US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi arrived in Taiwan on 2 August 2022, accompanied by a delegation of five Democratic Party members from the House of Representatives. This was the first visit by a US House of Representatives speaker in over 25 years. Pelosi addressed  parliament, met with senior ministers, dignitaries and officials and held a bilateral meeting with Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen, before leaving Taiwan on 3 August 2022. China did not take the news of the visit well and launched a plethora of full-scale military exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait.

Let us look at the background of the current standoff and juxtapose it to what happened to the Dalai Lama when he tried to attend the 80^th birthday celebration of his friend, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, in 2011.

In 1945, following Japan’s defeat in World War 2 (WWII), Taiwan was remanded to the Republic of China on behalf of the allied forces. Subsequently, China formed the Taiwan Provincial Government to govern Taiwan Province. The origins of Taiwan’s attachment to China derive from the colonial Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT) , which was based in Nanjing before relocating to Taiwan following the Chinese civil war and was the dominant party in China from 1928 to 1949. The question of Taiwan’s sovereignty was perceived as an unsettled dispute from an ongoing civil war. The policy of The People’s Republic of China (PRC) toward Taiwan has been shaped by the rivalry between the Chinese Communist Party  and the KMT. Irrespective, the south-east Asian nation has been governed independently from mainland China since 1949 despite the PRC having claimed ownership of the island for more than  50 years the PRC has claimed ownership of the first-island-chain. 

The PRC has dubbed Taiwan a renegade province and points to history to justify Taiwan’s origin as a Chinese province. However, Taiwan points to the same history to strongly dismiss these claims. Taiwan points out that it was never part of the modern Chinese state that was formed following the revolution in 1911 or the PRC that was formed under Mao in 1949. Nonetheless, Beijing asserts that there is only “One China” , a standing point that the US government has historically done little to quell. When the US government made a move to recognise the PRC and derecognise the Republic of China in 1979, the US government acknowledged the PRC as the “sole legitimate government of China” (5). Washington conceded that Taiwan was a part of China, hence reinforcing China’s claim to Taiwan. 

Additionally, the PRC claims Taiwan is bound by the 1992 Consensus, an agreement reached by the PRC and the KMT, which ruled Taiwan at the time. However, both sides dispute the contents of the consensus as Taiwan believes it was never meant to question Taiwan’s legal status. However, as President Xi Jinping stated (6), the  consensus “reflects an agreement that “the two sides of the strait belong to one China and would work together to see national reunification””. The current leaders of Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party, refute the consensus. Despite President Xi Jinping voicing the PRC’s long-standing proposal for Taiwan to be incorporated into China via the “one country, two systems” formula, like Hong Kong, Taiwan remains steadfast in its absolute independence. The country’s “One China policy” i.e.  that China is a sovereign state and People’s Republic of China (PRC) is its legitimate government and Taiwan is part of China.  This definition arguably, extends beyond Taiwan and sends a cautionary messaging to all territories contemplating and independence from China. Tibet’s history, conflict and consequent dealings with China almost mirrors that of Taiwan. Tibet is a region on the Tibetan Plateau in Asia, spanning almost halfway across China’s territory. It is the cultural homeland of the Tibetan people and other minor ethnic groups. Tibet is the highest region on earth, just north of the Himalayas. Tibet  has been occupied and ruled by China since 1951. The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, otherwise known as the Seventeen Point Agreement, actively legitimised the PRC’s claims to Tibet and justified the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) aggressive military invasion of Tibet in 1950.. The document is the only agreement signed between the PRC and a minority people. The mere existence of a fully functioning independent region in the mainland made signing the agreement imperative to the PRC. Before the agreement, the three provinces that constituted Tibet were self ruling since the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. The central province was led by the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. The principles of “cho-si sung-drel” or Buddhist politics and religion together, were the regions governing values. The two other provinces, Amdo to the northeast and Kham to the east, had rulers who were faithful to the Dalai Lama. 

The Seventeen Point Agreement was forced onto the Tibetan people via coercion. The PLA had invaded Kham and Amdo, so the Dalai Lama moved to the South of Tibet in search of refuge.  The Dalai Lama’s autobiography details how the Tibetan negotiator sent to the Chinese signed the Agreement, without the Dalai Lama’ consent. The book also mentions how fake Tibet seals were used on the document.  The Agreement alleged that Tibet had sought help from the PRC to drive out imperialist forces. Clause one  of the Agreement states; “The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the Motherland – the PRC.” Rather than liberating the Tibetans, the Agreement was a tool to consolidate China’s hold on the region. Despite the Agreement gesturing towards Tibetan autonomy, six clauses of the Agreement referred to efforts to ensure Chinese national security forces on Tibet’s frontier. 

