Leaked list sheds light on LGBTQ+ community’s crisis in China
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Leaked list sheds light on LGBTQ + community’s crisis in China

Ayesha Fakude Articles

Abstract

In late August 2021, a document appeared on social media that queried the state of mind and political ideology of “non-heterosexual” students at a large Shanghai university (1). The document, labelled as a campus survey, asked colleges to “investigate and research” “relevant information” about lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ+) students (2). It did not explain what this “relevant information”; was however, based on a crackdown of campus groups and organisations supporting the LGBTQ+ community, the “survey” caused widespread outrage and alarm, especially among young people (3). 

China’s LGBTQ+ community faces ever-more social discrimination and marginalisation in President Xi Jinping’s “new China” (4). The existence of the list is yet another grim instance of this. This report aims to observe the political and social landscape of the Chinese LGBTQ+ community. It will touch on the publication of the list. Additionally, the social and political opinions of the LGBTQ+ community and the history of the LGBTQ+ community in China shall be explored. Finally, it will consider the threat that the government’s agenda poses to the community. 

Introduction 

In late August 2021 a document posted on Weibo (Chinese Twitter) exposed a leading Shanghai university for asking for the political stance, social constraints and mental health status of its students (5). The institution is alleged to be Shanghai University, which has more than 55 000 students across three campuses and 30 schools (6). It was founded in 1922 and is one of China’s key higher education institutions (7). The institution was rumoured to be making a list of “non-heterosexual students” and LGBTQ+ rainbow groups (8) that contained unspecified “relevant information”. Additionally, the list asked colleges to “investigate and research” students.

This is a worrying turn. China is believed (9) to have the world’s largest LGBTQ+ population (which makes sense given that it has the world’s largest population – 1.4 billion people).

But this is not, by and large, an “out and proud” community. It is widely invisible and has faced mounting marginalisation, discrimination and stigmatisation (10). Previously, the LGBTQ+ community flourished in an increasingly accepting and growing home base on university campuses. However, the exposure of the list, coupled with the unprovoked blocking and deletion of dozens of pro-LGBTQ+ student social media accounts in July on Weibo, has raised concerns that students may increasingly be targeted (11). The deletion of these social media accounts, most with tens of thousands of followers, and the blocking and deactivation of registered LGBTQ+ “clubs and unofficial grassroots groups” on WeChat (12), points to growing intolerance by Chinese authorities of sex and gender nonconformists - especially those involved in activism (13).

It is not yet clear what the list was really about. Shanghai University has not officially responded to the public outcry; some speculate that the list was a poorly executed demographic study (14). However, most do not seem to believe it is innocent. The fear is real.

The lack of public acceptance and mistreatment of the LGBTQ+ community

In the first version of the 1978 Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders (CCMD-1), homosexuality was deemed a sexual disorder (15). In 2001, in the third edition of the CCMA (CCMA-3), homosexuality and bisexuality were removed from the list of medical disorders (16). However, stigma and discrimination remain. The Chinese view of the LGBTQ+ community is majorly determined by cultural context (17). Chinese culture places great emphasis on “obeying the laws of nature”, an ideology influenced by historical Confucianism (18). The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong, meaning “average” or “ordinary” in Confucianism) alludes to one conforming to the gender and sexual orientation widely accepted by the majority (19, 20).

Additionally, China is a collectivist society: great importance is placed on the acceptance and opinion of both society and family (21). A person who identifies as LGBTQ+ in a nation dominated by the values of family honour, dignity and reputation, may project a sense of shame onto one's family. Families may, thereafter, be subject to vicious gossip and stigmatisation. Ridicule and discrimination are not placed solely on sex and gender minorities, but on their parents too. Parents of people in the LGBTQ+ community face the harsh lens of public scrutiny and are often criticised for having not raised their children to uphold their duty to continue the family line (22). This has become even more the case since recent amendments to the country’s 1-child policy, which have placed greater emphasis on having children naturally (23). 

