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The 2023 Turkish elections

Turkish parliamentary and presidential elections will be held in eight short months; and in opposition circles, it is widely believed that they will put an end to the long rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While Turkey’s severe economic and fiscal challenges mean that Erdogan and his party are facing their most difficult electoral contest since 2002, the outcomes of both presidential and parliamentary elections are still uncertain at this point.

Thus far, three main electoral blocs have taken shape. The People’s Alliance, a holdover from the last election, brings together the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). While the alliance seems stable, the MHP’s popularity has steadily declined, so it may be less useful in helping the AKP retain its parliamentary majority or re-electing Erdogan. The second bloc, known as the Table of Six, is less a coherent political alliance than a loose assemblage of ideologically diverse opposition parties united only by their hostility to Erdogan and his party. It includes Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the Good Party, a breakaway faction of the nationalist MHP, as well as the Islamist Felicity Party. The alliance members have yet to agree on any electoral or governing platform, save for the general intention to return the country to a parliamentary system if they win elections. Finally, there is the Labour and Freedom Alliance, made up of six Kurdish and leftist parties with no real weight except for the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which is allegedly linked with the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and enjoys considerable political influence among an important slice of the electorate. The remaining parties seem to be there as window-dressing, to give the alliance a more Turkish, rather than Kurdish, identity.

Various polls conducted over September show a tangible decline in the AKP’s fortunes since the previous election, with the party receiving the support of 30–34 percent of the electorate, while the MHP is drawing only 7 percent of the vote. The main beneficiary of this decline has been the Good Party, now polling at 15 percent, while the CHP is still polling at 23–24 percent, much like the last parliamentary election.

The presidential election is harder to gauge because thus far the only known candidate is Erdogan, who is eligible to run for one final term. Polls that pit Erdogan against an unnamed competitor find that he has the support of some 34 percent of the electorate, which is roughly equivalent to the AKP’s projected support. This could change, however, depending on who throws their hat into the presidential ring.

Polls thus indicate that the People’s Alliance could lose their parliamentary majority, but much depends on economic and political developments in the coming months. While Turkey has avoided a recession since the war in Ukraine began, the economy remains fragile. The Turkish lira has lost 40 percent of its value over the last year, while inflation reached 83 percent in September; energy costs remain high as well. But the defeat of the AKP is not inevitable. The opposition is still in disarray, having reached no consensus on a political programme or electoral coordination and cooperation. The AKP’s main rivals in the Table of Six Alliance have yet to articulate a strong platform that could position it as a clear alternative to the AKP. The electoral law further complicates matters. The smaller parties in the coalition will not garner enough votes to reach the threshold for parliamentary representation. The CHP and the Good Party may therefore need to cede space to these parties on their own electoral lists if they hope to retain their support.

The opposition will have an equally hard time agreeing on a single presidential candidate. As the leader of the biggest and oldest opposition party, CHP head Kemal Kilicdaroglu believes himself best positioned to beat Erdogan. But his coalition partners in the nationalist Good Party do not agree; they are also less than pleased by Kilicdaroglu’s warm relations with the Kurdish HDP, which has already signalled its support for Kilicdaroglu. The Good Party has floated other possible candidates, such as the mayor of Istanbul, but has thus far been unable to build a consensus around them. None of the proposed alternatives have the political stature or experience of Erdogan, and it may be difficult to persuade a majority of voters to take a risk with a relative unknown, regardless of dissatisfaction with Erdogan or his actions as president.

As the date of elections approaches, the political and economic landscape will undoubtedly come into clearer focus. But at this point, amid so many uncertainties, it is still too early to predict electoral outcomes with any confidence.

(This article was first published by Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Doha, Qatar)

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Saudi Arabia plans to join BRICS. Why SA must be concerned

South Africa's relationship with Saudi Arabia continues to grow. Saudi Arabia has made substantial investments in South Africa over the years and continues to do so.   Saudi Arabia and South Africa have signed agreements and memorandums of understanding worth about $15 billion during a state visit by South Africa’s President to Riyadh over the weekend. President Cyril Ramaphosa led a delegation of ministers and business leaders to Saudi Arabia at an invitation of Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman. 

According to the Presidency, the meeting prioritised "economic bilateral between the two countries and nothing else". Notwithstanding, Ramaphosa surprised many when he announced during a briefing with journalists that Saudi Arabia plans to join Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa (BRICS). South Africa will be assuming the Presidency of BRICS in 2023. 

