Rising fuel prices have brought the conversation on the need for greener initiatives in the transport industry to the forefront. The way that people choose to travel and transport goods by road has a direct impact on whether future generations will inherit a more livable planet. Among those who are particularly focused on environmentally friendly approaches to the problem, electric vehicles are often discussed: they emit fewer greenhouse gases and air pollutants than petrol or diesel cars. They are seen as a sustainable way forward.

Are there reasons for optimism? Plenty. The global electric car fleet grew to 10 million vehicles in 2020, up 43% from the previous year, according to the International Energy Agency. While sales of conventional vehicles slumped in 2020 amid the Covid-19 pandemic, in Norway a record three of every four cars sold were electric. By 2025, BloombergNEF   that electric vehicles will comprise 16% of all new passenger vehicle sales and 54 million electric cars will be moving on the world's roads.

There is an important opportunity here for countries like Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Most electric vehicle batteries are lithium based; their primary components are a mix of cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite and other primary components. Zambia, the DRC and other countries that produce copper could take advantage of this opportunity and start to manufacture batteries.

Renewable energy expert Blessing Gondwe is of the view that with the right policies in place to drive the agenda of electric vehicle battery manufacturing, Zambia can go a long way and invest in this climate-smart industry.

“Zambia needs to work on the policy framework as a matter of urgency to help in this particular sector and these policies must have a twofold benefit for both the investor and for the Zambian government. The policy framework must respond to whether the investor will have incentives, while government will have access to carbon credits due to minimal emissions from electric vehicles,” Gondwe explained.

He said Zambia could learn from South Africa, Uganda and a few other countries on the continent which have put policies in place to benefit from the electric vehicle revolution.

Investing in the manufacturing of electric vehicle batteries could work well for Zambia as it produces cobalt which is one of the main requirements for the manufacture of these batteries.

Cobalt is a by-product of copper and most of the commodity globally comes from the belt which runs through the Central African Republic, the DRC, and Zambia.

Zambia is the second largest producer of copper on the African continent after the DRC which accounts for  70 percent of the continent’s total copper output.

So, can Zambia provide the rapidly growing demand for cobalt and copper? And, even more importantly, can the country use this opportunity to boost its failing economy?

There are currently only a few electric vehicle battery suppliers in Zambia. But they source these from Asian countries like China.

While the trade collaboration between Asian and African countries need to be enhanced because of the mutual relations between the two regions, and while China is equally a producer of copper, the added costs along the supply chain of electric vehicle batteries from that country to Zambia will certainly continue to push the cost to the end user.

Zambia has good reason to produce these batteries to allow for cheaper local acquisition by motorists, and also for the export market. It is well-positioned to do so: Zambia has more capacity than any other African country to refine cobalt on a large scale for use in battery manufacturing.

Kopo Mapila, a principal adviser for mining giant Rio Tinto, published an op-ed titled “Copper Can Save Zambia” on August 1, 2021 for Chatham House, in which he acknowledged that new technologies such as electric vehicles were driving demand for critical minerals such as nickel, lithium, cobalt, and copper.

According to the Zambia Chamber of Mines,  60% of the global supply for cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has a poor human rights track record and international organisations have denounced the Central African country for its exploitative labour practices around cobalt production.

In responding to what can be done to increase Zambia’s prospects of manufacturing electronic vehicle batteries, Zambia Chamber of Mines Chief Executive Officer Sokwani Chilembo noted that companies must be held accountable if they do not have policies that encourage the use of ethically sourced materials. 

More than manufacturing will be required. Charging infrastructure is also vital to promote the use of electric vehicles. Technology is needed that uses new developments in hardware and is equipped with the digital applications necessary to make this infrastructure work.

Some companies on the African continent have already identified this gap and moved to fill it.

“Not since the invention of the wheel have our choices in road transportation mattered more for the welfare of future generations. In Africa we have had to play second fiddle and have a lot to catch,” said Professor Blessing Chitsenga, Group CEO at 12k Energy Group. The company is championing the rollout of electric vehicles and charging stations in southern Africa.

He said that motorists were interested in electric vehicles but were reluctant to commit without the necessary charging infrastructure: “It’s an egg and chicken scenario.”

The company is working to install charging stations it calls the 12k Charge BOXX.

About the author

Juliet Makwama is a research fellow at Afrasid.  She is a trained journalist with experience in print and electronic journalism.  She writes  and reports on the convergence of electrification, transportation and e-mobility.

The relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong is incredibly complex. The two are intricately bound economically, in trade, legislation – and perhaps most importantly, in citizenship.

In 1984 when Hong Kong was still a British colony, the UK and China signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration. This stipulated that Hong Kong would be signed over to mainland China in 1997; however, the existing social, economic and political systems in the region were to be maintained. The “one country, two systems” model meant that Hong Kong would operate as a capitalist economy and its residents would enjoy free speech, press and religion for the 50 years that followed. But Hong Kong’s residents have proven resistant to Beijing’s continued political and social interference in its affairs.

Hong Kong’s political framework

Hong Kong is, in theory, a democracy. It shares China’s president as its chief of state, though each has its own head of government. The premier is the head of mainland China, and the chief executive is responsible for Hong Kong. The chief executive is accountable to the Central People’s Government. Hong Kong possess its own legal and judicial systems, characterised by its public servants and district organisations fashioned under British common law. Despite the separation of rights, systems and administration, examples of Beijing’s persistent and purposeful interference in Hong Kong’s political and social arena abound. 

One especially controversial example is 2020’s National Security Law. It was published on the same day that it went into effect, giving China sweeping powers over the semi-autonomous region of Hong Kong. The law describes penalties as severe as life imprisonment for crimes like secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. Within a year of its imposition, the law had drastically changed Hong Kong.

Political opposition has been crushed, pro-democracy media have been forced to close or self-censor and political and advocacy groups have disbanded. As from 2020, at least 128 people have been arrested and charged with national security offences under the National Security Law by a police force set up specifically to enact and enforce it. That number includes three minors, dozens of politicians and journalists. Only 17 have been granted bail. Freedom of expression has been crushed.

This law is viewed by people in Hong Kong as a step by Beijing to take the semi-autonomous region over entirely. They fear that the law will erode Hong Kong’s judicial system and make it more like the system employed by Beijing. People also worry that the imposition of the law could affect Hong Kong’s standing as a business and economic powerhouse, as thousands of people have already fled the region. 

The anti-extradition law

The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill has been another hot topic. This extradition bill was proposed by Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (its parliament) in 2019. The bill authorises Hong Kong to extradite criminals to mainland China for trial. After 1 million people rallied in the streets in a peaceful protest, the government refused to waive the bill. It took a protest involving more than 2 million people for the bill to be suspended but not fully dissolved

Hong Kong’s government claimed the bill was triggered by the February 2018 murder of a 20-year-old woman, Poon Hiu-wing, in Taiwan by her boyfriend, Chan Tong-kai. When Chan returned to Hong Kong he could not be tried for her murder although he admitted to it. The amended bill was intended to provide legal grounds for Chan to be tried for murder in Taiwan. However, the bill also allowed for the extradition of Hong Kongers to other nations, including mainland China, that do not have extradition agreements with Hong Kong.

There are worries that, if the bill is eventually enacted, it will solidify mainland China’s footing in Hong Kong’s judicial and political arenas, not to mention, undermine Hong Kong’s democracy.

Media censorship

For years following the activation of the “one nation, two systems” policy, Hong Kong was home to a plethora of local and foreign media outlets. However, within the last two years, several outlets have left the region. After the implementation of the National Security Law, the police have declined to specifically comment on the  rampant blocking of certain social media outlets. They have been quoted as saying they may “…take a disabling action on electronic messages… if their publication were likely to constitute an offence endangering national security”.

There have already been some high-profile blocks and bans. UK-based advocacy group Hong Kong Watch cannot be accessed from some Hong Kong networks. Last year the anti-government doxing platform, HKChronicles, was banned too. The platform published the personal information of people in Beijing and some police officers in Hong Kong accused of police brutality. Additionally, last year a website commemorating the killing of protesters in 1989 in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square also became inaccessible in Hong Kong.

What next?

The “one nation, two systems” approach was designed to see Beijing slowly integrate Hong Kong into the mainland’s political and judicial systems. It has been less than 2 decades and China has already taken great leaps to assimilate HK into its framework. China seems to be in a rush: it is forcing more of its systems onto Hong Kong all the time. For now, Hong Kongers are steadfast in their resistance to this push.

About the author

Qhawezo Ayesha Fakude is a Junior Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

Just before Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin renewed their vows of friendship. In a lengthy statement the countries vowed to “stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions and the intend to counter interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext”.

