Cote d’Ivoire continues to play an important role in the politics and economy of West Africa. The region has been experiencing a number of political challenges with a number of countries either under the military rule or facing political uncertainty. Moreover, political popularism in the region continues to stagnate political development and economic growth There are four countries – Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Guinea- currently under the military rule in West Africa. This has raised concerns not only in the region but in other parts of Africa. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been suspended from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). They have since formed Alliance of Sahel States which they “plan to replace ECOWAS”. This has raised tensions and concerns of political polarization, economic stagnation and possibly furthering political instability in the region.

Cote D’Ivoire will be holding elections on 25 October 2025. The incumbent, President Alassane Ouattara has confirmed his candidacy for re-election. On 04 June 2025, the country’s electoral commission published a final list of the voters’ register. Ouattara remains very popular in the country and polls suggests that he is likely to be re-elected. Reuters reports that “Ouattara is in a very strong position to win the elections”. Under the presidency of Ouattara, Cote D’Ivoire has had impressive economic growth for four successive years. This year, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to grow from 6% to 6.3%. Ouattara assumed office after defeating former President Laurent Gbagbo in 2010 presidential elections. Gbagbo refused to leave office; his refusal triggered political violence which led to widespread destruction of property and a large number of civilian deaths. According to the United Nations (UN) and Human Rights Groups, more than 3000 people were killed and more than 1 000 000 people displaced as a result. In 2011 Gbagbo was finally forced to relinquish power. He was subsequently arrested and charged with crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. After lengthy court procedures Gbagbo was acquitted, he returned to the country on 17 June 2021. During his trial at the Hague, Gbagbo was convicted in absentia in 2018 for embezzling public funds of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). His ambitions to contest elections in 2020 and in 2025 failed as a result of his conviction; the law in Cote d’Ivoire prohibit anyone convicted of criminality from running for presidential elections.

Notwithstanding the rise of political popularism in the region, Cote d’Ivoire is in a rather different position from most countries in the region. First, the country has sustained a positive economic growth multiple years in row making it one of the fasted growing economies not only in the region but in the whole of Africa. Between 2012 and 2019 the economy of Cote d’Ivoire had an economic growth of between 7%-8%. The country has also managed to streamline its cocoa exports which remains the mainstay of its economy. Cote d’Ivoire is one of the world largest cocoa producers; 40% of cocoa global supply come from the country. Subsequently large numbers of economic migrants from neighboring countries, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been flocking into Cote d’Ivoire seeking opportunities. Large amounts of financial remittances from Cote d’Ivoire flow into the region particularly Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. This is significant, as it indicates the important role Cote d’Ivoire plays in the regional economy.

Furthermore, with political turmoil and changes in most countries in the region, Cote d’Ivoire has largely become a significant conduit between business and countries in the region. Political stability, fiscal discipline and good governance has made Cote d’Ivoire an investment magnet. It is these achievements that continue to contribute towards the popularity of President Ouattara. Since taking office in 2011, Ouattara has transformed large parts of the economy in the country, there has been large scale infrastructural development including investments in mining, energy, agriculture and other economic sectors.

Countries in the region must leverage on the experience of Ouattara as they move forward with “reforms in their respective countries”. Ouattara’s access to foreign direct investments and his credibility within the global markets - both in Africa and abroad - could be leveraged by countries in the region towards their own economic developments. Ouattara could play significant political and economic roles in this regard. His role as a trusted statesman in the region is key in rebuilding trust and confidence in regional economies and governments.

However, as Cote d’Ivoire heads towards elections a number of huddles have emerged.

First, some Ivorians have taken to the streets to challenge the barring of some eminent people - particularly former President Laurent Gbagbo and Tidjane Thiam - from contesting elections. The constitution of Cote d’Ivoire does not allow those that have criminal convictions and those with dual citizenship to stand for presidential elections. Laurent Gbagbo is a convicted criminal and Tidjane Thiam, a former CEO of Credit Suisse, was removed from the election roll and barred from running in the elections due to his dual citizenship.

