle in front of their eyes.
  • The next coming days will see more tightening of sanctions and further isolation of Russia particularly Mr. Putin and his cronies.
  • Protests are likely to grow to other parts of Moscow as more countries and international organisations isolate Mr. Putin and allies.

Afrasid believes Mr. Putin would not give up easily however is likely to vacate the Presidency. 

 

  • US, NATO and the EU will not allow Putin back into power, the decision to invade Ukraine will be used as a pretext. The will therefore continue to put pressure on Mr. putin even if if he decides to negotiate.
  • We are likely to see military defections of Russian top brass soon. Russian soldiers are likely to abandon posts subsequently particularly as orders get intercepted.
  • Cyber-attacks on Russian institutions are likely to increase from activists and hackers around the world
  • Sustained protests are likely to ensue in Russia in the next weeks, particularly as economic situation continue to deteriorate.

Afrasid available for analysis and commentary.

www.afrasid.org

Iran is under siege, and has a growing concern about the enemy within

Iran is under siege, and has a growing concern about the enemy within

A number of people have been arrested in Iran over the years accused of spying against the government. Last year, the authorities arrested five Iranians on charges of spying for Israel, Britain and Germany. They were convicted and at least two were given prison sentences. In July 2017, the authorities rounded up seventeen of its citizens and charged them with spying for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Accusations of espionage have also been levelled at many Iranians in the diaspora, especially journalists and charity workers.

 

British-Iranian charity worker Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, for example, was first jailed in Tehran in 2016 accused of spying against Iran. She has always denied the charges. Nevertheless, she has just been sentenced to a further year in prison plus a one-year travel ban after being found guilty of producing propaganda against the regime in Tehran.

 

There has been widespread criticism of Iran for targeting journalists and charity workers; Tehran is said to be paranoid. However, Iran's nuclear development programme has been a singular concern and is the reason for this paranoia, as it has come under a lot of pressure to end its nuclear programme, mainly from Israel and the US, which argue that a nuclear Iran will pose a security threat to the occupation state.

 

In the recent past, Arab countries including Saudi Arabia have joined the call for Iran to drop its nuclear plans. The Saudis insist that any renegotiated nuclear deal with Iran must be "stronger and longer" than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in order to ensure that "Iran is prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons or developing the necessary capabilities." Iran insists that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only to augment its existing energy production.

 

 

As a result, Iran's sovereignty has been violated frequently over the past couple of years, mainly, it is believed, by Israel. In August last year, for example, it is generally held that Israeli agents shot and killed Abu Muhammad Al-Masri in Tehran. Although Iranian officials claim that this was at the behest of the US, no one — not the US, Israel nor Al-Qaeda — has claimed responsibility publicly. This was one of many incidents involving foreign powers operating inside Iran.

 

However, it was the January 2020 killing of one of Iran's highest-ranking officials, General Qassem Soleimani, which indicated that all was not well with the country's preparedness when dealing with espionage. The head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' elite Quds Force was killed in a US drone strike near Baghdad International Airport in Iraq. This led to a huge outpouring of anger on the streets of Tehran, with many calls for revenge and retaliation. The then US President, Donald Trump, claimed responsibility for killing Soleimani. Israel apparently provided technical assistance and intelligence. According to the Iranian Justice Ministry, a man identified as Mahmoud MM passed on information about Soleimani's whereabouts to the CIA and Israel's Mossad in return for money. The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) says that he will soon be executed.

 

Israel has since upped the ante on its clandestine missions inside Iran. The nuclear facilities in Natanz were sabotaged earlier this month. According to Israel's Channel 13, a bomb went off at 4 am on Sunday, 11 April, when some 1,000 workers were in the area. Explosives were reported to have been placed near the main electricity line at Natanz before they were detonated. Israel has neither acknowledged nor denied its involvement but officials are known to have boasted about it, and Israel remains determined to violate Iranian sovereignty and sabotage its nuclear programme.

 

Moreover, it is clear that there are people within Iran ready and willing to work with foreign powers against their own government. The majority of incidents in Iran must have had the involvement of Iranians working on behalf of foreign powers. Although Israel would not have been able to carry out the Natanz attack without inside help, little is known about those who might have provided it.

 

The seriousness of the Natanz bombing has led to calls for an overhaul of the entire vetting system for personnel at all sensitive installations in Iran. More stringent vetting procedures are unlikely to discourage potential collaborators, though, unless the dire economic situation and sanctions are addressed. The economic conditions mean that Iranians are ready to work against the state in return for cash.

