Solutions Sought For Insurgency In Mozambique’s “Forgotten Cape”
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Solutions Sought For Insurgency In Mozambique’s “Forgotten Cape”

The end, in 1992, of a post-independence civil war in Mozambique left citizens feeling optimistic about their and the country’s future. But, almost three decades later, real progress continues to elude the vast, resource-rich southern African country as it lurches from one crisis to another.

Mozambique boasts vast but as yet unexplored mineral resources. However, poverty rates are high in many parts of the former Portuguese colony.

For nearly five years, Mozambique has been in the throes of an insurgency that has made life uncertain for both citizens and foreign investors priming themselves to reap huge windfalls from the huge gas discoveries in the northern part of the country.

The bloody insurrection in Cabo Delgado province by an Islamist-linked armed group calling itself Ansar al-Sunna (supporters of the tradition) is generally believed to be linked to the marginalisation that locals in Cabo Delgado and other remote northern provinces have always complained suffering at the hands of the ruling elites in Maputo (which is around 2,400kms from Cabo Delgado). The province has become a magnet for investors and the people there are shown images of multi-million investments in extractive industry projects and hear often how rich their province is in natural resources like oil and gas – but none of the benefits have cascaded down to them or amounted to any tangible benefits.  

Five years ago, youths in Cabo Delgado launched an uprising against the government. These are frustrated young people who want jobs and demand government services; the toxic cocktail of poverty and radicalisation lit the fires of an insurgency that continues, largely away from the international spotlight.

In 2019, the insurgents pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State, marking the first Islamist-linked conflict in southern Africa and alarming the world. The nature of their relationship with the larger terror group is uncertain. In March 2021, the fighters launched a brutal attack on the port town of Palma, close to the gas projects. It left dozens of people dead, and, within a month, the militants controlled a significant chunk of territory in four of the country’s five provinces.

A history of oppression, radicalisation

Cabo Delgado has a long history of both oppression and radicalisation. Once a favoured target of slave traders, the province’s Muslim-majority population was repeatedly forced into labour for the production of cotton and other cash crops during 500 years of Portugal’s colonial domination.

The first shots in Mozambique’s independence war were fired in this province in the mid-1960s. However, during the subsequent decade of the liberation struggle, it was the Makonde tribal group, mostly Christians from the province’s highlands, who went on to play a central role in the subsequent Marxist Frelimo government. The coastal Muslim Mwani people were largely sidelined, which partly explains their frustrations and grievances. Cabo Delgado residents call their region “Cabo Esquecido” or “forgotten Cape”.

At some point around 2007 the Mwani people slowly began to believe – through radicalisation – that having an independent state could solve their social exclusion. They did not trust government institutions and decided to solve local problems themselves. The central government responded by calling the Mwani bandits and criminals, sending in heavily armed police to restore public order. In October 2017 the extremists, who had previously targeted civilians, began attacking police posts and military barracks.


Outside intervention

Mozambique’s government then tried to quell the uprising by hiring Russian mercenaries. The guns for hire suffered heavy casualties and were forced to flee.

President Filipe Nyusi then reluctantly turned to other African countries for assistance. This had been on offer for some months, especially from other members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the European Union and the US. Nyusi initially insisted that Mozambique did not require outsiders’ boots on the ground: instead, he called for training, weaponry and money. But, come July 2021, Rwandan and southern African troops (from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania) were finally deployed to Cabo Delgado to fight alongside Mozambican soldiers. At this stage the insurgency was slowly spreading into the neighbouring Niassa province and Tanzania.

Some security observers have suggested that France might be behind Rwanda’s push into Mozambique: The European nation, they argued, was trying to protect a $20 billion gas field investment by French energy giant Total. It is a view shared by author and journalist Joseph Hanlon, who has written extensively about the unfolding of events in Cabo Delgado. However, it’s worth nothing that within two weeks in July 2021, the 1,000-strong Rwandan detachment made more headway than Mozambique’s own army and foreign mercenaries had achieved in four years, wrestling back key infrastructure that had been under rebel control for two years.

What comes next?

President Nyusi will want to leave a positive legacy at the end of his second five-year term in 2024. In the second week of February 2022, he went on a diplomatic offensive around the world, looking for assistance and money for the war; award-winning Mozambican journalist Luis Nhachote is among those documenting this drive.

Meanwhile, the bystanders in this war – the EU – and global energy giants are watching and hoping that their time to reap what they’ve sowed in investment is drawing nearer.

About the author

Charles Mangwiro is a research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid) specialising on geopolitics of Mozambique.  He also serves as the  editor of Radio Mozambique in Maputo, Mozambique. 