More than a month on, Russia faces ever-more global condemnation and economic sanctions – including being shut out of the Swift financing system.  China, meanwhile, stands to benefit from the ongoing war in its own quest to stand against American or western domination. This quest is at the heart of Sino-Russia relations, which are largely underpinned by shared determination to create an economic and social order that would suit their interests best and, to use their own term, have Chinese or Russian characteristics. China showed that it is prepared to create such an order when it availed it alternative financial systems and its social media platform, Weibo, to Russia in the wake of global restrictions. Both nations are also committed to “de-dollarisation” so they can avoid any punitive financial measures taken by the Americans. There is already close cooperation between Russia and China’s  central banks. This offers Russia access to its foreign reserves in the Chinese currency which remains untouchable by the west.  

The two nations are tight trading partners. Russia is China's biggest supplier of resources, including petroleum products and wood, while China provides the majority of Russia’s electrical and electronic equipment needs. Russia has also committed itself to becoming a crucial part of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Bilateral trade hit a record annual high of more than $146 billion in 2021, up from less than $16 billion in 2003 and nearly $110 billion in 2020; Russia serves as a major source of China’s oil, coal, natural gas, and agricultural imports. 

The countries’ union is not just economic. Diplomatically, they seek to build new international organisations.

But Beijing will be aware that it needs to tread carefully as the Ukraine war continues and global backlash deepens. Its close relationship with Russia may see it face sanctions, too. By standing with Russia, China risks damage to its reputation and its economy. Having only recently emerged from a trade war with the US, and still grappling with the economic implications of Covid-19, China knows the last thing it needs is to get inextricably bound up in a conflict that somebody else initiated.

 Close to mid-2022, President Xi is set convince 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, to divorce succession tradition and abolish term limits, giving him a third go in office. As would expected with any political organization before any watershed convergence such as this, discontent is already rearing its ugly, especially, amongst the middle-class and well-off Chinese.

This group would rather have Xi concentrate on addressing domestic problems such growing air pollution in Guangzhou, contaminated drinking water and factory spills of toxic chemical in Shanxi Province, as opposed to shipping focus and attention a cross the border to the Russian-Ukraine crisis. If Xi doesn't give these so-perceived kingmakers, it could be costly and detrimental to his plans of becoming the most powerful Chinese leader, ever.

Through the much-praised BRI China diplomatically projects herself as a sound, reliable and non-interfering trade partner who respects territorial integrity and governance architecture of all nations, and its open support for the non-silencing of guns in Ukraine could be a slap in the face of that status in the global village. This is more so, to the close to 54 African nations, who not so long ago themselves just tasted freedom from the claws of oppression, colonialism and political depression.

It will, however, be loathed if it is to entirely desert Russia in its hour of need. The answer here lies in China stepping up as a peace broker between Russia and Ukraine and aiding the two nations to carve a solution through negotiations.

This is perhaps why the tone of China’s public statements has shifted from siding outright with Putin and the Kremlin to encouraging all diplomatic efforts and offering to play a constructive role in promoting the de-escalation of the situation in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, there are increasing fears from America and Europe that China may see the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to occupy Taiwan, which it believes is an integral part of China. These concerns will likely keep Russia and China close: China needs Russia if it is to move against Taiwan.

Russia has in the past pledged its support for a one-China policy which dictates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory and has given China its word that it would respect this position by not engaging officially with Taiwan.  The US, however, says it remains committed to Taiwan’s independence and sovereignty; it will continue to oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo in the best interest of the people of Taiwan.

Be that as it may, the recent dispatching of top US security defence and diplomatic assets to Taiwan is indicative that the world will not stand by and watch China invade and take over that island nation, hence signalling a stern warning to Xi and his forces not to attempt.  This is strongly so because, unlike with Ukraine, Taiwan is part of what has been termed "first island chain," which according to history is a conglomerate of islands that are fraternal with the US and its foreign policy focus.

China would therefore not dare taint its standing in the world with invading Taiwan at a time it is crucial for its global trade partners to grow and subsequently the dominance and performance of Chinese products on shelves around the globe.

About the author

Jemima Beukes is a Research Fellow at Afrasid based in Namibia, Windhoek. She is the co-founder of Women in the Media. She holds a Bachelor of Journalism and Communication Technology degree. She is a senior political journalist at Namibia Media Holdings.

