The relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong is incredibly complex. The two are intricately bound economically, in trade, legislation – and perhaps most importantly, in citizenship.

In 1984 when Hong Kong was still a British colony, the UK and China signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration. This stipulated that Hong Kong would be signed over to mainland China in 1997; however, the existing social, economic and political systems in the region were to be maintained. The “one country, two systems” model meant that Hong Kong would operate as a capitalist economy and its residents would enjoy free speech, press and religion for the 50 years that followed. But Hong Kong’s residents have proven resistant to Beijing’s continued political and social interference in its affairs.

Hong Kong’s political framework

Hong Kong is, in theory, a democracy. It shares China’s president as its chief of state, though each has its own head of government. The premier is the head of mainland China, and the chief executive is responsible for Hong Kong. The chief executive is accountable to the Central People’s Government. Hong Kong possess its own legal and judicial systems, characterised by its public servants and district organisations fashioned under British common law. Despite the separation of rights, systems and administration, examples of Beijing’s persistent and purposeful interference in Hong Kong’s political and social arena abound. 

One especially controversial example is 2020’s National Security Law. It was published on the same day that it went into effect, giving China sweeping powers over the semi-autonomous region of Hong Kong. The law describes penalties as severe as life imprisonment for crimes like secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. Within a year of its imposition, the law had drastically changed Hong Kong.

Political opposition has been crushed, pro-democracy media have been forced to close or self-censor and political and advocacy groups have disbanded. As from 2020, at least 128 people have been arrested and charged with national security offences under the National Security Law by a police force set up specifically to enact and enforce it. That number includes three minors, dozens of politicians and journalists. Only 17 have been granted bail. Freedom of expression has been crushed.

This law is viewed by people in Hong Kong as a step by Beijing to take the semi-autonomous region over entirely. They fear that the law will erode Hong Kong’s judicial system and make it more like the system employed by Beijing. People also worry that the imposition of the law could affect Hong Kong’s standing as a business and economic powerhouse, as thousands of people have already fled the region. 

The anti-extradition law

The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill has been another hot topic. This extradition bill was proposed by Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (its parliament) in 2019. The bill authorises Hong Kong to extradite criminals to mainland China for trial. After 1 million people rallied in the streets in a peaceful protest, the government refused to waive the bill. It took a protest involving more than 2 million people for the bill to be suspended but not fully dissolved

Hong Kong’s government claimed the bill was triggered by the February 2018 murder of a 20-year-old woman, Poon Hiu-wing, in Taiwan by her boyfriend, Chan Tong-kai. When Chan returned to Hong Kong he could not be tried for her murder although he admitted to it. The amended bill was intended to provide legal grounds for Chan to be tried for murder in Taiwan. However, the bill also allowed for the extradition of Hong Kongers to other nations, including mainland China, that do not have extradition agreements with Hong Kong.

There are worries that, if the bill is eventually enacted, it will solidify mainland China’s footing in Hong Kong’s judicial and political arenas, not to mention, undermine Hong Kong’s democracy.

Media censorship

For years following the activation of the “one nation, two systems” policy, Hong Kong was home to a plethora of local and foreign media outlets. However, within the last two years, several outlets have left the region. After the implementation of the National Security Law, the police have declined to specifically comment on the  rampant blocking of certain social media outlets. They have been quoted as saying they may “…take a disabling action on electronic messages… if their publication were likely to constitute an offence endangering national security”.

There have already been some high-profile blocks and bans. UK-based advocacy group Hong Kong Watch cannot be accessed from some Hong Kong networks. Last year the anti-government doxing platform, HKChronicles, was banned too. The platform published the personal information of people in Beijing and some police officers in Hong Kong accused of police brutality. Additionally, last year a website commemorating the killing of protesters in 1989 in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square also became inaccessible in Hong Kong.

What next?

The “one nation, two systems” approach was designed to see Beijing slowly integrate Hong Kong into the mainland’s political and judicial systems. It has been less than 2 decades and China has already taken great leaps to assimilate HK into its framework. China seems to be in a rush: it is forcing more of its systems onto Hong Kong all the time. For now, Hong Kongers are steadfast in their resistance to this push.

About the author

Qhawezo Ayesha Fakude is a Junior Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

Just before Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin renewed their vows of friendship. In a lengthy statement the countries vowed to “stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions and the intend to counter interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext”.