Could hosting the next Climate Change Conference in the MENA region be a solution for the climate apocalypse?
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Could Hosting The Next Climate Change Conference In The MENA Region Be A Solution For The Climate Apocalypse?

For many countries in the Middle East, October and November’s United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) summit in Glasgow revealed a reality at the heart of climate change: they are not chiefly responsible for the problem, but will be badly affected by it.

The evidence suggests that global warming will do the Middle East no favours. For an early example of the phenomenon’s damaging power, it is timely to look no further than Syria. Climate change caused the generational drought that preceded the ongoing civil war there. That drought drove rural farmers into urban centers like Damascus and Aleppo, priming the populace for concentrated, large-scale political unrest. 

As climate change causes rapid temperature increases, food shortages, and economic pain elsewhere, more Middle Eastern countries might tip over into bloodshed. Relatedly, climate change has helped fuel civil war and conflict across the Middle East, including in Syria, Libya and Yemen. 

In Tehran, between 4,000 and 5,000 residents lose their lives per year due to air pollution. According to a report by the World Bank published in April 2019, Tehran is ranked 12th among 26 megacities in terms of ambient PM10 levels. After Cairo, Tehran is the most polluted non-Asian megacity.

Energy sources, mainly water, have also become a reason for direct conflict between Middle Eastern countries. Nearly every country in the Middle East, from Morocco to Iran, shares water resources with a neighbour; some have little freshwater of their own. Therefore, a proxy war between Egypt and Sudan and between Turkey and Syria could become a frequent feature of Middle Eastern politics as water becomes even more scarce.

As an another example, it is at the heart of the siege of Gaza — the River Jordan is one of the biggest problem between Israel and the Palestinians. According to Amnesty International,  one of the most devastating consequences of this water conflict is the impact of Israel’s discriminatory policies on Palestinians’ access to adequate supplies of clean and safe water. As a result of continuous restrictions, many Palestinian communities in the West Bank have no choice but to purchase water brought in by trucks at extremely high prices ranging from 4 to 10 USD per cubic metre. In some of the poorest communities, water expenses can, at times, account for half of a family’s monthly income.

Over the years, water has also brought Iraq, Syria and Turkey to the brink of war over their shared rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris. Water, it is clear, matters as much as land.

There is some hopeful news. last November, Egypt and the UAE were selected as host countries for COP27 and COP28, respectively. The question, of course, is whether these opportunities will help mitigate against the destructive effects of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, or offer a platform to stabilise its water wars. Of course the events themselves are a cure for the economic hegemony of climate change – they are not the end of the road, but part of the journey. Hosting the events gives the region momentum.

Already, there have been positive signs. After COP26, Qatar rapidly started to focus on its own local energy sources to fight against climate change. The world's largest exporter of liqufied natural gas (LNG) announced its decision to pull out of OPEC, ending nearly 60 years of membership of the international oil producers' cartel. The withdrawal from OPEC did not mean that Qatar was getting out of the oil business altogether; it was simply withdrawing from an organisation that governs oil markets.

According to McKinsey “Global Gas Outlook to 2050”, the world is witnessing a new global energy transformation: LNG, it argues, will not only show resilience but will also be the fastest-growing fossil fuel between 2020 and 2035. Qatar can use its LNG status to adopt technology that offers energy alternatives; given that its geographic location places it at serious risk from climate change, it has no time to lose in transforming its energy sector.

To sum up, it is clear that COPS27 and 28 will be a platform for Arab people, and especially for the youth, who have been vocal on this topic, to be heard. Regionally, it is a time for climate activists to showcase what they have been doing on the ground. Many youths don’t get media coverage internationally. It will be a good oppourtunity for local people to be seen to be responding to pressure to act not only from the west, but from within their own region. People in the Middle East share some of the west’s problems – a lack of water, a collapse of ecosystems. Now, it is time to share the solutions.

About the Author

Elif Selin Calik is a Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).  She is a regular contributor to publications like TRT World, Daily Sabah, Rising Powers in Global Governance and Hurriyet Daily News. She was one of the founders of the In-Depth News Department of Anadolu News Agency. 

Why does Algeria insist on hosting an Arab Summit that can bring no good?
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Why Does Algeria Insists On Hosting An Arab Summit That Can Bring No Good?

The late Muammar Gaddafi erred in many policies and positions, but he was very correct in his lack of faith in the Arab League. Despite his discontent with it and its accumulated flaws, and despite his repeated threats over the years to withdraw from it, Gaddafi did not have the courage to withdraw from this crumbling league. He did not find an alternative, in his direction towards the depth of Africa. This is a sign of the difficulty of the trap of belonging to the Arab League and the almost impossibility of escaping from it.