South Korea will soon have a new president. In what is regarded as the closest presidential win in the country’s history, Yoon Sook-yeol from the opposition People Power Party beat out the governing Democratic Party led by Lee Jae-myung in early March. Yoon has vowed to pay particular attention to people’s livelihoods and to welfare services. He wants to unify the nation and introduce a new age of active participation in the international community. But despite being president-elect in the world’s 10^th largest economy, Yoon won’t have an easy ride. There has already been extensive public backlash to his election – and women are perhaps the most concerned about what the avowed anti-feminist’s rule will bring.

Comparisons with Trump

Yoon, 61, served as the South Korean prosecutor general from 2019 to 2021 under President Moon Jae-in and played a key role in the prosecution for corruption of former President Park Geun-hye. Yoon joined the presidential race late last year; his style of campaigning drew immediate attention. Several publications and observers drew stark parallels with the US presidential campaign, with Yoon being compared to Donald Trump. Reference was made to Yoon’s style of speaking and barrage of offensive comments during the campaign. Many were particularly concerned by a comment that was interpreted as praise for the former South Korean President and military dictator, Chun Doo-hwan, who was known for his brutal mistreatment of pro-democratic protesters in the 1980s. Additionally, and more alarmingly, despite somewhat virtuous presidential ambitions to address key economic shortcomings, Yoon pledged to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality. 

Yoon argues that women in South Korea do not face systemic discrimination. This, despite vast evidence to the contrary. Yoon blames South Korea’s low birthrate on the rise of feminism and women being more assertive about their rights.

In spite of the aspirations of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, South Korea has the worst record for women’s rights in the developed world. Experts in the country affirm that laws do not provide sufficient punishment for crimes against women and girls and that the judicial system’s approach to crimes against women and girls is intrinsically linked to the country’s patriarchal society. The stigmatisation of women's rights by Yoon’s campaign is strongly supported by his voter base, made up largely of young men who believe the president-elect speaks for them.

Anti-Feminist Rhetoric

Amid skyrocketing housing costs, an increasing wealth gap and soaring numbers of youth unemployment, people in South Korea are looking for a change. In his presidential campaign, Yoon promised to address the social and economic issues plaguing the county. However, in doing, so he weaponised the frustrations of young men at the expense of women’s rights.

South Korean men reject notions of masculine privilege and the benefits that come with patriarchal forms of sexism. Furthermore, a study revealed that young men’s impressions of sexism are strongly characterised by anti-feminist rhetoric: 56.8% of men in their 20s are strongly opposed to feminism, with 29.8% rating their opposition on a scale from 1 to 12 as 12.

According to reports, unemployment has risen to 9.9%. As a result, men are feeling a sense of loss; their social status is threatened by economic uncertainty. Many blame women and policies aimed at giving women employment opportunities. Perhaps to a degree their grievances are justified.

South Korean women have a higher rate of university graduation and are generally able to begin work earlier than men (young men are conscripted into the military, delaying the start of their working lives). On the flip side, though nearly 70% of women aged between 25 and 34 are employed, many leave the workforce to have children because of social pressure and workplace policies that discriminate against working mothers.

Working women face substantial discrimination. For example, The Economist recently ranked South Korea as the worst performer among industrialised nations on the glass-ceiling index, which measures gender differences in education, wages and managerial positions. South Korea is ranked 127th out of 153 countries in terms of economic participation in the World Economic Forum’s gender gap report, a far cry from 96th in 2006. Additionally, there is a 35% gender pay gap with few women holding managerial or decision making positions. Women account for less than a fifth of South Korean national legislators and only 5.2% holding board member positions in publicly traded companies. And according to The World Bank, women hold only 17% of seats in South Korea’s parliament. 

Violence against women and girls is a huge problem in South Korea, too. The rise of the #MeToo movement led to revelations about several high-profile cases. In 2020, Seoul mayor Park Won-soon died by suicide after his former secretary accused him of sexual harassment. Additionally, the government struggled to address problems with online gender violence, namely the non-consensual sharing of sexual images and molka – secretly filmed videos, sexual in nature, posted online. But Yoon did not take aim at men in his campaign: instead, he stated that harsher punishments should be enacted for false sexual harassment allegations. If he goes ahead with this policy it will almost certainly silence victims.

With Yoon at the helm, it appears that life for South Korea’s women and girls is about to get tougher.

About the author

Qhawezo Ayesha Fakude is a Junior Research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid).  She holds a Bachelor of Social Science from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She majored in politics and governance, anthropology and sociology.

Keep the Palestinian struggle out of Putin’s war in Ukraine, Thembisa Ebrahim Fakude, unpacks