The imposition of China’s communist reforms created conflict between the China-India border as well as within neighbouring Tibetan provinces, resulting in an uprising in Kham and Amdo in 1956. Civilian refugees and Tibetan guerrillas fled to Lhasa where they formed a resistance army. In 1959 rumours spread that the PRC was intending to arrest the Dalai Lama, who then fled to India  before Lhasa could be seized. The uprising and the Dalai Lama’s flight signified the failure of the Seventeen Point Agreement. The agreement was the early blueprint of the “one nation country, two systems” policy enforced in Hong Kong today. However, from his permanent exile in India, much like the Taiwanese government, the Dalai Lama refutes the claims of the PRC, stating that the Seventeen Point Agreement was forced on the Tibetan people and government under threat of armed force. 

So, why was the visit of Nancy Pelosi important and why it has to be juxtaposed to that of the Dalai Lama’s cancelled visit to South Africa.  On 4 October 2011, the Dalai Lama was forced to cancel a planned visit to South Africa (SA) to attend Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s eightieth birthday celebrations.  The announcement was made just three days before the trip, following a lack of response from SA’s visa application office.  Former President Jacob Zuma’s government maintained that the Dalai Lama’s visa  delay was owing to a delay in processing, however, given SA’s ties to China, very few believed this reasoning. China has long viewed the Tibetan leader as a dangerous separatist, pressuring foreign governments not to meet with him thereby furthering his international isolation.  Bishop Tutu was livid; he went on to threaten to “pray for the defeat of the ANC”.  Notwithstanding the overtures of reconciliation by President Cyril Ramaphosa on behalf of the ANC, Tutu remained angry and critical of the ANC till the last days of his life.

China have a historical habit of interfering with international nations’ interactions with political figures and countries that take issue with the PRC’s will.  Actions such as imposing pressure on SA to avoid interactions with the Dalai Lama, or launching aggressive military drills in neighboring contentious waters in response to Pelosi’s Taiwanese exchange, signifies, to some, bullying tactics that set a dangerous political global precedent. There are certainly many reasons why Pelosi decided to visit Taiwan, it can be argued that they were largely influenced by politics.  However, her insistence to visit Taiwan notwithstanding Chinese pressure is key.  The precedence that was set by China in South Africa in terms of restricting movements of its dissenters was significant and troubling towards freedom of movement as a democratic principle.  Pelosi’s defiance was significant in that it sent a clear message, not only to China, but a reminder to the world that freedoms do not come free and continual efforts are required to ensure that they are safeguarded from being usurped.

In recent years, as globalisation has taken hold, Chinese companies have come to play a key role as they seek new markets and opportunities around the world. A number of African countries have come to be such key markets: in 2022, statistics suggest, there are about 10 000 Chinese companies operating across the continent. But this surge of Chinese industry has had an incredibly polarising effect on Africa, economically and socially.

Although Chinese companies invested a total of $2.96 billion in 2021 in African industrial and infrastructure projects, a 9.6% increase from 2020, critics often argue that Chinese companies prefer to hire Chinese workers. They are accused of depriving African people job opportunities in their own countries, of violating labour laws and of unfairly treating those they do employ. If this is the case, who should be held responsible: Chinese industry or African countries?

Though the focus on China’s role in Africa has only really sharpened in recent years, its interest in the continent goes back to the Bandung Conference in 1955. The conference was hosted by Indonesia and attended by leaders of newly independent Asian and African nations who hoped for greater collaboration between their countries and decreased dependence on Europe and North America. At the close of the conference, attendees agreed to the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation, the protection of human rights and peaceful coexistence.Notions of anti-colonial rhetoric, Third Worldism and freedom of self-determination were the basis of the Conference. An agreement for the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation, the protection of human rights and a peaceful coexistence signalled the close of the Conference.  Decades later, and with the “spirit of Bandung” abandoned, Africa/Asia ties remain.

With the recent and swift rise in investment, there’s been widespread study and reporting. Much of it focuses on economic and developmental issues, and the behaviour of Chinese companies. Chinese labour practices are often viewed as unfair, with various instances of reported harsh and poor working conditions. In Juan Pablo and Heriberto Araujo’s book Silent Army, the pair describe Chinese companies’ hostile attitudes towards trade unions, outline examples of human rights violations and discuss several instances of discrimination aimed at African employees.

For instance, in a video that went viral, Chinese national Liu Jiaqi was deported from Kenya for using racial slurs against his Kenyan colleagues. A video from Uganda showed an illegal Chinese miner assaulting a Ugandan government official.