More than a month on, Russia faces ever-more global condemnation and economic sanctions – including being shut out of the Swift financing system.  China, meanwhile, stands to benefit from the ongoing war in its own quest to stand against American or western domination. This quest is at the heart of Sino-Russia relations, which are largely underpinned by shared determination to create an economic and social order that would suit their interests best and, to use their own term, have Chinese or Russian characteristics. China showed that it is prepared to create such an order when it availed it alternative financial systems and its social media platform, Weibo, to Russia in the wake of global restrictions. Both nations are also committed to “de-dollarisation” so they can avoid any punitive financial measures taken by the Americans. There is already close cooperation between Russia and China’s  central banks. This offers Russia access to its foreign reserves in the Chinese currency which remains untouchable by the west.  

The two nations are tight trading partners. Russia is China's biggest supplier of resources, including petroleum products and wood, while China provides the majority of Russia’s electrical and electronic equipment needs. Russia has also committed itself to becoming a crucial part of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Bilateral trade hit a record annual high of more than $146 billion in 2021, up from less than $16 billion in 2003 and nearly $110 billion in 2020; Russia serves as a major source of China’s oil, coal, natural gas, and agricultural imports. 

The countries’ union is not just economic. Diplomatically, they seek to build new international organisations.

But Beijing will be aware that it needs to tread carefully as the Ukraine war continues and global backlash deepens. Its close relationship with Russia may see it face sanctions, too. By standing with Russia, China risks damage to its reputation and its economy. Having only recently emerged from a trade war with the US, and still grappling with the economic implications of Covid-19, China knows the last thing it needs is to get inextricably bound up in a conflict that somebody else initiated.

 Close to mid-2022, President Xi is set convince 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, to divorce succession tradition and abolish term limits, giving him a third go in office. As would expected with any political organization before any watershed convergence such as this, discontent is already rearing its ugly, especially, amongst the middle-class and well-off Chinese.

This group would rather have Xi concentrate on addressing domestic problems such growing air pollution in Guangzhou, contaminated drinking water and factory spills of toxic chemical in Shanxi Province, as opposed to shipping focus and attention a cross the border to the Russian-Ukraine crisis. If Xi doesn't give these so-perceived kingmakers, it could be costly and detrimental to his plans of becoming the most powerful Chinese leader, ever.

Through the much-praised BRI China diplomatically projects herself as a sound, reliable and non-interfering trade partner who respects territorial integrity and governance architecture of all nations, and its open support for the non-silencing of guns in Ukraine could be a slap in the face of that status in the global village. This is more so, to the close to 54 African nations, who not so long ago themselves just tasted freedom from the claws of oppression, colonialism and political depression.

It will, however, be loathed if it is to entirely desert Russia in its hour of need. The answer here lies in China stepping up as a peace broker between Russia and Ukraine and aiding the two nations to carve a solution through negotiations.

This is perhaps why the tone of China’s public statements has shifted from siding outright with Putin and the Kremlin to encouraging all diplomatic efforts and offering to play a constructive role in promoting the de-escalation of the situation in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, there are increasing fears from America and Europe that China may see the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to occupy Taiwan, which it believes is an integral part of China. These concerns will likely keep Russia and China close: China needs Russia if it is to move against Taiwan.

Russia has in the past pledged its support for a one-China policy which dictates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory and has given China its word that it would respect this position by not engaging officially with Taiwan.  The US, however, says it remains committed to Taiwan’s independence and sovereignty; it will continue to oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo in the best interest of the people of Taiwan.

Be that as it may, the recent dispatching of top US security defence and diplomatic assets to Taiwan is indicative that the world will not stand by and watch China invade and take over that island nation, hence signalling a stern warning to Xi and his forces not to attempt.  This is strongly so because, unlike with Ukraine, Taiwan is part of what has been termed "first island chain," which according to history is a conglomerate of islands that are fraternal with the US and its foreign policy focus.

China would therefore not dare taint its standing in the world with invading Taiwan at a time it is crucial for its global trade partners to grow and subsequently the dominance and performance of Chinese products on shelves around the globe.

About the author

Jemima Beukes is a Research Fellow at Afrasid based in Namibia, Windhoek. She is the co-founder of Women in the Media. She holds a Bachelor of Journalism and Communication Technology degree. She is a senior political journalist at Namibia Media Holdings.

 

South Korea will soon have a new president. In what is regarded as the closest presidential win in the country’s history, Yoon Sook-yeol from the opposition People Power Party beat out the governing Democratic Party led by Lee Jae-myung in early March. Yoon has vowed to pay particular attention to people’s livelihoods and to welfare services. He wants to unify the nation and introduce a new age of active participation in the international community. But despite being president-elect in the world’s 10^th largest economy, Yoon won’t have an easy ride. There has already been extensive public backlash to his election – and women are perhaps the most concerned about what the avowed anti-feminist’s rule will bring.