The League was in better regional political condition than it is now and it did not encourage the divorce of the Arab League. Today, given the deterioration and fragmentation of Arab relations, withdrawal seems less difficult to implement and promote.

At the time of Gaddafi, it was possible to reform the Arab League, albeit with difficulty. However, some members, led by Egypt, refused to open the door to talk about any reform because it would have meant reconsidering the General Secretariat and the rest of the leadership positions and how they are assumed. This would have affected the sanctity of Egypt's monopoly on the General Secretariat and its control over the organisation's work mechanisms and positions.

Today, there is neither hope nor an opportunity for reforming the Arab League. It should be dissolved, and its employees and diplomats should be returned to their homes and countries. Algeria's relentless pursuit of hosting the next Arab summit, and its insistence on making it a success, is an unrealistic thought. The so-called Arab ranks no longer exist, and President Abdelmadjid Tebboune's talk about its unification is also far from reality and political realism.

Even if Algeria hosted the summit, its success remains a completely different story – and the terms of its success and failure need to be defined in this context. The fault is not in Algeria's intentions as much as it is also in other objective data, and in the members, their positions and their political mentalities.

The Algeria Summit, if and when it is held, will be the most difficult and dangerous. It may be the lowest ranking in terms of official representation (the quality of attendance has become the only measure of the Summit's success).

Aside from limited exceptional cases, such as the summits that followed major events, such as the "Three No's" summit in Khartoum after the setback of 1967, the Tunis Summit (1979) following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the Fez Summit (1982) following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, it has not witnessed a summit of kings and presidents at the level of gravity of the awaited summit in Algeria this year.

The difference today is that the Khartoum, Tunis and Fez summits, for example, were held against the background of the dangerous events that preceded them and were punctuated by similar feelings and moods that led to similar positions. However, the 2022 Algeria summit is being held amid unprecedented division. It is also held to save face and show off, and not against the backdrop of dangerous unilateral decisions such as the normalisation of the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain and Sudan with Israel (does anyone know what the Arab League's position is on this normalisation?). These decisions are comparable in severity to the Camp David Accords at the time, and are even more than that.

The Arab region today is drowning in quantity and type of crises that cannot be solved. Syria needs a special summit. Libya as well; Yemen, Iraq, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Moroccan-Algerian crisis and the relationship with Iran. This is in addition to the crises of health, education, poverty, hopelessness, and illegal migration, which are concerns far more dangerous than politics and threaten human beings in their existence.

The other danger is that Arab governments and regimes are deeply divided over each of these crises, without exception. There is no similar Arab position (let alone unified) regarding any of these crises, and there will not be. Some crises were created by Arab countries, and they played dangerous sabotaging roles in them, so are we waiting for the wolf to assume the role of the shepherd?

There is a fact that Algerian officials need to consider seriously, which is the absence of any noticeable influence for them in the Arab environment. The centres of influence and their tools in the Arab world have changed and moved to other countries. This happened in the absence of Algeria, either because of the civil war in the 1990s, or when Bouteflika monopolised everything and decided to paralyse the country as soon as he was paralysed by illness.

Influence over the Arabs today is monopolised by certain countries, and Algeria is not one of them. This includes Saudi Arabia due to its economic and spiritual power, the UAE, by virtue of its economic strength and daring to engage in strategic risks, and Egypt is trying to hold on to the remnants of its traditional influence, supported by the Gulf. Then there are other countries like Qatar, Kuwait and Oman.

Algeria does not have the new tools of influence. It does not have the economic power to compete with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Its diplomatic traditions inherited from the Cold War are crippling it, and these traditions themselves discourage it from any diplomatic boldness. All this makes Algeria incapable of imposing its word in a forum such as the Arab Summit.

Algeria should think of finding a suitable excuse to give up hosting an Arab Summit that may not take place, and if it does, it will be nothing more than an occasion to exchange hollow diplomatic words and take pictures for memory. Then each guest will go back to their country at lightning speed. If Algeria cancels the Summit at all, no one will be sad, but rather it will lift the embarrassment from many Arab leaders.

If the Algerian authorities want to restore their place in regional diplomatic work, the Arab League is not the best door to this. Even worse, the Arab Summit is a trap, not a launching pad. Algeria should stop waiting for something from the Arab League. It should pay attention to Africa, and it should also fix its relationship with France, the European Union and other economic and strategic spaces on the five continents.