Although the CCMD-3 removed homosexuality and bisexuality from the list of medical disorders, it retained a category called “ego-dystonic homosexual” (24). This categorical loophole, not found in the World Health Organization’s 10th edition of the International Statistical Classification of Disease and Related Health Problems, is coined for those unable to accept their same-sex attraction (25). This “diagnosis” allows for “treatment” by education and health sectors that still refer to homosexuality as a perversion (26). “Treatments” conducted by biased psychiatrists and psychotherapists include various forms of conversion therapy (27), including alleged shock treatments. 

Chinese work culture is often described as arduous, time-consuming and incredibly competitive. Women, alarmingly, are known to face blunt, invasive discrimination tactics like unfair dismissals during pregnancy and workplace harassment. The LGBTQ+ community faces similar discrimination at work - but without any potential backing or aid from the law. Quite simply, relevant labour laws do not contain non-discriminate provisions for sexual orientation or gender identity (28). People in the workplace may face discrimination based on their clothing (29), hair or mannerisms; essentially, they will be discriminated against if they’re perceived not to conform to gender “norms” or if they deviate from traditional gender expression. According to Chinese labour laws, post-operation transgender people are entitled to update their gender identity on household registration forms or identity cards but may not update academic records or other crucial documents (30). This disconnect between documents may cause employers to distrust or discredit potential transgender employees.

Of the 40 to 70 million Chinese people who identify as LGBTQ+ (31), none have the legal backing of the government or law. Some speculate that modernisation and economic development will breed tolerant attitudes towards sexual and gender minorities; most, however, are cynical. Gay marriage in China is still illegal, which has far-reaching implications. For example, foreign partners are not entitled to receive spousal visas, inheritance, child custody, hospital visitation rights or social welfare (32).

About 95% of China’s population are mobile internet users. In June 2017, the official Chinese Netcasting Services Association (CNSA) published a new regulation concerning online broadcasting. This is being used to tighten political and administrative internet control and access to mass media broadcasting (33). The LGBTQ+ community is incredibly critical of these new regulations because they describe homosexuality and bisexuality as abnormal sexual relationships (34). The new rules prohibit the posting of or commenting on stories about homosexuality – and, in the broader sense, the LGBTQ+ community as a whole (35). Other regulations, such as those posted in May 2017 by the Cyberspace Administration of China, have also been criticised as discriminating against the LBGTQ+ community.

 The second cultural revolution 

Xi’s “new China” is completely intolerable to those who do not conform. It is speculated that Beijing's disdain for pro-LGBTQ+ civil groups is because they exist and operate outside of the government’s spectrum of control and may be privy to “foreign influence” (36). State reforms, coupled with the new internet crackdown measures initiated by the government, have left the atmosphere for the LGBTQ+ community increasingly bleak. Shanghai Pride, China’s sole major annual celebration of sexual minorities, was suddenly cancelled last year, although Covid was used as an excuse, the cancellation of the event was oddly too convenient. The shutdown of the event comes after increasing pressure by public officials (37).

Intriguingly, it appears the Chinese public has little problem with the LGBTQ+ community: a study by BMC Public Health found that heterosexual people had an 11.1% rejection rate for familial relationships and a 2.1 - 4.1% rejection rate of social relationships with the LGBTQ+ community (38). So, what is the government’s problem?

It seems clear that President Xi Jinping’s “new China” means conforming at all costs (39). He has incited a neo-cultural revolution that has already hit the education, health and gaming spheres (40). It closely resembles the first Cultural Revolution under Mao: but, instead of political opponents and capitalists being weeded out (41), the LGBTQ+ community and their allies are in the crosshairs. The Common Prosperity doctrine, aimed at decreasing the ever-widening Chinese wealth gap, may reverse decades of strengthening acceptance and would spell disaster for the LGBTQ+ community (42). Following the deletion of numerous social media accounts, comments in favour of the shutdowns were allowed to be posted without hindrance, which shows that Beijing is willing to allow a homophobic discourse (43). 