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February this year, BRICS has amplified its expansionist intentions. Iran, which holds the world's second-largest gas reserves, has applied to join the BRICS. This has raised concerns about whether Russia, a leading member of BRICS, is using the organisation to push back against western hegemony as it continues to seek new markets for its goods and services. Western nations have imposed varying widespread economic sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. 

A message of defiance 

President Cyril Ramaphosa's announcement of Saudi Arabia's plans to join BRICS contradicted earlier statements by the Presidency that the Saudi visit was only going to concentrate on economic discussions. Before Ramaphosa embarked on the visit, there were earlier reports that he was likely to carry a message from US President, Joe Biden to Bin Salman regarding the reduction of oil production by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Biden had earlier in the week, following the decision by OPEC, threatened Bin Salman with "consequences".  

The announcement to join BRICS has further added credence to reports that Ramaphosa did pass on the message to Bin Salman. Plans to join BRICS at this juncture in international politics and as the war in Ukraine continues, suggests a doubling down by Bin Salman, a clear message of defiance back to the US using Ramaphosa as a conduit. However, for Ramaphosa, this was used as an opportunity to reassure his counterparts about his commitment as suspicions of his strengthened relationship with Biden continues within BRICS. 

Ramaphosa's announcement on Saudi Arabia rebuffed reports and suspicions particularly those that proliferated in the media about him being an emissary of Biden.  

Checkered human rights' records 

However, what should be of major concern for South Africans is not just that Cyril Ramaphosa acted as an emissary for Joe Biden in this instance; It is the continuing membership of South Africa in BRICS given the calibers of its current membership and indeed future members. South Africa finds itself surrounded by member countries with checkered human rights records and proponents of unprogressive politics. 

The country remains an odd partner in the bloc considering its respect for democratic principles and its continual, at least in rhetoric, promotion of basic human rights across the globe. 

Recently South Africa has been criticised for its voting patterns at multilateral platforms, including its stance on the invasion of Ukraine.  

For example, plans by Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt to join BRICS further complicate South Africa's position inside the organisation.

Egypt continues to crack down on political activists, and has jailed thousands of journalists and those who speak against the government. Iran continues to crack down on protesters and has suppressed basic freedoms. The recent death of a young woman for violating the dress code has led to nationwide protests and deaths of dozens of protesters.  

Saudi Arabia stands accused of having ordered the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's continuing bombardment of civilians in Yemen has been widely criticised.

South Africa will have to take a firm position at some point regarding its membership in BRICS as the bloc expands.

The blind and desperate admission of countries, irrespective of their human rights track record into BRICS could further compromise South Africa’s position as an advocate of human rights in the world. Moreover, the expansion of BRICS membership takes away the exclusive nature of the organisation, something South Africa strived for in the first place.  

BRICS has ceased to be an exclusive platform of foremost developing nations.

(This article first appear on News24, a South African based publication)

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Historic floods still haunt Mozambique.

Twenty-two years on, scars of Mozambique's worst floods still haunt Gilda Muhate, a 60-year-old widow living with her five grandchildren. Their parents died in the 2000 floods in Chokwe City, located about 250 kilometres north of Mozambique's capital city Maputo.

Gilda Muhate has survived two consecutive floods of the year 2000 that killed over 700 and another one in 2013 that displaced 56,000 people. As a result, Gilda and other 500,000 displaced flood victims were evacuated to Chihaquelane village, a resettlement centre established by the local government about 30 km from Chókwè in Gaza Province to accommodate flood survivors.

"I came here because of the floods, first in 2000, then again in 2013." She paused. "In 2013, flood-displaced us again. We lost everything, properties, crops and our animals," She regretted.

Previously, Muhate relied on farming for her livelihood, but it was destroyed by flood. Although the government has allocated her a plot to farm at Chihaquelane village, where she now calls her home, she cannot cultivate because she is too old. Muhate abandoned farming and started cooking bean pastries every morning and sold them at a nearby roadside market to get money to pay fees for her grandchildren, who travel (6km) every day.

Chokwé district is an agricultural region with an area of 2,466 square kilometers and nearly 200 000 inhabitants. Chokwe town, the economic capital of Gaza Province, is prone to flood as it is located along the Limpopo River, the second largest African river that drains the Indian Ocean.

Lack of government support.

At Chihaquelane Village, flood victims gradually return to Chokwe despite the flood's threats and warnings. Salvador Fernando Matuassa, Chihaquelane Village secretary, blamed the government for neglecting the flood victims and not developing the area.