Comparisons with Trump

Yoon, 61, served as the South Korean prosecutor general from 2019 to 2021 under President Moon Jae-in and played a key role in the prosecution for corruption of former President Park Geun-hye. Yoon joined the presidential race late last year; his style of campaigning drew immediate attention. Several publications and observers drew stark parallels with the US presidential campaign, with Yoon being compared to Donald Trump. Reference was made to Yoon’s style of speaking and barrage of offensive comments during the campaign. Many were particularly concerned by a comment that was interpreted as praise for the former South Korean President and military dictator, Chun Doo-hwan, who was known for his brutal mistreatment of pro-democratic protesters in the 1980s. Additionally, and more alarmingly, despite somewhat virtuous presidential ambitions to address key economic shortcomings, Yoon pledged to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality. 

Yoon argues that women in South Korea do not face systemic discrimination. This, despite vast evidence to the contrary. Yoon blames South Korea’s low birthrate on the rise of feminism and women being more assertive about their rights.

In spite of the aspirations of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, South Korea has the worst record for women’s rights in the developed world. Experts in the country affirm that laws do not provide sufficient punishment for crimes against women and girls and that the judicial system’s approach to crimes against women and girls is intrinsically linked to the country’s patriarchal society. The stigmatisation of women's rights by Yoon’s campaign is strongly supported by his voter base, made up largely of young men who believe the president-elect speaks for them.

Anti-Feminist Rhetoric

Amid skyrocketing housing costs, an increasing wealth gap and soaring numbers of youth unemployment, people in South Korea are looking for a change. In his presidential campaign, Yoon promised to address the social and economic issues plaguing the county. However, in doing, so he weaponised the frustrations of young men at the expense of women’s rights.

South Korean men reject notions of masculine privilege and the benefits that come with patriarchal forms of sexism. Furthermore, a study revealed that young men’s impressions of sexism are strongly characterised by anti-feminist rhetoric: 56.8% of men in their 20s are strongly opposed to feminism, with 29.8% rating their opposition on a scale from 1 to 12 as 12.

According to reports, unemployment has risen to 9.9%. As a result, men are feeling a sense of loss; their social status is threatened by economic uncertainty. Many blame women and policies aimed at giving women employment opportunities. Perhaps to a degree their grievances are justified.

South Korean women have a higher rate of university graduation and are generally able to begin work earlier than men (young men are conscripted into the military, delaying the start of their working lives). On the flip side, though nearly 70% of women aged between 25 and 34 are employed, many leave the workforce to have children because of social pressure and workplace policies that discriminate against working mothers.

Working women face substantial discrimination. For example, The Economist recently ranked South Korea as the worst performer among industrialised nations on the glass-ceiling index, which measures gender differences in education, wages and managerial positions. South Korea is ranked 127th out of 153 countries in terms of economic participation in the World Economic Forum’s gender gap report, a far cry from 96th in 2006. Additionally, there is a 35% gender pay gap with few women holding managerial or decision making positions. Women account for less than a fifth of South Korean national legislators and only 5.2% holding board member positions in publicly traded companies. And according to The World Bank, women hold only 17% of seats in South Korea’s parliament. 

Violence against women and girls is a huge problem in South Korea, too. The rise of the #MeToo movement led to revelations about several high-profile cases. In 2020, Seoul mayor Park Won-soon died by suicide after his former secretary accused him of sexual harassment. Additionally, the government struggled to address problems with online gender violence, namely the non-consensual sharing of sexual images and molka – secretly filmed videos, sexual in nature, posted online. But Yoon did not take aim at men in his campaign: instead, he stated that harsher punishments should be enacted for false sexual harassment allegations. If he goes ahead with this policy it will almost certainly silence victims.

With Yoon at the helm, it appears that life for South Korea’s women and girls is about to get tougher.

About the author

Qhawezo Ayesha Fakude is a Junior Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

Keep the Palestinian struggle out of Putin’s war in Ukraine, Thembisa Ebrahim Fakude, unpacks

 

 

At the turn of the millennium, China and Zimbabwe revived relations after the African nation had cut ties with its former coloniser, Britain. When the British left, trade doors were opened; Chinese companies snapped up lucrative tenders for national projects and became a dominant player in Zimbabwe.