These and less extreme examples show how Chinese companies test labour laws in various African countries. At home, the Chinese government has followed an industrialisation programme built on the values of heavy industrialisation, low labour costs, capital-intensive manufacturing industries and export-led growth. This development trajectory has seen it grow in leaps and bounds economically but has come at a steep cost to workers’ welfare and wages. Worker safety is not a priority, and the Chinese government has cracked down hard on organised labour: independent unions are illegal and workers do not have the right to strike. All of these approaches are playing out in Chinese companies’ work in African countries.

This results in a double-edged sword for African nations: yes, capital is flowing, but at what cost?

Former Zambian leader Michael Sata, a strong voice against Chinese labour practices, denounced China’s role in Africa and vowed that Zambia would not be a “dumping ground for their human beings”. In Nigeria, attitudes are no different. A Nigerian doctor reportedly spoke of treating a Nigerian labourer’s wounds, incurred at the hands of a Chinese employer. The worker was beaten with an aluminum rod. Just days later news broke of Chinese employers firing live ammunition at protesting workers at Collum coal mine in southern Sinazongwe province, Zambia. Eleven workers were admitted to hospital, sparking outrage on the African continent.

One of the problems is people’s sheer desperation to earn money in countries whose governments offer little support. Nigerian construction workers make $137 a month; some other casual workers make as little as $3 a day. But people need jobs – and cheap wages are seen as better than nothing. The attitude Chinese companies take towards Africa whispers sentiments of exploitation; key concerns are being overlooked on a continent that's already struggling to get on its feet.

Chinese industry has found a goldmine in Africa. The majority of the continent is unable to repel Chinese infractions (they need the capital) but also does not implement labour laws to protect local workers. As is the case in China, the flow of capital comes at great cost to workers. Considering China has lax labour laws, it is not a complete shock that its native business model would reflect in Africa. Outrage and critique are not enough to dispel cases of unfair and unjust treatment at the hands of Chinese industry, the government of Africa's nations needs to do better.It is time for African governments to better balance their countries’ need for capital with their citizens’ basic rights.

Infrastructure is key to any country’s economic development. But, as with many African states, Zambia has found itself lacking in this regard. When British colonial rule ended in 1964, there was sufficient infrastructure to support the southern African nation’s population of approximately 3.1 million people. Today, Zambia is home to about 19 million people , this has jumped from about 10 million when the country conducted its fifth and most recent census in 2010.   

The population has grown but infrastructure development has been limited. Zambia’s road network, both within towns and on intercity routes, is under-developed. Other infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools and public offices, among many others, dates back to the colonial era or was constructed during the 27 years of President Kenneth Kaunda’s rule from 1964 to 1991.

China initially came on board to support the former President Levy Mwanawasa’s drive to improve infrastructure from 2002 until 2008.  Rupiah Banda, who became president after Mwanawasa’s death, continued to work with the Chinese government on various infrastructure projects such as the construction of roads, dams and bridges. In 2006 Michael Chilufya Sata, then the leader of the official opposition, vowed to cut ties with China if he became president. He rescinded that statement before the 2011 general elections that saw him become Zambia’s fifth president. The country’s relationship with China continued – and China continued to build infrastructure in Zambia.

One of the biggest Zambian projects China has spearheaded in recent years is the construction of the Kafue Gorge Lower Hydropower Station in the southern district of Chikankata. One 150-megawatt turbine has been commissioned; four more are set to follow. When the project is completed it will add 750 megawatts to the country’s electrical grid and has been touted as a partial solution to Zambia’s power shortages.The Kafue Gorge Lower Hydro power plant is being built by the Sino-Hydro Corporation, at a cost of more than $US 2 billion. It has reportedly created about 3000 jobs and supported the establishment of auxiliary businesses. Another major project is the Levy Mwanawasa General Hospital. Its first phase was completed in 2014, with a capacity of 120 beds. The hospital, located on Lusaka’s Great East Road, was constructed with a grant in excess of USD $8 million. China later expanded the hospital, making it the second largest health institution in Zambia. (The University Teaching Hospital is the largest.) China committed $90 million towards the expansion. Today the hospital has a capacity of 1000 beds and is fully equipped to offer specialised treatment.