"Hunger and lack of other basic needs drove people back to Chokwe. Only a few remain, but the bulk is gone. Since its arrival more than twenty years ago, the camp has no water nor electricity," explains Matuassa

Due to limited government support, key infrastructures like hospitals and schools essential to these communities' survival are still unavailable. Matuassa says that the flood-affected victims complain about underdevelopment, but nothing happens. This forces them to return to their flood-prone homes around and within Chokwe to reclaim their fertile lands for food production and other income-generating activities despite flood risks and constant warnings.

"There is no secondary school in the area despite residents building three classrooms as their contribution towards an agreement with the government, who promised to build three more," Matuassa added.

Margarida Flavio, another flood victim, has been evacuated twice from the flood-prone Limpopo River banks but preferred going back to continue with her agricultural activities because the land is fertile and productive.

"They (government) told us to vacate, but I don't have money to build a new home. They made several promises, but nothing happened, so I prefer to die in flooding waters than in hunger," she said.

Like in many sub-Saharan African countries, long dry spells, severe flooding, and coastal storms have increased in frequency.

In march 2019, Cyclone Idai left a trail of destruction in Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique, with Mozambique the worst hit.

While five tropical storms and cyclones have battered Mozambique's northern coastal areas since the start of this year, villagers from the southern areas fear the uncertainty of alternating floods and drought invites.

An artisan fisher, Casimiro Cossa, said climate change has affected the availability of water and increased the flooding and drought events in the region.

"In 2000, I fled from rising water to Chihaquene, but I returned to Chokwe again. Here I make a living catching and selling fish." Cossa explained, "We want government projects that can contribute to improving the livelihoods of poor rural farmers in this region by providing additional knowledge and practical actions," he said.

The effects of the disaster are still visible. Agricultural land whose topsoil was swept away by soil erosion is now infertile. Matuassa says, "People plant but yield nothing because the land the government gave to the victims is unproductive. We can only grow cassava and beans here," pointing to yellow and drying maize.

The Chókwè Irrigation Scheme, located in the Limpopo River Basin, has seen declining crop yields mainly due to soil salinization and other practices, including poor water management.

Effort to rebuild

To rebuild and restore livelihood in the flood region, reconstruction of Mozambique's flagship tourism town of Chokwe city began early this year. Juvencio Pedro Novela, a Public Works official at Chokwe District Services for Infrastructure (DPS), says government  plans to build resilient houses.

"One thing is that we must make sure that public works and infrastructures meet a certain quota in terms of materials, construction methods", Novela explained.

While at the Chihaquelane resettlement center, Chokwe district administrator Eceu Muianga say that the government is trying to build infrastructure that provides essential services like electricity and water.

However, the agriculture-rich Xai Xai city Mayor, Emidio Xavier, says that despite establishing a committee on disaster risk management, nothing still seems to work.

Although Xavier attributes the flood event to the people constructing along the river banks, unattended clogged or destroyed canals, he agrees that the city needs to improve its monitoring system and implement the right projects on time.

Mozambique became a global success story of post-conflict economic recovery in southern Africa after a 16-year crippling war that ended in 1992. The war cost almost two million lives two decades earlier, brought the economy to its knees, and destroyed much of the country's infrastructure, roads, railways, and administrative posts.

Starting from this challenging base, Mozambique has seen average annual economic growth rates of five per cent since 1995 but remains extremely vulnerable to climate variability and change on the back of this commendable progress.

(This article was first published by Africa Climate News)

 About the author

Charles Mangwiro is a research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid) specialising in geopolitics of Mozambique.  He also serves as the editor of Radio Mozambique in Maputo, Mozambique. 

 

The emerging “Third Way” within the governing ANC in South Africa
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The emerging “Third Way” within the governing ANC in South Africa

There is much said about the future of the governing party in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC). There are some who have gone to an extent of calling for the disillusionment of the ANC. What is further amplifying these calls are widespread corruption allegations against the ANC and recently, the manner in which the provincial conferences of the organisation were managed, particularly in provinces of Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng. The provincial conferences exposed several fault-lines in the political and human infrastructure of the organisation characterised by political factions within the organisation namely, Radical Economic Transformation(RET) forces and the Ramaphosa factions. The RET faction consists mainly of supporters of former President Jacob Zuma and some senior leadership of the organisation most of whom are accused of corruption and/or violations of organisational code of conduct. The Ramaphosa faction, as the name suggests consist of supporters of President Cyril Ramaphosa who is currently on the back foot following the Phalaphala scandal. Millions of US$ were apparently stolen from the Phalaphala residence of the president in the northern part of the country. The alleged theft has given political ammunition to the political opposition and enemies of the president, they have accused the president of money laundering.