Experts state that in 2011 alone, Chinese investments pumped US$460 million into the Zimbabwean economy. The Asian giant consistently ranks among Zimbabwe’s top five trade partners – the volume of trade between the two countries surpasses US$1.1 billion annually.

But how is this relationship playing out for ordinary Zimbabwean workers? This paper shall examine the nature and extent of labour rights abuses by Chinese companies operating in Zimbabwe. Its premise, though, is that the flouting of labour regulations cannot be blamed solely on investors’ conduct. Instead, such flouting is evidence of disrespect for Zimbabwe’s working class that is embedded within its own regulatory environment. In fact, there is much deeper abuse of workers in Zimbabwe by locals than there is by Chinese companies. This is because the company is complicatedly informalised. Because Chinese companies tend to , their abuses make headlines more often than local examples do.

Zimbabwe has a long-standing legacy of worker abuse. There are weaknesses embedded in its labour rights enforcement institutions that are beyond the control of international investors operating in the country.

Historic relations 

China–Zimbabwe relations were birthed during the colonial period when the former late President Robert Mugabe was given support by the Asian nation in his quest to outwit the colonial forces of Rhodesia. Mugabe turned to China after the Soviet Union turned down his request to support the military wing of his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union, in favour of his rival Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union.

On 18 April 1980, as Zimbabwe celebrated its independence from colonial rule, Mugabe met with Chinese officials to formally establish diplomatic ties. Two months later then vice-president Simon Vengesai Muzenda visited Beijing to express his thanks; Mugabe followed the next year.

But between 1980 and the year 2000, relations between the two countries did not extend to huge economic contact. The Southern African nation was still pursuing a somewhat close relationship with Britain as part of a policy of reconciliation.

Then came the government’s fall-out with white commercial farmers during the late 1990s and the inception of the Fast Track Land Reform Exercise which evicted those farmers from their properties. Relations between Zimbabwe and the West deteriorated. China stepped into the vacuum.

Ties between the two nations have deepened since then, in line with Zimbabwe's Look East Policy. China has become Zimbabwe’s all-weather friend.

Chinese investments in Zimbabwe   

China has snapped up high-value projects in Zimbabwe, including work on fixing water infrastructure and rehabilitating sewerage systems for the Harare City Council, to the tune of US$144 million. The project was financed by China’s Exim Bank.

Another project was the completion of the US$ 98 million Zimbabwe National Defence College, constructed by Anhui Foreign and Economic Construction Company, again through an interest-heavy loan from China’s Exim Bank. This was celebrated at a time when Zimbabwe’s credit rating had been downgraded to “junk” status by multilateral lending institutions. Other projects include the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Pipeline – first mooted by colonial settlers in 1912 and finally taking shape – as well as development of the Kunzvi Dam. Chinese firms are also engaged in massive power and energy projects in Zimbabwe.

It's not just large, national-scale projects that draw Chinese investors and companies. They are working across all spheres of Zimbabwe’s economy. This means Chinese companies are major employers – and with that comes the risk of potential labour rights violations and issues.

Labour rights dilemmas

There have been several instances of Chinese companies running foul of labour laws. For instance, in 2011 employees took a Chinese-run construction company, Sogecoa Zimbabwe (Pvt) Company to court amid allegations of exploitation and rights violations. Sogecoa is a sister to the diamond company, Anjin, which was among those awarded licences to mine Marange diamonds. The workers said they were being paid a measly US$4 a day for working long hours. This was far below gazetted rates of between US$1, 06 and $1, 51 per hour with a 44-hour week.

But this is by no means a problem unique to Chinese companies in Zimbabwe. Many workers were left hamstrung by history:  the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions has accused government of pursuing an anti-labour stance by adopting bad economic policies which devalued the local currency; the fast tracked land reform exercise meant many workers in the agricultural sector had been rendered jobless; and, the manner in which white commercial farmers were forced out of the country meant they weren’t able to settle pension and salary obligations. Zimbabwe has a traceable history of disregarding labour rights long before Chinese companies came on board.

Labour institutions like unions and National Employment Councils, mandated to legally enforce labour rights, were already weak at the turn of the millennium as the government pursued a policy to salvage the economy at the expense of workers’ rights.

Still, complaints against Chinese employers and companies continue to dominate the headlines.

The National Union of Quarry Workers of Zimbabwe  has accused Chinese employers at Ngezi Mine in Zvishavane of ill-treating and underpaying their workers. Union leader Onias Munenga was quoted in the press as saying the Chinese miners were not abiding by the country’s labour laws. There have also been complaints from the construction sector.