China has also funded two state-of-the-art international airports in Zambia: Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe International Airport in Ndola and a modern terminal at Lusaka’s Kenneth Kaunda International Airport. The latter included a hotel, cargo terminal, air traffic control building, and a rescue and fire station. It is hoped this facility will increase passenger numbers from two million to four million annually. The construction of the Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe International Airport saw Ndola Airport being handed over to the Zambian Air Force and renamed the Zuze Air Force Base. This means the copper-rich Copperbelt province now has two major airports of international standard.  Zambia has also turned to China for help in raising its profile as preferred destination for international travelers, global conferences and conventions. It will push this agenda in July when it hosts the African Union’s Heads of State and Government Summit in Lusaka. The Chinese government paid $US 60 million to build the Kenneth Kaunda Conference Hall as a host venue.  China could help Zambia’s ambition of creating strategic roads between itself and its neighbors. Speaking recently when he met with a delegation from the South West Chinese Business Association of Zambia , Infrastructure and Urban Development Minister Charles Milupi said the government was seriously considering putting up a dual carriageway between the capital, Lusaka and Livingstone. When completed, this will facilitate easy and fast transportation to four countries: Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The country is also anxious to improve connectivity to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique.  Zambia is looking at China once again to play a role in this regard. China has already opened links between Zambia and Tanzania through the construction of the railway line from the Port of Dar es Salaam to Kapiri-Mposhi, a district in Zambia’s Central province. The Zambian government has already indicated that it needs partners to implement infrastructure projects through the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model – and China, its all-weather friend, looks likely to step up.

Notwithstanding, questions continue to arise from locals and Zambians in diaspora alike regarding reasons behind China’s infrastructural development in Zambia. Skeptics argue that there are ulterior motives behind China’s economic interventions in the country.  Simultaneously, there are some who argue that China’s intervention and investment in infrastructural development are genuine, these efforts are altering Zambia’s infrastructure to the better and are enabling the government to realise its development agenda.

About the author

Chileshe Conrad Mwango is an Associate Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues and a multi-award-winning journalist.  He is a senior news reporter at the Phoenix Radio station, a popular radio station in Lusaka, Zambia.

Coronavirus infection rates are soaring in Hong Kong; the city, in 2022, has the highest reported death rate, for its population size, in the world. After once being praised as a global example for Covid-19 contaminant, the semi-independent region’s zero-Covid strategies have failed, and infections have rocketed.

Low vaccine coverage rate is driving the infection and fatality rates. As of March 2022, the death rate stands at 25 per 100 000. Chinese authorities have ordered Hong Kong to get a grip on its infection rates – but in this as in so much else to do with the two countries, mounting tensions are being exposed. In 2019 protests erupted in Hong Kong. The media, education sector, civil society and electoral system have all been restructured to China’s liking. And mainland China has forced Hong Kong to adopt its zero-Covid policies. But given that the vaccines on offer are manufactured in Beijing, trust is low.

Warring policies

Hong Kong’s zero-Covid policy was designed to mirror that of mainland China. Just as other governments were lifting restrictions and easing rules, the region implemented some of the strictest Covid-19 rules in the world. This is proving incredibly tough for Hong Kong’s economy. In February, following China’s lead, Hong Kong closed its border. This cut its connection with both the mainland and the rest of the world. The city, a global financial hub that brands itself as “Asia’s World City”, saw 71 000 people depart in February and a further 54 000 in March. The already dwindling number of travellers to the city had to undergo a two-week quarantine period.

Recently, however, Hong Kong’s outgoing leader, Carrie Lam (she has announced that she will not seek a second term at the helm) declared that the territory would ease some restrictions. She lifted a travel ban on flights coming from nine countries – among them the US, Australia and the UK. Quarantine periods for travellers were also dropped to seven days. And she detailed a roadmap to the gradual easing of further restrictions related to social gatherings, mask-wearing and in-person schooling. This so-called “dynamic zero policy” has irked China, which says that unless Hong Kong maintains a zero-Covid policy, borders between it and the mainland will remain closed.

Economic impacts

Despite escalating tensions, Hong Kong and China’s economic ties have remained strong. The two nations boost each other's economies with annual bilateral trade estimated at $547 billion in 2020. Hong Kong is seen as a gateway for those who wish to do business in the mainland or to enter the Chinese business market. As of 2021, 31 of the 161 licensed banks in Hong Kong operated with mainland interest. Mainland China is the largest contributor to Hong Kong’s economy and the second-largest direct source of inward investment. It is also China’s main (45.1%) import source, and the mainland is Hong Kong’s largest (46.6%) receiver of exports.

China’s threat to keep its borders closed unless Hong Kong maintains the Covid policy foisted upon it has left the semi-autonomous region with little room to manoeuvre.

If Hong Kong maintains China’s policy, it will need to implement severe fiscal buffers to cushion the economic blow to households and businesses. Considering the extreme nature of the “zero-Covid” policy, Hong Kong may look less attractive to potential investors; this, coupled with the fact that there is no clear end in sight for the policy, means that Hong Kong will have to use its large fiscal reserves. This would have adverse effects on the region’s credit profile.