( This piece was first published by the Middle East Monitor on 03 February 2022)

About the author

Tawfiq Rabahi is an Algerian journalist.

Can Qatar save Europe from a cold winter in the event of a Russia-Ukraine war?
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Can Qatar Save Europe From A Cold Winter In The Event Of A Russia-Ukraine War?

Any war scenario between Ukraine and Russia would undoubtedly imperil European energy security. Existing energy supplies in the region are still not enough, filling only 38 per cent of Europe's storage capacity, according to Gas Infrastructure Europe. But the shortfall compared with previous winters is narrowing, and prices are retreating from record highs. Against this background, the emir of Qatar was invited by US President Biden to the White House this week to discuss opportunities for the country to adequately supply liquified natural gas (LNG) to Europe.

Speaking alongside Qatari leader Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad during the Oval Office meeting on Monday, President Biden designated Qatar a "major non-NATO ally", thus putting it in a top-tier position of US security partners who are not NATO members. This, it seems, would be a well-earned status if Qatar were to address Europe's energy security needs in a time of acute crisis.

In the event of such a short-term solution, some of the long-term Qatari LNG buyers will need to be willing to divert shipments to Europe. The government in Doha would prefer that any diversion requests come directly from the US to buyers.

Comparably, seeking Qatar's support for future supplies, should the energy crisis in Europe worsen, is a major geo-economic step to mitigate in the wake of Russian aggression on Ukraine. "No discussions have taken place… this has not happened," QatarEnergy Chief and Minister of State for Energy Saad Al-Kaabi told Reuters.

According to an Atlantic Council report, Qatar sells most of its LNG to Asia on long-term oil-indexed contracts. Therefore, it is important to ask, will Qatar approach its Asian customers over diverting gas supplies to Europe? At present, this seems unlikely, and most Europeans can expect a limited increase of gas from the Gulf state.

Minister Al-Kaabi has already made it clear that if Russia cuts its supply to Europe, no one country will be able to fill the gap. This statement shows that Qatar is still in the stages of finalising the selection of its commercial partners for the upcoming trade. It is still having discussions with client countries to supply gas and would not name the selected buyers, apart from the UK.

In late 2021, following COP26, Qatar rerouted four LNG tankers to the UK to assist with the energy shortage. Additionally, LNG relations between the two nations go back to former UK Prime Minister Theresa May's term in office. In 2008, Britain received the first LNG ships from a dock at the South Hook terminal near Milford Haven, one of Europe's largest LNG terminals, which Qatar owns. Qatar invested in the UK with the launch of LNG terminals, being the majority owner of South Hook LNG terminal in Wales. Meanwhile, the UK's energy and services company Centrica has a long-term Qatari LNG import agreement for delivery into the Isle of Grain terminal. Therefore, it is most likely that Qatar's LNG diplomacy in the UK might end Britain's energy supply crisis, regardless of what happens in Europe.

On the other hand, despite the worsening energy crisis in Europe, Germany is preparing to apply sanctions on Russia. In the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany would be forced to halt the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, within the context of the European Union (EU)'s political or military sanction strategy. This scenario would further intensify Europe's energy crisis. However, the EU is just one stakeholder of this Nord Stream project signed during Angela Merkel's period. As such, Russia can bargain with other parties to protect its own interest.

Seemingly, luck is not a long-term strategy for energy security in Europe. It is clear that Putin's gas weaponisation tactics and Europe's clumsy mistakes regarding energy prices could harm Europe's energy security. The US and Europe will need to convince Qatar's LNG clients to reroute some supplies to Europe, as any deal struck between the emir and the Biden administration relies on the willingness of client countries to reroute, as well as the availability of unallocated LNG.

Ultimately, the US will have to compensate Qatar and its client countries. This might be tough, but it is possible to some extent, as Qatar did reroute its LNG supplies in 2011, prioritising Japan after the tsunami of that year. It may just be able to keep some parts of Europe warm if war does break out between Russia and Ukraine.

(This article was first published by Middle East Monitor in London, on 5 February 2022)

About the Author

Elif Selin Calik is a Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).  She is a regular contributor to publications like TRT World, Daily Sabah, Rising Powers in Global Governance and Hurriyet Daily News. She was one of the founders of the In-Depth News Department of Anadolu News Agency. 

Africa Travel Ban Jan
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Omicron Travel Ban Leads To Renewed African Solidarity And Political Attitude Towards The West

 

Global Covid-19 politics appear to have awakened Africa’s liberation spirit: the continent’s leaders and citizens are united in their censure of the West’s response to the Omicron strain as an “African variant”.