Second, there are some Ivorians who have accused President Ouattara of violating the constitution by standing and running for the fourth-term. The constitution of Cote d’Ivoire was amended in 2016. Amongst changes in the constitution was limiting the terms of office of the president to two terms. The amendment was instituted and sponsored during the second term of Ouattara. The objective of amending the constitution was to avoid endless occupation of presidential office by one person. However, what has been a bone of contention has been the effective date of the amended constitution. In other words, when ware the amendments supposed to have come into effect? The constitution is quiet in that regard. Ouattara availed himself for another term arguing that the constitution only became effective after it was enacted in 2016, meaning that the first two terms he occupied as the president where annulled by the constitutional amendments. He has argued that a new constitution approved in 2016 reset his two-term limit in 2020. Despite the constitutional debate, the constitutional council approved Ouattara’s bid to run for the third term in 2020 and subsequently for the fourth term in 2025. Both terms are regarded as the first and second terms respectively according to the amended constitution of 2016.

Turkiye has been very busy this July, not only has it welcomed thousands of tourists mainly from the Gulf countries for their summer holidays; a number of political events have been taking place there. Foremost amongst those has been the dismantlement of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. Ocalan a Marxist-Leninist separatist launched an armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984. The organisation’s main objectives were to create a Kurdish state on Turkish territory. In May 2025 the PKK announced that it was disbanding its activities and will be handing over its weapons for destruction. The handing over of weapons by the fighters of the PKK started days ago and have dominated the news better part of the week of 15 July 2025 overshadowing other significant political events.

There was also the fighting between the Arab Bedouin and Druze minority in the city of Suwayda in Syria. The fighting left scores of people, mainly from the Druze community, dead and hundreds displaced. The relationship between Bedouin and Druze communities in Syria’s southern province of Suwayda has long been marked by complexity, alternating between periods of cooperation and violent confrontation. Ever since the fall of Bashar al Assad in December 2024 Turkiye has been assisting in the rebuilding of the infrastructure and socio-political fabric of Syria. Therefore, whatever political events occurring in Syria resonate within Turkiye as was the conflict in Suwayda. What further amplified the news about Suwayda was the Israeli attack on the Syrian military headquarters in Damascus, Syria. Israel claimed that the attack was in retaliation for the attack on the Druze community in Suwayda. The Israeli attack in Damascus caused extensive damage to infrastructure, killed and injured scores of Syrians. Turkey condemned the attack and accused Israel of wanting to derail the development and construction of a new political order in Syria. According to the official statement from the Turkiye’s foreign ministry, “Israel’s attacks on Damascus, following its military interventions in the south of Syria, constitute an act of sabotage against Syria’s efforts to secure peace, stability, and security”.

Importantly, for the past 9 years the people of Turkiye have been commemorating the attempted coup on the 15th July. Turkiye witnessed the bloodiest coup attempt in its modern history on 15 July 2016, when a faction of the Turkiye military launched a coordinated attempt to topple President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government. The Turkiye government has blamed Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish cleric and businessman who lived in self-imposed exile in the state of Pennsylvania in the US until his death on 20 October 2024, for plotting the coup with his followers. The Turkish government calls Gulen’s network the Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO). The 15th July 2016 attempted coup dramatically changed the politics of Turkiye. The overwhelming rejection of the coup by the people of Turkiye communicated a clear message to the world, Turkiye does not have appetite for coups anymore. Since the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic, Turkiye has had three coups before the attempted coup in 2016. In 1960 Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was overthrown by the military. Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was forced to resigned amid economic turmoil and unrest in 1971. There was also a toppling of the government in 1980 which resulted in mass arrests and torture of political opponents. The last coup before the 2016 attempt was in 1997 when Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was pressured to resign by the military.
On 15 July 2016 the Turkish people of all persuasions filled up the streets and prevented the coup from materialising. All Turkiye, even those who were vehemently against the leadership of AK Party and the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan joined in the streets to stop the coup. It was indeed at that point when President Erdogan became a true leader of Turkiye. The country became united behind his leadership, which gave him the power to implement changes in the political discourse of Turkiye for many years to come marking a new era in Turkiye’s politics. In April 2017, the Turkish population narrowly approved the constitutional changes necessary to transition to a presidential system, by 51.4 per cent to 48.6 per cent. Importantly, there was also a change of political leadership in Istanbul. After 25 years of AK Party rule, it lost the elections to the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The AKP’s candidate, former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim lost the mayoral elections of Istanbul to Mr Ekrem Imamoglu, of the Republican People’s Party (CHP).