 

The current talks in Vienna aimed at reviving the JCPOA are important for Iran, as they could lead to the easing of sanctions and the desperate economic situation. Nevertheless, the proliferation of democratic movements and those calling for reforms inside Iran cannot be ruled out when looking for those behind the increase in espionage against the state. It is becoming increasingly obvious that as long as the government and authorities in Tehran insist on maintaining the socio-political status quo, the willingness of Iranians to collaborate with foreign powers is going to increase.

 

Thembisa Fakude | Senior Researcher and Director Afrasid

Thembisa holds Masters degree in Politics. He is a columnist with the Middle East Monitor in London. He is a research fellow at Al Sharq Forum in Istanbul, Turkey. He serves on the board of Common Action Forum in Madrid, Spain and on the board of Mail and Guardian publication in South Africa. He is the former Bureau Chief of Al Jazeera Media Network for Arabic and English Channels in Southern Africa

 

 

Towards understanding the insugency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
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Towards understanding the insugency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique

ABSTRACT

Since the October 2017 attacks by alleged Islamist insurgents- commonly referred to as Ahlu Sunnah Wa-al-Jama and locally know as Al Shabab- on Mocimboa da Praia, it has not been entirely clear who the attackers were, what their strategic objectives are, and on whose domestic and international support they rely. Today, almost everyone is aware of who these people are: the disgruntled youth of Cabo Delgado, who are demanding a slice of the resources that are found in abundance in their region. This paper, grounded in a historical understanding of conflict in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, seeks to identify possible stakeholders and scenarios in what we no longer see as an insurgency, but a war. This study will also seek to highlight the drivers of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, and attempt to answer the following questions: what does a peaceful intervention by the African Union (AU) look like? what must it avoid as a block to achieve normalisation and stability?  

 

Introduction

The attacks by the so called “Islamist terrorists” have been happening at a critical juncture in Mozambique’s history. In August 2019, a peace agreement, the third, between the Government and the Renamo opposition was signed by President Filipe Nyusi and the Renamo leader Ossufo Momade (1). Complementing a decentralisation reform through a change in the Constitution, with a focus on provincial governments, the agreement focusses on the “Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration” (DDR) of more than 5,000 Renamo soldiers – an ongoing process which commenced very slowly and exclude a section of the Renamo guerrillas still active and lethal in central Mozambique. The government’s response capacity is limited, politically and financially. It faces stringent budget constraints caused by several interrelated factors. The major ones are: the economic and fiscal fall out of the USD 2.2 billion secret debts contracted in 2013 to finance dubious fisheries and maritime security projects (2); a decline in economic growth and foreign direct investment, and in tax revenue (except for windfall revenue from the sale of Anadarko and its gas extraction and liquefaction concession in Cabo Delgado to Total): and, finally, the drop in aid allocated via budget support. This last issue, together with a cautious good governance attitude of the IMF and major bi- and multilateral cooperating partners: forces government to increasingly resort to non-concessional domestic and international credit to finance its budget deficits (3). This has resulted in the deterioration in the provision of public services and maintenance of public infrastructure, especially outside the capital Maputo, together with a disenchanted electorate concerned with corruption and a trend towards authoritarian rule. However, this did not affect the outcome of the presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections on 15 October 2019. Frelimo and its presidential candidate Nyusi won by a large margin, amidst accusations by opposition parties, civil society organisations and international observers of massive fraud and irregularities in all phases of the electoral process (4). With dwindling domestic and international support, the President and his party now face major obstacles to delivering on their promises to combat corruption, promote and consolidate peace, boost small scale agricultural and food production and processing, as well as to improve public services, notably water supplies, in a more inclusive way. 

 

Drivers of the Conflict in Cabo Delgado

There are several possible drivers of the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Several analysts and President Nyusi himself, have attributed the conflict to high levels of poverty and unemployment and noted that these conditions are being exploited by foreign and local militants looking to recruit members (5). In addition to that, government corruption, and the heavy-handedness of the security forces in dealing with the local people, needs to be addressed.

The government and those multinational companies operating in the province should start to address these problems immediately in order for peace to return to the area. There is a need to settle the issue of land which was taken away from the people to pave way for the multinational companies to set up their mining operations. The government of Mozambique needs to pay some form of compensation to the people who were dispossessed of their land as a matter of urgency. 

