The end, in 1992, of a post-independence civil war in Mozambique left citizens feeling optimistic about their and the country’s future. But, almost three decades later, real progress continues to elude the vast, resource-rich southern African country as it lurches from one crisis to another.
Mozambique boasts vast but as yet unexplored mineral resources. However, poverty rates are high in many parts of the former Portuguese colony.
For nearly five years, Mozambique has been in the throes of an insurgency that has made life uncertain for both citizens and foreign investors priming themselves to reap huge windfalls from the huge gas discoveries in the northern part of the country.
The bloody insurrection in Cabo Delgado province by an Islamist-linked armed group calling itself Ansar al-Sunna (supporters of the tradition) is generally believed to be linked to the marginalisation that locals in Cabo Delgado and other remote northern provinces have always complained suffering at the hands of the ruling elites in Maputo (which is around 2,400kms from Cabo Delgado). The province has become a magnet for investors and the people there are shown images of multi-million investments in extractive industry projects and hear often how rich their province is in natural resources like oil and gas – but none of the benefits have cascaded down to them or amounted to any tangible benefits.
Five years ago, youths in Cabo Delgado launched an uprising against the government. These are frustrated young people who want jobs and demand government services; the toxic cocktail of poverty and radicalisation lit the fires of an insurgency that continues, largely away from the international spotlight.
In 2019, the insurgents pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State, marking the first Islamist-linked conflict in southern Africa and alarming the world. The nature of their relationship with the larger terror group is uncertain. In March 2021, the fighters launched a brutal attack on the port town of Palma, close to the gas projects. It left dozens of people dead, and, within a month, the militants controlled a significant chunk of territory in four of the country’s five provinces.
A history of oppression, radicalisation
Cabo Delgado has a long history of both oppression and radicalisation. Once a favoured target of slave traders, the province’s Muslim-majority population was repeatedly forced into labour for the production of cotton and other cash crops during 500 years of Portugal’s colonial domination.
The first shots in Mozambique’s independence war were fired in this province in the mid-1960s. However, during the subsequent decade of the liberation struggle, it was the Makonde tribal group, mostly Christians from the province’s highlands, who went on to play a central role in the subsequent Marxist Frelimo government. The coastal Muslim Mwani people were largely sidelined, which partly explains their frustrations and grievances. Cabo Delgado residents call their region “Cabo Esquecido” or “forgotten Cape”.
At some point around 2007 the Mwani people slowly began to believe – through radicalisation – that having an independent state could solve their social exclusion. They did not trust government institutions and decided to solve local problems themselves. The central government responded by calling the Mwani bandits and criminals, sending in heavily armed police to restore public order. In October 2017 the extremists, who had previously targeted civilians, began attacking police posts and military barracks.
Outside intervention
Mozambique’s government then tried to quell the uprising by hiring Russian mercenaries. The guns for hire suffered heavy casualties and were forced to flee.
President Filipe Nyusi then reluctantly turned to other African countries for assistance. This had been on offer for some months, especially from other members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the European Union and the US. Nyusi initially insisted that Mozambique did not require outsiders’ boots on the ground: instead, he called for training, weaponry and money. But, come July 2021, Rwandan and southern African troops (from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania) were finally deployed to Cabo Delgado to fight alongside Mozambican soldiers. At this stage the insurgency was slowly spreading into the neighbouring Niassa province and Tanzania.
Some security observers have suggested that France might be behind Rwanda’s push into Mozambique: The European nation, they argued, was trying to protect a $20 billion gas field investment by French energy giant Total. It is a view shared by author and journalist Joseph Hanlon, who has written extensively about the unfolding of events in Cabo Delgado. However, it’s worth nothing that within two weeks in July 2021, the 1,000-strong Rwandan detachment made more headway than Mozambique’s own army and foreign mercenaries had achieved in four years, wrestling back key infrastructure that had been under rebel control for two years.
What comes next?
President Nyusi will want to leave a positive legacy at the end of his second five-year term in 2024. In the second week of February 2022, he went on a diplomatic offensive around the world, looking for assistance and money for the war; award-winning Mozambican journalist Luis Nhachote is among those documenting this drive.
Meanwhile, the bystanders in this war – the EU – and global energy giants are watching and hoping that their time to reap what they’ve sowed in investment is drawing nearer.
About the author
Charles Mangwiro is a research Fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues (Afrasid) specialising on geopolitics of Mozambique. He also serves as the editor of Radio Mozambique in Maputo, Mozambique.