There are views that factionalism within the ANC has divided the organisation , introduced toxicity and enmity within the organisation. Ordinarily, fierce political debates and disagreement are supposed to add vibrancy to intra-party democracy. However, what has emerged within the ANC are chaotic provincial conferences and deterioration of decorum resulting in the undermining of integrity of the organisation including its democratic processes. However, there are interesting views and interpretations to the current goings within the ANC that are worth examining.

First, the schism within the ANC is a common phenomenon in political parties in any democracy, such add life to internal democracy of political organisations. Moreover, constant pull and push in such situations is one of the essential traits that demonstrates democracy; what is happening within the ANC epitomizes maturity of democracy. Furthermore, contrary to prevailing general opinions on the need for unity; insistence on unity has proven, in some instances, to be a dangerous trapping to vibrant democracy. It could also be a precursor that leads to dictatorship. Organisations that have survived collapse are usually those that encourage dissent, accept clumsiness of democracy within their processes.

Therefore, besides chaotic conferences, toxicity and violence that is occasionally witnessed within the organisation; ANC is certainly reaching another stage of its life. It is an essential stage that will test the democratic shock absorbers of the organisation. It communicates an important fact, that disagreement and leadership contestations are healthy for democracy and the organisation.

What is emerging therefore as a result of the ongoing challenges in the party is the “Third Way” discussion. Third way is not a faction, rather a discussion, a process of renewal of the organisation intended to reinstate integrity, accountability and public respect of the organisation . The Third Way is best characterized by the leadership of outstanding individuals who are quietly and effectively working for the betterment of the people of South Africa . It is made up of second tier leadership of the organisation with implacable track record in the organisation and government.

Parks Tau, Khumbudzo Ntshaveni, Mmamoloko Kubayi, Sputla Ramokgopa are amongst those whose leadership characterise the Third Way and dominate the current discussion. They are young leaders who were inducted into the politics of the “movement” to eventually lead the organisation. Their future outlook of the organisation is informed by their intrinsic understanding of the fundamentals of the organisation.

Therefore, as the nomination process for the National Executive Committee (NEC) commences, it is important that the organisation considers the the outcomes and suggestions of the Third Way discussions. The process of NEC nomination must avoid the repeat of provincial conferences, which culminated in the inclusion of individuals with checkered pasts in provincial leadership. Former President Motlhanthe announced that there will be vetting processes and do’s and don’ts in the nomination process; that is essential for the success of the organisation. The organisation must carefully consider the Third Way particularly as it prepares itself for 2024 national elections.

Turkiye holds panel on Security Council reform in Cape Town
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Turkiye holds panel on Security Council reform in Cape Town

Turkiye's Communications Directorate on Tuesday organised a panel on reform in the UN Security Council in Cape Town, Anadolu News Agency reports.

Moderated by Turkish scholar, Mursel Bayram, the panel brought together Turkish Professor, Suay Nilhan Acikalin, South African economist, William Gumede and Daryl Swanepoel, head of the South Africa-based civil society group, Inclusive Society Institute.

The panel kicked off with a video message from Turkiye's Communications Director, Fahrettin Altun.

Altun said the UN has made significant contributions to peace and stability in various geographies of the world since its establishment.

However, he said the UN Security Council needs reform.

The UN has found itself in desperate straits in the face of recent human tragedies and wars, Altun said.

Zaheer Laher, the acting Chief Director of the UN Peace and Security's Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), also attended the panel via video-conference and said Turkiye and South Africa have a similar approach on UN reform.

"As South Africa, we attach great importance to the development of peace and security, human rights, democracy, justice and the rule of international law in the international arena," Laher added.

Noting that a significant part of the Security Council agendas included the conflicts in Africa, Laher also said that the continent is represented by only temporary members in the Council.

"Africa and Latin America should be represented permanently in the UN Security Council," he said.

For his part, Gumede drew attention to the inequality of the current global system dominated by industrialised countries. "We can say that some countries are more equal in the rule of law in this system," he said.

"In this moment of great uncertainty in an evolving world, we need change in the global system," he added.

Swanepoel stressed it is impossible for the UN to remain unaffected by the geopolitical and economic transformations experienced in the last 77 years.

He argued that if the UN wants to be inclusive, it must do so not only in terms of geographical membership, but also in terms of geopolitical orientation and cultural influence.

"There is a worldwide perception that this organisation is not doing enough to suppress and resolve conflicts. In fact, the UN is paralyzed by the interests of its competing members," he added.

Also speaking at the panel, Turkish academic, Acikalin, said the Security Council could not meet the expectations of the international system in this chaotic environment.

She stressed the "need to produce solutions with systems that cover the whole of the world and the international community and that work effectively."

This article first appeared on the Middle East Monitor