So rather than asking what impact the conflict will have on the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) sector, we should ask what impact the LNG sector is having on local communities if we are to better understand how to prevent and counter violent extremism.

To add to that, unemployment and poverty alone do not predict the emergence of violent extremist organisations. Several studies show that relative deprivation, perceptions of marginalisation and discrimination, violation of human rights and a history of hostility between identity groups are far more relevant in predicting where such groups will emerge and how they will recruit from local populations.

These challenges are now, in early 2021, exacerbated by the socioeconomic impact of the state of emergency declared on 31 March 2020 due to Covid-19. Under these difficult circumstances, LNG projects in Cabo Delgado, with major reserves and an estimated total investment of more than USD 50 billion to become Africa’s Qatar, represent a silver lining of hope on the horizon, at least in terms of upstream and downstream investment and revenue generation, from 2024 onwards (6). But this silver lining may vanish and turn out to be a mirage, for two interconnected reasons. The first could be the tumbling of global energy prices, which could be partly due to the increase of production of oil e.g., by both Russia and Saudi Arabia, causing an expected decline of demand, refinery output, available storage, and return to investment expectations in energy exploration. This may negatively affect the inclination of gas and oil giants Total and ExxonMobil to proceed with their onshore investment in Cabo Delgado as planned (7). The second factor is the expanding armed activities of insurgents in Cabo Delgado, which the government and its reinforced “Defence and Security Forces” (FDS), have not been able to contain, even with some support from “Private Security and Military Enterprises” (PSMEs) and police cooperation with neighbouring Tanzania. Combatting the armed activities exacts a high toll on both the government and investors’ budgets. 

Both the government and mining companies routinely emphasise the enormous economic opportunity the LNG projects will bring to Mozambique and the "trickle down" potential they have for communities in terms of "job creation, supply and associated services industries" (8).

In reality, however, mining operations have routinely failed to benefit local communities. Many such projects have created unmet economic expectations, generated human rights violations, reinforced ethno-religious inequalities, and dispossessed local communities of their land.

The idea that the insurgents are spearheading an attempt by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its regional affiliates in Africa to incorporate Cabo Delgado into the Islamic State’s Central African Province (ISCAP) is gaining currency in studies and reports on the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Yet, in our view, solid research-based evidence together with the scientific exploration of other explanatory avenues is still lacking to verify this hypothesis. This is despite the fact that ISIS often claims responsibility within 24 hours after attacks.

In the present analysis, which considers historical dimensions of state building and the political economy in Cabo Delgado, we try to examine additional, complementary hypotheses on the origins and dynamic of what we label a “New War” in Mozambique’s northernmost province. This study will use this concept as an antithesis to the ‘Islamic State onslaught’ thesis which has not seriously been challenged to date. Our argument is that without more profound examination of determinants such as political history and change, ethnicity, interests of private security enterprises associated to investment in extractives as well as international relations, our understanding of the war in Cabo Delgado, its causes and its implications will remain incomplete. The analysis of structural factors such as demographic trends, poverty, disenchanted “youth in waithood” (9), unequal access to land and concession, long-term allocation and distribution of budgets and their effects on public services, structural state violence, among others, will be dealt with in the context of this study. 

This study abstains from summarising what we already know about the ‘insurgency armed groups’, such as their gaining military strength, strategic competence and the increasing efficiency of their armed action.

 

The Discovery of Rubies in Montepuez

Another critical factor that is adding to current crisis in Cabo Delgado is the discovery of rubies. In April 2009, rubies were discovered near the city of Montepuez in Cabo Delgado (10). By the end of 2010, thousands of artisanal miners, or garimpeiros, were mining the deposits.

In June 2011, Mwiriti Limitada, a Mozambican company owned by army Gen Raimundo Pachinuapa, a senior member of the ruling Frelimo, and London-based Gemfields signed a 25%-75% joint venture agreement to form the “Montepuez Ruby Mining” (MRM). MRM subsequently won mining rights to a 34,000ha concession (11).

Over the next three years, multiple instances came to light of artisanal miners allegedly being beaten, shot, and buried alive by the Mozambican police, the country’s environment protection agency and private security companies.

There were also cases of local communities being forcibly removed from their land and of villages being razed to make way for MRM mining activities.

In 2018, while denying liability, Gemfields publicly recognised that "instances of violence have occurred on and around the MRM licence area, both before and after Gemfields arrival in Montepuez".