According to the Chinese Ministry of Education, China is facing a male feminisation problem; an overabundance of “sissy boys” (44). The effeminate male has become the trademark scapegoat for Chinese underdevelopment. The effeminate male, characterised by a slim figure and amazing makeup, may commonly be seen in grossly popular boy bands and drama shows (45). In December 2020, when outlining the strategies to overcome the perceived “sissy boy problem”, the Ministry of Education referenced a 2015 book by Zheng Tiantian titled Tongzhi Living, which linked manhood to the crisis of the nation-state (46). In responding to a proposal by businessman and Chinese People’s Political Consultative member, Si Zeifu, who sought to prevent the further feminisation of male adolescents (47), it was implied that if men are not fit, strong and macho, China itself may become weaker. Correlation and emphasis are placed on the economic development of China and the role of men in society (48). The government fears that “sissy boys”, including gamers and book worms, degrade the value of Chinese society, and as a result, the nation’s growth and prosperity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the LGBTQ+ community comes from a long history of medical, social and cultural hardship. Its members are hounded by traditional dogma and historical ideology. The introduction of the 1-child policy and now the 3-child policy has done little to ease the load and discrimination faced by non-conformists. The revision of medical categories in the CCMD had little to no effect on the progression of the LGBTQ+ community; it has, instead, worsened perceived public opinion. The publication of the controversial list on Weibo highlighted the ever-encroaching expanse of the Chinese government into social spheres. It appears the Chinese government is trying to stifle the community by controlling the spread and production of information.

Reference list

About the author

Qhawezo Ayesha Fakude is a Junior Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

Competing media narratives as the conflict continues in Ethiopia
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Competing media narratives whilst the conflict continues in Ethiopia

Thembisa Fakude Articles

Earlier this week media reports emerged that Tigrayan People Liberation Front (TPLF) was withdrawing its rebels from Amhara and Afar to pave way for peace talks.  The reports had hallmarks of TPLF’s media strategy which since the conflict in Tigray began has peddled a “victimhood narrative”.  The government countered by issuing its own press statement.   It insisted in the statement that TPLF did not voluntary withdraw from Amhara and Afar, rather the TPLF was compelled to retreat by the fighting power of the government forces. 

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has been warring the TPLF since November 2020.   A year ago, T.P.L.F. forces attacked a federal military base in Tigray and tried to steal its weapons.  The conflict has since expanded to other provinces neighboring Tigray including Amhara and Afar.  Thousands have crossed the borders into neighboring Sudan and Eritrea adding to socio-political tensions between the new arrival and local communities in those countries.  Meanwhile, there have been thousands of casualties and millions of people internally displaced by the conflict.  Cultural and heritage sites which attract thousands of tourists annually in the ancient town of Lalibela in the Amhara region, have also been impacted. 

Media reporting have morphed into a major propaganda in the conflict, warring parties are using the media to gain advantage in the conflict.  In November 2021, nine anti Ethiopian organisations based in the US held a press conference in Washington announcing that they were joining the TPLF’s fight against the government.  At a news conference in Washington, DC, the new coalition said it planned to dismantle Abiy’s government by force or by negotiations, and then form a transitional authority.  Notwithstanding the size and obscurity of these political organisations, the event resonated widely particularly within the international media.  Subsequently, there was an upsurge in media interviews granted by international organisations to the TPLF. 

The government’s initial response and interactions with the media since the conflict began have been wobbly.  It has also been criticized for its treatment of journalists during the state of emergency.  According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Ethiopian authorities have arrested at least 14 journalists since declaring a state of emergency on November 2 as part of the government’s response to a year-long civil war against rebel forces allied with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  The TPLF has taken advantage of the deteriorating relationship between the government and the media.  Furthermore, the deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and the US added obstacles to how the Ethiopian authorities deal with the media.  The government has accused the western media and US based media in particular of bias.  Meanwhile, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is due to consider a draft resolution that, if adopted, will set up an international commission of rights experts investigate abuses in war-hit Ethiopia.  Ethiopia has condemn the move arguing that it has the right to repel the rebels.  The report is likely to equate what the government regards as terrorism perpetrated by the TPLF to “a legitimate fight against terrorists who threaten the national cohesion”. 