Over and above the constitutional changes that led to the transition to the presidential system in parliament and political party changes in the mayorship of Istanbul, there were other notable changes in the political infrastructure in Turkiye. The events of 15 July 2016 weakened the deep state that has always impacted and controlled Turkiye’s politics from behind the scenes. The Turkish phrase derin devlet literally means “deep state.” According to historian Ryan Gingeras, the term “generally refers to a kind of shadow or parallel system of government in which unofficial or publicly unacknowledged individuals play important roles in defining and implementing state policy.” The dismantling of the “Deep State” allowed further development of the democratic changes in Turkiye. The grip of the deep state particularly the military elite that controlled the politics of Turkiye over the years, suffocated socio-political realities and possibilities in Turkiye. The situation in Turkiye of 2025 is certainly a far cry from the Turkey of the pasts where politics was dominated by the deep state and the military apparatus as the “permanent occupiers of power”.
Finally, the failure of the attempted coup also served as a clear signal to other resistance movements inside Turkiye. The masses in the country were sick and tired and had lost appetite for violent takeover of governments. Coups and armed resistance to influence politics in Turkiye were no longer an option for the people of Turkiye. Luqman Rezi a local political analyst argues that “it is this realisation that has led to the PKK to abandon armed resistance. This realisation has also pushed the PKK to mainstream political contestation instead of violence”. Importantly though, the PKK’s political fortunes in the region have been rapidly weaning, particularly with the toppling of Bashar Al Assad and the liberation of Syria. The entrenchment of Turkiye in the politics of the region after the fall of the regime of Bashar al Assad has been critical. It can be argued therefore that the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 did not only unite the people of Turkiye against coups, it also assisted in entrenching and legitimised the power of President Erdogan and the AK Party. Significantly, it significantly weakened the deep state and altered the influence of the army in Turkiye forever.

The assassination of one of the highest-ranking Generals and the Commanders of Al Quds Force – part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) – Qasem Soleimani, opened an unprecedented form of conflict in the Gulf region. Soleimani was killed in Iraq on 3 January 2020 by an US drone strike in Iraq, while travelling to meet Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi. Iran retaliated by targeting the US military facilities in Iraq, it fired more than a dozen ballistic missiles at two Iraqi air bases housing US forces days after the assassination. According to The Times of Israel, Israel helped the US in that operation.
The leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh was killed by Israel in Tehran after attending the inauguration of the President of Iran Masoud Pezeshkian. Another pure violation of the sovereignty of Iran and international law. The killing of Haniyeh in July 2024 came on the heels of the attack and killing of a number of Iranian diplomats at the embassy of Iran in Damascus, Syria on 01 April 2024. Israel – with the support of the US – has continued to assassinate Iranian officials at will inside Iran.

Qatar had joint military operations with the US during the Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991. After the operation, Qatar and the US signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement. The agreement was expanded in 1996 to include the building of Al Udeid Military Air Base at a cost of more than $1 billion. The Al Udeid Military Air Base is the largest US military base in the Middle East. Iran attacked Al Udeid in retaliation to the US’s attacks of Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Esfahan in Iran in June 2025. Although the retaliation strikes were downplayed by the US and Qatar, the attacks seemed to have been carefully choreographed, exposing a new fault line in US-Qatar military cooperation.
The question in most minds of Qataris is; what will happen next time when the US decides to attack Iran, will Iran retaliate by attacking Qatar again? Notwithstanding the repeated mantra of “a friendly, brotherly love and appreciation” between Qatar and Iran, the biggest threat to Qatar’s security and political stability now and in the near future is a possible war between Israel and the US against Iran. The targeting of Iran by Israel and the US presents a new security threat in the region.