The company then agreed to pay £5.8m to settle a case, brought before the London Supreme Court, in which 273 complainants alleged human rights abuses (12).

Back in Mozambique, there was little judicial action. The attorney-general announced an investigation, but it was never concluded. No serious steps were taken to seek justice for victims or to put policies in place to address the use of force against communities affected by the extractive industry.

In addition to food and water insecurity and the loss of supplementary income, the stress and trauma associated with forced displacement has fractured social networks and eroded trust between community members, local leaders, and company and government representatives.

Hundreds of families have been forced to resettle away from their ancestral farmland and fishing grounds to make way for onshore support facilities for the projects.

Speculative investing in land in anticipation of the gas boom, often by Frelimo elites, has also fuelled resentment among villagers, who continue to lose access to land and sustainable livelihoods.

In rural areas particularly, land is inextricably linked not only to livelihoods but also to identity, culture, and history. The Cabo Delgado coastal zone has traditionally been occupied by the Muslim Kimwani-speaking people, who rely predominantly on trading, fishing, and seafaring. The displacement and marginalisation of coastal communities in Cabo Delgado is especially concerning, given pre-existing ethno-religious fault lines.

Many Muslims in the province backed Frelimo’s independence struggle against the Portuguese. However, since the first multiparty elections in 1994, Kimwani speakers have tended to vote for Renamo.

As journalist Joseph Hanlon writes: "Local Muslim leaders have always been annoyed that their role in the independence struggle was not recognised, and they see the largely Christian Makonde speakers from Mueda and Muidumbe districts dominating Frelimo and moving into the coastal areas." (13)

Today, the Makonde form the local elite in Cabo Delgado, while the Kimwani-speaking people are among the poorest in the province and the most negatively affected by the LNG projects.

It is unlikely that the substantial number of jobs created by the LNG projects will go to local coastal communities, given low levels of formal education and the investment in training and support needed to equip community members with the requisite skills.

Any poverty reduction from jobs that do go to these communities has likely already been offset by the thousands of local citizens who have lost access to fishing grounds and small-scale agricultural production.

For communities living in the region, the security situation has deteriorated significantly over the past two years. Not only have they been victim to dozens of attacks by the “Ahlu Sunnah wa-al-jamah” (ASWJ), but the region has become highly securitised. Local communities report "living [in] constant fear of mistreatment by the military and by private security actors rather than feeling protected from the attacks".

In late August 2020, Total’s subsidiary in the region announced it had signed a memorandum of understanding with the government. The government would deploy a joint task force from the defence and security forces (FDS) to ensure security. In return, the Mozambique LNG project would provide logistical support to the FDS, including equipment and subsidies for troops.

As Mozambique’s Centre for Democratic Development notes: "In allowing the deployment of FDS troops to protect private interests in exchange for monetary payments, the government is privatizing the FDS services and, consequently, violating the Defence & Security Policy." The FDS is already stretched beyond the point where it can effectively protect communities in Cabo Delgado (14).

While the defence of strategic interests is one of the fundamental roles of the ministry of defence, it is easy to see how this relationship between the military and LNG sector would be viewed differently by a local population exposed to violence at the hands of armed groups, private military companies, and government security forces on a weekly basis.

Natural gas revenues will only begin to accrue by 2024. This means there is still time for Mozambique to prioritise sustainable development, inclusive growth, and better policies to manage large extractive industry investments.

 

Conclusion

Although ASWJ maintains transnational linkages, the group is the result of domestic pressures and conditions in Mozambique. At first glance, ASWJ seems like an Islamist terrorist group emboldened through affiliation with the Islamic State. Both Mozambican government officials and Islamic State – Central Africa Province (IS-CAP) statements assert that recent attacks are by the Islamic State. However, not only are those ties murky focusing solely on the threat that the Islamic State poses in the region also ignores domestic insurgencies like ASWJ.

The role of Islam, particularly Wahhabist interpretations, should not be understated. But local ethnic and economic situations laid the groundwork for ASWJ’s extremist ideology to find support in Mozambique. Cabo Delgado and bordering provinces Niassa and Nampula have the highest rates of poverty in Mozambique; they have not reaped the rewards accruing from the natural resources found in their area, particularly natural gas, and ruby deposits. Early ASWJ recruits included disempowered and impoverished male youths in Mocímboa da Praia who looked to Islam as a means of challenging the state and its economic structures. From there, the group developed by articulating a message that resonated with the underserved population in northeast Mozambique.