The government is changing its technical strategy in this conflict including how in relates to the media.  Recently, it has used the media, including social media, to rally support across the country.  Prime Minister Abiy has used the media to call on "all capable Ethiopians" to "show their patriotism" by joining the war against TPLF.  Thousands of Ethiopians across ethnic lines have since taken up arms against the TPLF.  However, some have criticized Abiy’s call for Ethiopians to take arms against the TPLF accusing him and his government of short-term solutions which could have a long-term impact on the national coalition.  Having said that, there are many Ethiopians who feel that the government should deal decisively once and for all with the TPLF.  TPLF stands accused by many in Ethiopia of committing human rights violations and past economic maladministration.   The TPLF was a dominating party within the then Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) an alliance which governed Ethiopia.  The EPRDF was an ethnic federalist political coalition in Ethiopia that existed from 1988 to 2019.  It consisted of four major ethnic based political organisations; the TPLF, Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM).  Abiy dissolved the EPRDF in 2019 to form a new national political party the Prosperity Party. 

The media has played an important role in covering the Ethiopian conflict. However, the media remains susceptible to narrative manipulations by all parties in this conflict.  When the conflict began, the Ethiopian government was seen by many across the globe as an aggressing party.  The government had itself to blame in that regard.  It had a number of missed opportunities which were the consequences of adverse relationship with the media.  That situation gave the TPLF an upper hand in the media, it enabled it to amplify its messaging.  Finally, as government’s communications improve; the treatment of journalists remains a stumbling block in how the world view the situation in Ethiopia.  Moreover, as the conflict intensifies it is likely that the access of journalists to the conflict will shrink and information flow impeded.  That situation could unfortunately lead to further unfavorable reporting against the government.  

About the author

Thembisa Fakude holds a Masters degree in Politics, a columnist at the Middle East Monitor in London and  a Deputy Chairperson of a provincial governement investment promotion agency in South Africa, the Gauteng Growth and Develeopment Agency (GGDA).  Thembisa is a research fellow at Al Sharq Forum in Istanbul, Turkey. He also serves on the board of Common Action Forum in Madrid, Spain and on the board of Mail and Guardian publication in South Africa. He is the former Bureau Chief of Al Jazeera Media Network for both  Arabic and English Channels in Southern Africa.

Tunisia's state of flux and counter-revolution
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Tunisia's State of Flux and Counter-Revolution

Mustafa Fetouri Articles

Tunisia's President, Kais Saied, vehemently denies what he did in Tunisia is, literally, a constitutional coup, as his adversaries claim. The President might feel comfortable if we describe his July power grab as "half a coup" since the constitution, he says, is still there however ignored in disputable ways!

Every time the country's political leaders and parties criticise the President's actions, the former constitutional law professor, Saied, fires back by claiming what he did is actually called for by an entire article of the constitution itself.

In defending his actions he cites article 80  of Tunisia's 2014 constitution, which Mr. Saeid helped draft. The problem here is simply about interpretation of that particular article of the document. President Saied wants Tunisians and the outside world to accept his own interpretation that justifies his "extraordinary" measures, in effect since 25 July. At the end of the day, he is one of the top constitutional law experts in the country and qualified representatives of the larger academia body in the field—why not take his word as a fact?

But there is a catch here: the constitutional expert, Kais Saied, is not the same as President Kais Saied. The President of the county is supposed to be just that—a President for the entire nation. This means his own interpretation of any legal document should not be taken for granted and his word cannot always be trusted, because that would make him the judge and adversary at the same time. This would deprive his adversaries of their constitutional guarantees that give them the right to challenge his actions in a court of law— this is one of the checks on power in any democracy.