In a recent and terrible example of this issue, in 2020 a Chinese national named Zhang Xuelin, who doubled as proprietor and General Manager of Reeden Mine near the city of Gweru, allegedly shot and injured workers Wendy Chikwaira and Kennedy Tachiona, according to the New Zimbabwe news website. The two had reportedly approached their boss to demand their unpaid wages. A brawl followed and the pair were shot – Tachiona apparently three times in both legs. In response, the Chinese Embassy in Harare issued a statement, expressing hope that the incident would not damage their country's relations with Zimbabwe. Others in the Chinese community denounced the shooting – a reminder that it’s important to distinguish between individual criminal acts and Chinese abuses.

Meanwhile, the shooter fled the country and was exonerated by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. This is evidence, surely, of internal weaknesses rather than widespread Chinese misconduct.

Another example of the blurred lines between Chinese behaviour and Zimbabwe’s own responsibilities can be found in the diamond mining sector. In Chiadzwa, Manicaland, thousands of villagers were displaced from their villages and relocated  to Arda Transau , a state-owned farm in Odzi, to make way for a diamond mine. The villagers were promised better lives by both the government and several Chinese mining companies. Yet, much of the blame is heaped solely on the Chinese companies while, as Newsday noted in a report on 21 March 2021, Zimbabwe’s government failed to enforce the expected basic standards.

The Zimbabwe Environmental Association (ZELA) makes an interesting observation: “As the Chinese footprint is surging especially in Zimbabwe’s extractive sector, there has been an increase in alleged cases of unfair labor practices, human rights abuse and disregard of environmental regulations by the Chinese.” 

The environmental lobby group then traces the real problem to its roots. China needs the strategic mineral resources available in Zimbabwe, while the latter needs the income from these resources, especially after its show of defiance against the West. Zimbabwean elites have found a commercial partner in China with capital to finance mining and provide a market. It is therefore the desperation of Zimbabwe’s government to generate income that underpins inherent weaknesses in the institutions that ought to project workers. Chinese companies alone cannot be blamed.

Instead, Zimbabwe must look to its own culture of disrespecting workers’ rights.

A bad track record

Zimbabwe’s record of ill- treating workers predates the arrival of Chinese capital in the country. Records of the International Labour Organisation indicate that as early as 2004 and several years thereafter, labour abuses were rife. In some instances, the government would not accept the ILO’s commissions of enquiry into its activities.

The courts do not always protect workers, either. On 17 July 2015 Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court ruled that workers could be dismissed with only two weeks’ notice. This further weakened employees’ already precarious position in the labour market.

Another internationally respected lobby group, the International Trade Union Confederation, has consistently rated Zimbabwe as one of the world’s worst countries for the working class due to rampant abuse of workers rights through government institutions and weak legislation.

A study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has shown that Zimbabwe has the second largest informal sector in the world. Only Bolivia, in South America, has a larger informal sector. Yet to date, the National Social Security Authority, which is mandated to trace, detect and address workplace deficits does not deal with the informal sector. This means it effectively ignores the widespread labour rights abuses in the sector

It appears that Chinese companies become more visible because they are the dominant or large-scale employers in a highly informalised economy where millions of abuses go unnoticed due to the haphazard nature of organised labour.

Conclusion

While Chinese companies are found wanting on the issue of abusing labour rights in Zimbabwe, the country’s record of workers rights abuses predates the arrival of the Asian nation’s companies into the Southern Africa nation. For decades, Zimbabwe has been listed by globally acclaimed labour institutions for flouting labour regulations – yet very few of these lists mention Chinese companies as the main offender.

Labour rights abuses by local employers largely go unnoticed because there’s little tracking of workers’ experiences in the informal sector.

It is also important to note that Zimbabwe’s labour legal framework does not adequately protect workers’ rights; this leaves them prone to abuse by any employer, regardless of nationality.

Chinese companies in Zimbabwe operate investments concentrated in agriculture, mining, construction, trade and tourism which coincidentally happen to employ the majority of the populace. This makes any allegation against the companies automatically big news, but it is not representative of the actual state of affairs around workers’ rights in Zimbabwe.

About the author

Alois Vinga is Zimbabwean journalist who holds a Diploma in Communication & Journalism, Bachelor of Arts Degree in Media Studies, post-graduate diploma In Education and is currently reading for a Masters in Development Practice with the Midlands State University. He holds three media reporting awards in Labour and Gender and Disability Reporting.