Economic, social, and political marginalisation are all exacerbated by ethnic divides in the region. The Kimwani, a local Muslim ethnic group, holds grievances against majority ethnic groups, particularly the predominantly Catholic Makonde. This societal cleavage is useful for ASWJ recruitment and popularity, because ASWJ offers the possibility of increased standing and economic benefits if the current social structures are overturned. The geographic origins and spoken languages of many members indicate that the Kimwani community has served as a useful recruitment pool for ASWJ. 

At the same time, ASWJ exists in a fluid environment where other jihadist groups exert ideological influence. Followers of a Kenyan Imam, Aboud Rogo Mohammed, have played an important role in the radicalisation of disaffected individuals in Cabo Delgado. Moreover, although IS-CAP has claimed that ASWJ is an affiliate, their relationship remains tenuous and uncertain.

As the current SADC chairperson, Mozambique’s president should tap into regional support to ensure civilian protection against attacks and to restore security in Cabo Delgado. South Africa’s Department of International Relations, reacting to the latest deadly attack in Palma, tweeted that South Africa stands ready to work with the government of Mozambique in pursuit of lasting peace and stability. Mozambican authorities should take up the offer.

Mozambique authorities, SADC, and the AU need to demonstrate to civilians in Palma and the entire Cabo Delgado province that their security and the protection of their rights is a top priority. Failure to act now could have dire consequences for the people of Cabo Delgado and the entire southern Africa region.

An Angolan scenario, where a political elite captures all the local content opportunities, will only serve to increase grievances, and swell the ranks of the insurgency.



 

 

References

1. Mozambiques Rivals Sign Peace Deal

https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-08-00-mozambique-rivals-sign-peace-deal/, 11 April 2021

 

2. Mozambique-Credit Suisse is Liable for 2 billion Secret Debt

http://www.cadtm.org/Mozambique-Credit-Suisse-is-liable-for-the-2-bn-secret-debt, 11 April 2021

 

3.US-Total Mozambique Deal

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-total-mozambique-idUSKBN1WF0HM, 11 April 2021

 

4. Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi Re-elected in Landslide Victory

https://www.dw.com/en/mozambique-president-filipe-nyusi-re-elected-in-landslide-victory/a-51009484, 12 April 2021

 

5. How Mozambique’s Corrupt Elite Caused Tragedy in the North

https://www.theafricareport.com/79096/how-mozambiques-corrupt-elite-caused-tragedy-in-the-north/, 12 April 2021

 

6. Growing Risks for 50 billion Mozambique’s LNG Projects

https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2021-01-31-growing-risks-for-50bn-mozambique-lng-projects/, 12 April 2021

 

7. Going Deep into Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Extremism

https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/africa/2020-10-29-going-deep-into-mozambiques-cabo-delgado-extremism/, 12 April 2021

 

8. Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322030113_Generation_in_waiting_The_unfulfilled_promise_of_young_people_in_the_middle_east, 12 April 2021

 

9.Mozambique Ruby Discovery 21st Century

https://www.gia.edu/gems-gemology/spring-2015-mozambique-ruby-discovery-21st-century, 12 April 2021

 

10. Mozambique Ruby Giant hit by Virus

 https://www.barrons.com/news/mozambique-ruby-mining-giant-hit-by-virus-01593098704, 12 April 2021

 

11. Gemfield Reveals and Denies Fresh Human Rights Abuse Claims in Mozambique

https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/gemfields-reveals-and-denies-fresh-human-rights-abuse-claims-in-mozambique/, 13 April 2021

 

12. Gemfields Compensate Over Mozambique’s Mining Abuse

https://sports.yahoo.com/gemfields-compensate-mozambique-torture-victims-denies-liability-150728001.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAALgsBFVg0I9v0hUCRiH4oBRhgy0Id-5GBJbs9ktiHpx9-094VVYz17LXGs5oqHRsGYN432LprggglI4bKSWwMSPzVT51_8hU_L2PuDILRwEWFJIkIPqGEHYmFvSlDEHaZ_FSwNZQuT9Rl3-EL6HFtxHwZQxT0k, 16 April 2021

13. Mozambique’s NGO Criticises Privatization of Sovereignty in Government Accord

https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-ngo-criticises-privatisation-of-sovereignty-in-government-accord-170019/, 13 April 2021

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