To further complicate things for the President's challengers: they have no legal venue to challenge whatever they think is unconstitutional in any presidential decrees or actions. The country's Constitutional Court does not exist, mainly because the bickering parliamentarians failed to approve the appointment of four judges, while the other five judges will be appointed by the presidency and the High Judicial Council. Since the parliament failed to appoint but one judge, the process of having the nine-judge court running stalled and the political fights overwhelmed everyone, putting the issue on the back burner.

President Saied, in fact, used the political turmoil in parliament as a pretext for his extraordinary measures, giving himself ultimate power including to rule by decree without the parliament. He, capitalising on the huge public support he enjoys, suspended the legislative, dismissed the government and gave himself public prosecutor powers. Article 80 gives the President only one month to return to normal constitutional practices, in which the elected parliament can ask the Constitutional Court to scrutinise the President's actions. That did not happen, since parliament is suspended and the "extraordinary" state the President announced is still on, four months and counting. In the absence of the court, Mr. Saied has plunged Tunisia into a constitutional crisis and, so far, he has failed to map a way out. Now he has a free hand to decide what he thinks is good for the country. On 29 September, he appointed Najla Bouden Romdhane as Prime Minister and a government was formed, a week later, while he kept repeating his promise of better governance and a corruption free country. However; he is yet to offer a workable roadmap to bring the country back to democratic life in which the ballot box decides who should be in power and a Constitutional Court that can decide, when needed.

Clearly Mr. Saied is aiming to re-write the constitution in a way that brings back the presidential system instead of parliamentarian system that many Tunisians blame for the current crisis, in the first place. His supporters still think he, literally, salvaged the state from within by putting an end to the otherwise endless politician quarrels that paralysed Tunisia for years.

The constitutional debate, aside from Tunisia's political crisis, masks deeper economic problems with entailing devastating social consequences. The country's almost bankrupt and foreign aid all but dried up after President Saied announced his measures. This is the real issue Kais Saied has so far failed to tackle, simply because he lacks the required cash.

In the regional context, what happened in Tunisia is seen differently by different regional powers. The European Union, Tunisia's main economic partner, believes it is an internal matter that has to do with democracy and the rule of law.

This view is countered in an article by Romano Prodi, in Italy's El Mensajero. Mr. Prodi is a veteran Italian politician and former European Commission president, accused Europe of supporting the "coup" in Tunisia by keeping silent. He interprets that silence as support for an "autocratic" axis, already groomed by regional powers like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. This is being countered, Mr. Prodi thinks, by Turkey and Qatar who are supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. This narrative is not new and has been the dominant talking point among commentators and pro- "Arab Spring" figures, including Mr. Saied predecessor, Moncef Marzouki, who thinks what Kais Saied is doing is part of a wider regional "counter revolution" sweeping the countries of the so called "Arab Spring."

The idea of "counter revolution" goes deeper and wider than Tunisia, to include Libya, Egypt, Syria and even Yemen. The Saudi, an autocratic regime deeply entangled in a largely failing military aggression in Yemen, would like to see the "democratisation" wave lose momentum and slowly die altogether. At the height of the "Arab Spring", Saudis sent forces to shore up its autocratic little neighbour, Bahrain. The Emirates, on the other hand, while competing with the Saudis, are attempting to dominate the political process in countries like Libya by supporting local proxies, including General Khalifa Haftar.

However, the situation in Tunisia can neither be characterised as a counter-revolution nor the work of some shady forces led by any regional power. The Tunisian case is a clear power struggle, enveloped in a constitutional dispute being made worse by failing parliament and political elite.

(This article was first published by the Middle East monitor, London.)

About the author

Mustafa Fetouri is a Libyan academic and freelance journalist. He is a recipient of the EU's Freedom of the Press prize.

