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Iranians granted visa free entry to Saudi Arabia
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Iranians granted visa free entry to Saudi Arabia

The Brief, No 45

15 December 2023

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Examining the implications of the mutiny in Russia in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Brief, No. 43

24 June, 2023

*Background* 

The mutiny by the Wagner Group against the Kremlin’s top brass will impact the war in Ukraine and geopolitics in Sub Saharan Africa. 

The Wagner Group is involved in a number of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Libya to name but a few.

The manner in which the mutiny occurred in Russia is similar to that in Sudan.  

After refusing to be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) engaged in a mutiny. 

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu demanded that Wagner Group’s troops sign contracts with his ministry by July 1, 2023.  The leader of Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin refused. Afrasid believes this led to the mutiny.

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Examining the implications of the mutiny in Sub-Saharan Africa

 

Wagner is accused of sponsoring the RSF in Sudan. The mutiny will certainly impact that conflict. There could be the weakening of the RSF and possible pull out of the Wagner Group from Sudan.

Other conflicts in Africa where the Wagner Group has been active could also see drastic changes.

Moreover, Russia’s rapprochement in Sub-Saharan Africa will certainly be impacted overall. The disappearance of the Wagner Group from the political scene in Sub-Saharan Africa could limit Russia’s “dirty work in Africa”. 

Importantly the mutiny could ease South Africa’s predicament regarding Putin’s visit to the country in August 2023 for the BRICS Summit. Putin is unlikely to leave Russia in the midst of mutiny.

Afrasid is available for analysis and commentary.

www.Afrasid.org

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - One year on

The Brief, No. 42

23 February, 2023

Tomorrow will be a year since Russia invaded Ukraine.  Much has happened in Ukraine since; there has been widespread destruction of critical infrastructure, thousands have died, and millions displaced. 

When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022 its main objective, we were told by the Kremlin at the time, was to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and protect the Russian speaking Ukrainians from neo-Nazi harassment.  These were some of the justifications that were provided by Kremlin for its “Special Military Operations” in Ukraine.

One year on, Russia has lost the media war and it is also not winning the fight on the ground.  Ukrainians, with the assistance of NATO and Western nations, are putting up a fierce fight, are gaining ground and recapturing some of the territories lost during the initial stages of the war. 

Below are some of the points to be considered as the war enters the second year:

  • Russia will intensify the bombardment of Ukraine
  • High profile Russian officials will start defecting to the West
  • Oligarchs will begin to organise against Putin
  • Continual sporadic protests in Russia against Putin will likely intensify
  • NATO, EU and the US will increase their military support for Ukraine
  • Ukraine will militarize with sophisticated weaponry
  • Sanctions against Russia will begin to have devastating effects
  • “Brand Russia” which is badly bruised, will take further knocks
  • International sport, economic and sociocultural boycott against Russia will intensify
  • Putin is likely to cement his power by prolonging his tenure in office

Afrasid is available for analysis and commentary.

www.afrasid.org