African leaders have used strong terms – “travel apartheid”, “unscientific”, “discriminatory” and “unjust” among them – to condemn travel bans instituted by some developed countries after the strain was identified and flagged by South African scientists on 24 November 2021.

What particularly incensed African countries was that blanket bans came at a time when Covid numbers were far higher in parts of Europe than in any African country. In early December, the UK was registering more than 50 000 new cases a day, while the figure was 6400 in South Africa, only 19 in Botswana and a paltry 16 in Malawi.

The fast-spreading variant emerged quickly around the world but, despite it being detected in more than 40 countries (among them the US, the UK, and swathes of both Asia and Europe) in the days after South Africa’s announcement, only travel to and from the African continent was restricted.

Dr Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank, summarised many people’s complaints when he tweeted on December 6: “Now that omicron has been found in many non-African and developed countries, why are travels from those countries not banned? Why single out African countries? Singling out African countries is very unfair, non-scientific and discriminatory. Lift bans on African countries!”

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa slammed the travel restrictions on his and other African countries as “unscientific and discriminatory”. He also suggested that South Africa was being punished for discovering the variant.

“We in the South have proven that we’ve got the scientific capability to identify a very threatening variant of Covid-19. It is out of our transparency and our responsibility to the world to demonstrate that we’ve found this variant, and we least expected to be punished by the various countries for what we have disclosed very transparently,” said Ramaphosa.

Speaking to Afrasid, leading South African analyst and academic Professor Somadoda Fikeni echoed Ramaphosa’s sentiments, saying South Africa and its scientists deserved praise, not censure, for having swiftly alerted the world about the Omicron variant.

“South African scientists have done excellent work in discovering this variant early and alerting the world to it,” Fikeni said. “Remember, China was heavily criticised for being perceived as slow in telling the world about this disease.”

“I view (travel bans and related censure) as unjust and a mirror of the West’s prejudice to have reacted in that manner to a global pandemic,” he said.

Botswana’s President Mokgweetsi Masisi, in a televised national address, pointed out that travel bans defeated the spirit of multilateral cooperation needed for dealing with the pandemic.

“The decision to ban our citizens from travelling to certain countries was hastily made and is not only unfair but is also unjustified. While remaining confident that reason and logic will prevail, the harshness of the decision has the effect of shaking our belief in the sincerity of declared friendship and commitment of equality and economic prosperity for us,” Masisi said.

It wasn’t just African leaders who questioned the wisdom and logic of travel bans. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said: “What's unacceptable is to have one part of the world — one of the most vulnerable parts of the world economy — condemned to a lockout when they were the ones that revealed the existence of a new variant that, by the way, already existed in other parts of the world, including in Europe, as we know.”

He acknowledged that the disease was highly transmissible but pointed out that border closures would not magically keep it at bay: “We have the instruments to have safe travel. Let's use those instruments to avoid this kind of, allow me to say — travel apartheid — which I think is unacceptable.”

The World Health Organisation’s Director, Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus, was another powerful voice against travel bans and took aim at how some European media organisations reported on the variant.

In a tweet after a Spanish newspaper published a racist cartoon about African people bringing the variant to the rest of the world, Ghebreyesus said: “It pains me that shows of racism like this still plague the challenges facing the world today. Caricaturing people crammed in a boat bringing a virus to Europe is disgusting. We can only advance, as one community, by promoting solidarity, not stigma.”

South African analyst Fikeni suggested to Afrasid that the prejudiced reaction of many countries towards Africa should not be viewed entirely negatively.

“It is a wake-up call,” he said.

“There are many African leaders that lived under the illusion that the solution to African problems lay in the West. I am glad this disease has shown that Africans should look for answers to their problems within themselves. Firstly, Africa was side-lined when it came to vaccine distribution and now their economies have suffered from being painted as the face of the omicron virus.”

And he is adamant that Africa’s scientists should continue to behave openly and honestly.

“There are already positive responses to Africa reporting omicron early. Transparency should always lead because early warnings help countries to mitigate the devastation of the disease.”

“I know there are some, especially those in the tourism sector, that believe African scientists should in the future keep information about new diseases they discover secret. This is near impossible because our scientists are in the labs with Europeans working together. I think African countries will continue to share information about the disease with the world. It is the right thing to do.”

About the author

Phathisani Moyo is a research fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  He is a communication strategist at International Trade Centre (ITC).  He has worked for a number of media organisations and has served at various levels including as the news editor for The Star newspaper in South Africa. He holds a Honours degree in political science and administration from the University of Zimbabwe.