Is Taiwan on the brink of being Colonized for the Seventh Time?
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Is Taiwan on the brink of being Colonized for the Seventh Time?

Ayesha Fakude Articles

Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China, is an island located to the southeast of mainland China, separated by the Taiwan Strait. It is about an eighth the size of Poland and is home to 23 million people. It has also, in recent years and amid escalating global geo-political tensions, been subjected to sometimes damaging political and military interest from Beijing.

The island has a long history of colonisation: the Dutch (1624-1662), the Spanish (1626-1642), the Zheng family (1662-1683), the Manchus (1683-1895), the Japanese (1895-1945) and finally, the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime (1945-1988) (1) have all colonised Taiwan.

The Dutch brought large numbers of Han Chinese to the island as labour for deer and agricultural exports. Following the defeat of the Han Ming dynasty by the Manchu Qing dynasty in 1644, Taiwan became a base for the Ming dynasty's recovery. The Dutch were driven out of Taiwan in 1662 with the aid of Zheng Cheng-gong, the son of a revered pirate and Ming Chinese official. Cheng-gong thereafter became Taiwan’s ruler. Subsequently, Zheng Cheng-gong made the first Han-backed regime and introduced Chinese administration to Taiwan;  Tainan, now Tainan City, was an administrative centre (2). Zheng Cheng-gong’s rule expanded the Chinese population and Chinese culture became dominant in most parts of the island.

The Spanish were not as successful during their Taiwanese rein as the Spanish had been. They were forced to retreat in 1642 due to Dutch and aboriginal pressures. The Dutch, during this time, supported the Chinese colonialists with military and administrative structures. Zheng Cheng-gong continued to support the Ming and opposed the Manchus until he died in 1662. However, Zheng’s support of the Ming dynasty was mostly for show: Zheng and the Ming administration, the Yung-li court, rarely spoke, leaving Zheng free to do as he pleased in his kingdom. The Ming’s absence from Taiwan gave Zheng ample flexibility and independence to pursue his interests.

The question of Taiwan’s sovereignty - and China’s claims that it certainly was not an independent state - stems in part from the Manchu period. The Manchu kingdom was twice the size of the Ming. Mainland China, in essence, was a colony itself, quite similar to India for the British Empire (3). The Manchu ruled Taiwan differently from China. Taiwan’s rule was loose, minimal and partial (4); for example, the American consul to Amoy, Charles LeGrendre, signed a treaty in 1867 with the Taiwan aboriginal Chief, not the Manchu government (5). Taiwan was Manchu, not Chinese.

Following Japan’s defeat in World War Two, in 1945 the Republic of China took over Taiwan on behalf of the allied forces and established the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Office (6). The story of the inseparable link from Taiwan to China stemmed from the colonial Kuomintang (KMT) government based in Nanjing (1945-1949). Neither the KMT government nor the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claimed Taiwan until 1942 (7). Then, in 1949, assertions of Taiwan’s link to mainland China emerged loudly from both Taipei and Beijing.

In more recent years, Beijing has labelled Taiwan a renegade province (8). Beijing asserts that there is only “one China” (9). The People’s Republic of China (PRC), declares itself to be the sole legitimate government of China, based on the “one-China principle” (10). The KMT-drafted constitution describes China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea as part of the Republic of China. Furthermore, Beijing claims that democratic Taiwan is bound by a 1992 consensus. The consensus, noted by the KMT and the ruling CCP, states that Taiwan agreed to be ruled by China. However, Taiwan disputes the contents of the consensus and says that it was never designed to question Taiwan’s legitimacy or legal status (11).