Hong Kong’s Fitch rating is sensitive to economic competitiveness. As a central hub for economic prosperity and connectivity, it will worry that the prolonged implementation of China’s “zero-Covid” policy may erode its hallmarks. This is a double-edged sword: on one hand, it acts as a test of loyalty to the mainland, and on the other, it is an extreme cause of friction in an already tense situation. 

Vaccination uncertainties

Hong Kong’s vaccination procedure is shrouded in mistrust and scepticism.

Hong Kong’s Free Press announced that in January, there were more than 500 cases per 100 000 residents. This high infection rate has been attributed to multiple factors: a high population density, cramped living conditions especially in mass housing estates, and an unprepared healthcare system.

Low vaccination rates are a problem. Currently, 80% of those aged 12 and above have received two doses of the vaccine; this number drastically decreases to 37% in those aged 80 and above, despite the elderly being the most vulnerable to Omicron. After months of pro-democratic protests, arrests and the security law crackdown, mistrust in the authorities may also be to blame for the spike of cases. In Lam’s roadmap she highlighted the scope for mass vaccinations among the elderly.

Economically, socially and politically, Covid – and the battle between Hong Kong’s policy versus China’s – has shaken life in the now deeply isolated region to its core.

About the Author

Qhawezo Ayesha Fakude is a Junior Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

In more than two years since Covid-19 was first identified in Wuhan, China and began its spread around the globe, the race has been on to develop a safe and effective vaccine. China was among the nations working towards a vaccine; in fact, the first vaccine approved and listed by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for emergency use was made in Beijing, by a state-owned firm, Sinopharm.

The WHO’s approval processes assess manufacturing quality, efficacy and safety. Using the same stringent process, the body approved and listed another Chinese vaccine, CoronaVac, in July 2021. This vaccine is produced by the privately-owned company Sinovac. Approval by the WHO opens the door for vaccines to be distributed to lower-income nations as part of the Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative. It is interesting to note that by May 202, while 45 countries had approved Sinovac’s use, the WHO was the first stringent regulatory body to authorise the data underpinning the science of the vaccine.

This fact points to one of the reasons that Chinese vaccines are still being met with hesitance despite the fact that safe, effective vaccines are urgently needed in many parts of the developing world. Even the WHO’s approval is not enough to allay people’s concerns about the Chinese State’s lack of transparency – and a reliance on censorship and propaganda - when it comes to anything related to Covid-19, vaccines or otherwise.

A long-standing problem

Such behaviour has been evident since the start of the pandemic. China’s government was accused of withholding evidence from the public about the virus, downplaying its severity and under-reporting infection numbers. In 2021 it was reported that authorities were detaining vaccine advocates, censoring any critiques of Chinese-made vaccines and spreading misinformation about vaccines from elsewhere in the world.  In 2021 China was littered with vaccine scandals. There was mounting public concern about and backlash against the government’s persistent failure to regulate and control the vaccine market.

Families of people who died allegedly because of problems related to Chinese-made vaccines are petitioning for justice but must often deal with police harassment, intimidation and even imprisonment in return. For example, in October 2021, authorities in Henan Province allegedly forcibly disappeared He Fangmei, an outspoken critic of Chinese vaccines who blamed her daughter’s neurological disease diagnosis on the vaccine. And it’s not just Covid vaccines that have caused conflicts: Human Rights Watch reports that, before WHO experts arrived in China to investigate the origins of the Covid-19 virus, Hua Xiuzhen, a safety advocate, was forcibly disappeared by Shanghai officials. Her daughter was diagnosed with a neurological disease following her rabies vaccination. It goes back further, too. In 2018, also in Henan Province, a court sentenced self-proclaimed vaccine safety activist Zhang Da’e to two years in prison for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble".

What comes now?

There has been some improvement in 2022 – at least when it comes to the veil of secrecy within China about its various vaccines. Various potential mass spreader events (like Chinese New Year celebrations and the recently finished Winter Olympics in Beijing) put authorities on high alert.

Omicron and/or Delta variant outbreaks are occurring in numerous cities throughout the country, for example, in Tianjin (near Beijing), Anyang, Xuchang, Yuzhou, Zhejiang and Hong Kong. So, citizens are now receiving booster shots. Science dictates that these must differ from the Sinopharm or Sinovac vaccines. This “mix and match” approach, according to researchers from Brazil and the University of Oxford, will induce stronger antibody protection against both variants.  Hopefully this will be the start of greater transparency from Beijing when it comes to sharing its science with global authorities, other countries – and, crucially, its citizens.