The current leaders of Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), also refute the consensus. Since the induction of Taiwan’s democratically elected President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, China has displayed escalating aggression towards Taiwan, including flying fighter jets close to the island. Still, President Tsai has refused the formula of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, which endorsed cross-strait ties with China (12). In a 2019 speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping, China reiterated its long-standing proposal for Taiwan to be incorporated into China under its “one country, two systems” formula (13). Quite similar to Hong Kong, the formula provides the ability for a territory to preserve its political and economic systems, with a high degree of autonomy (14). However, the formula is grossly unpopular in Taiwan – especially given Chinese crackdowns on Hong Kong’s freedoms. Both Tsai and the MKT have rejected the “one country, two systems” formula.

Globally, meanwhile, Taiwan has drawn praise for its peaceful and successful transition from authoritarian rule to a democracy. Taiwan is a poster child for the “third wave” of democracy which occurred in the 1980s and 90s; it receives regular praise from the US (15). In electing to force the “one country, two governments model” (16), China would ultimately destroy a democratic government.

There is major economic pressure at play, too. Taiwan’s economy is highly dependent on its trade with mainland China. Due to Beijing’s pressures on the island and Taiwanese officials’ growing concern about the nation’s over-reliance on China (17), Taiwan has been branching out and decreasing its trade with China. During President Ma’s tenure (2008-2016), Taiwan signed 20 pacts with the PRC, including, in 2010, the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (18). The agreement lifted a decade long trade barriers between the two nations. Subsequently, direct sea, air and mail links resumed. Tsai and the DPP have attempted to diversify Taiwan’s trade relations, with varied results. Tsai experienced success with boosting trade and investment with countries in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific through systematic initiatives, particularly the New Southbound Policy. Trade and investment between Taiwan and its designated countries increased by $15 billion between 2016 and 2019 (19). Additionally, in 2019, Tsai revealed a three-year plan to incentivise Taiwanese manufacturers to move from the mainland back to Taiwan.

Inversely, however, Taiwan’s trade with China in 2020 hit an all-time high. Beijing has pressured nations not to sign free trade agreements with Taiwan. Only a handful of nations have, with New Zealand and Singapore the only countries in the developed world to do so. Furthermore, Beijing has pushed for the exclusion of Taiwan from multilateral trading blocs such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (20).

Taiwan is not part of the United Nations (UN) because China rejects its participation. Given China’s increasing military capabilities and assertiveness, it is rumoured that China will do anything to “reunite” the mainland. Taiwan is highly unlikely to stave off a Chinese attack without external support, and so enters the United State of America (21). The US formally initiated diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1999, while simultaneously cutting diplomatic ties with the PRC. Amid mounting tensions between the PRC and the US and Taiwan and China, it is unknown whether the US would come to Taiwan’s aid. The US has adopted an ambiguous stance on the matter; it has, however, been selling defensive weapons to Taiwan against China’s wishes. Taiwan, in 2020, purchased $5.1 billion worth of arms from the US (22).

Since 1994, China has launched a series of military exercises. These exercises have a dual purpose: to demonstrate China’s resolve in maintaining the territorial integrity of the nation and to intimidate Taiwan into conforming to the “one-China principle” (23). Escalating tensions between China and the US may not necessarily be observed on the ground but can be seen in the US’s shifting opinion of China. China’s military might and enhanced capabilities have increased tension in the Strait, including for nations in Taiwan’s general vicinity - South Korea, Japan, The Philippines and Australia.

In closing, tensions are high. What can Taiwan do, and will the escalating tension result in war between China, Taiwan and the USA? Only time will tell.

Reference list

About the Author

Qhawezo Ayesha Fakude is a Junior Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

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COP26 must deliver a transformative agenda for financing climate action across developing countries

Parks Tau Articles

Climate change is one of the biggest challenges of our time. The cumulative effect of anthropogenic activity over the last 200 years is a main contributor to a rapidly changing climate. 

Climate change is a pattern of long-term change in the temperature and weather patterns globally or regionally which occur naturally. However due to the rapid increase in anthropogenic activity the change in weather patterns and temperature is being accelerated. 

The contribution of greenhouse gas emissions to climate change are too evident to ignore. Average global temperatures are increasing, extreme weather events are becoming more severe, ocean levels are rising, and acidification is occurring. 

All of these ecological threats are a result of human activity. Although the impacts of a rapidly changing climate cannot be prevented its intensity can be minimised through changing business as usual and adopting greener ways of operating as a society.

The Paris Agreement, which is a comprehensive framework that guides international efforts to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to meet all the associated challenges posed by climate change, was reached in 2015. 

The Paris Agreement sets out a global framework to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. It also aims to strengthen countries’ ability to deal with the impacts of climate change and support them in their efforts. To reach these goals, it is important that countries (especially developed countries) adhere to the commitments of the Paris Agreement. 

South Africa is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and has committed (in the updated Nationally Determined Contribution) that its GHG emissions will be between 398 – 510 mt co2 eq and 350 – 420 mt co2 for the periods 2021 – 2025 and 2026 – 2030 respectively. 

The Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development has been mandated by Gauteng Executive Council to provide climate leadership in the Gauteng City Region (GCR). 

To this extent, the Department had to develop a Gauteng climate action roadmap and clarify roles and responsibilities for various stakeholders, including Gauteng Provincial Government Departments and the private sector. 

The Gauteng City Region Over-Arching Climate Change Response Strategy and Action Plan has been completed and approved by the Gauteng Executive Council on 26 August 2020. Through the implementation of this Strategy, Gauteng Province is contributing its fair of South Africa’s commitment made in the National Determined Contribution (NDC) document. 

The Gauteng Department of Infrastructure Development has a Green Technology Programme with sub-programmes on solar rooftop, gas conversion and supply in hospitals, installation of smart meters to track the average consumption, water conservation, waste water recycling, and waste to energy. The solar roof top sub-programme is estimated to install 10MWp across all 11 Health Care Facilities for phase 1. 

The amount saved as a result of the installation of smart metres amounts to over R300 million on electricity bills. 

Transport is the second most greenhouse gas emitting sector after energy in Gauteng City Region. The Gauteng City Region is therefore pursuing investment in public transport systems, especially mass transit (commuter rail, Gautrain and Bus Rapid Transit) along major corridors in urban areas and their integration e.g. Rea Vaya BRT, Harambee BRT, Areyeng BRT. Implementation of green infrastructure for the construction of roads and non-motorised transport systems has also been prioritized.

A new report released by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shows that the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather disasters such as floods, droughts and megafires as a result of climate change is having a devastating effect on food security and livelihoods. 

In Gauteng, crop and livestock production are expected to reduce due to lower soil fertility, short rains, extreme weather events such as hail and flooding, loss of feed caused by loss of grasslands and heat stress. 

In response to these threats, the Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development is implementing conservation agriculture, urban agriculture and climate resilient programmes. 

Metropolitan Municipalities have developed the Cities’ Climate Action Plans whose implementation is putting the cities in the low carbon path and ensure climate resilience. 

The City of Johannesburg’s Climate Action Plan has been approved by Council whilst the City of Tshwane Climate Action Plan and City of Ekurhuleni’s Green Cities Action Plan are at advanced stages of approval. 

Whilst the provincial and local governments are responsible for development of policy framework and implementation of certain flagship programmes, most of climate change response work lie within the private sector. 

The Gauteng Provincial Government, therefore, commends the climate change response initiatives undertaken by different institutions within the private sector and also encourages other institutions to commission similar programmes. 

The Gauteng Provincial Government supports South Africa’s position on COP 26 which will be held on 31 October to 12 November 2021 in Glasgow, Scotland and the commitments in the Nationally Determined Contribution Document through its continued implementation of the programmes highlighted above. 

The Province further commit to allocate more resources for the expansion of these programmes and commission of new ones to ensure a low carbon footpath and climate resilience within the Gauteng City Region.

This article was first published in the African Mirror by Parks Tau.

About the author

Parks Tau is the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) of the Provincial Government of Gauteng in South Africa