Al Udeid has served as “a symbol of protection for the State of Qatar against potential attacks and other forms of hostilities”. However, when put to the test, Al Udeid has failed to meet those expectations. Besides the recent Iran attacks of the US military installations in Al Udeid; when Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt led a blockade against Qatar in 2017, there was no forewarning from the US notwithstanding Al Udeid’s superior military intelligence. According to the Qatari Defence Minister, Khalid al Attiyah, “Actually it was not a mere intention. There was a plan to invade Qatar”. The “plan was set into two phases, imposing the siege with the aim of creating an overall state of panic, which would have a direct impact on the Qatari street, then executing a military invasion”.

The possible future conflicts involving the US and Iran have raised serious concerns about the safety of US’s assets and personnel in the region. It has also triggered a debate, particularly within the US media, of the viability and rationale of the country’s continued involvement in Israel’s wars in the region. The Make America Great Again (MEGA) leading supporters such as the executive chairman of Breitbart News, Stephen Banon and right-wing journalist and social media influencer Tucker Carlson have questioned “the US continuing blind support Israel’s wars in the Middle East”. Tucker Carlson a known Trump supporter and a right-wing voice has been the loudest. He has been “urging the US to stay out of Israel’s war with Iran”. Bannon and Carlson are part of a broader effort to overturn the “GOP’s hawkish consensus on Israel”. Notwithstanding his unwavering support of Israel, Trump has been critical of Benjamin Netanyahu war mongering strategy in the region. Trump has entered into lucrative business relationships with countries in the Arab/Persian Gulf recently; Netanyahu stands to disturb that relationship. The US and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have agreed to turn Abu Dhabi “to a site of the largest artificial intelligence campus outside the US”. The US will allow “the UAE to import half a million Nvidia semiconductor chips, considered the most advanced in the world in the artificial intelligence products”. According to The Guardian, Saudi Arabia struck a similar deal of semiconductors, obtaining the promise of the sale of hundreds of thousands of Nvidia Blackwell chips to Humain, an AI start-up owned by the Saudi Sovereign Wealth Fund. Indeed, given these interests and the strengthening relationship between the US and the Gulf countries, the US has much more to lose if it continues to blindly support Israel’s wars.

The relationship between Iran and the State of Qatar is very strong, both countries share gas exploration sites in the South Pars/North Dome. They are the gas condensate fields located in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. They are by far the world’s largest natural gas fields. There is also the people to people relationship between Qatar and Iran dating back to time immemorial. The next attack of Iran by the US or Israel could escalate and spread the war to Qatar. Although the US managed to move its assets from Al Udeid to other locations in Qatar before Iran’s attacks last month, the question remains. What guarantees do Qatar have that in future Iran would not target those locations? There is a possibility that if attacked Iran will once again retaliate. What will happen then? The retaliatory attacks could go beyond a mere violation of Qatar’s airspace and sovereignty; it could also cost Qatari lives. The State of Qatar has to take serious decisions regarding Al Udeid if it wants to maintain its future relationship with Iran and other countries in the region. It must close Al Udeid. It has more valid reasons to do that now. The threat has morphed in the region. Consequently, new defence infrastructure needs to be considered by Qatar. Al Udeid presents more political and diplomatic challenges than opportunities.

The anti-migration regulations in Europe and the US against Africans continue to affect the sociopolitical and economic development of Africa. Thousands of Africans who apply for visas continue to have their applications rejected.

Moreover, most Africans are charged exorbitant non-refundable fees when applying for visas. Millions in foreign and local currencies are accumulated by European and US embassies in various African countries from visa applications annually. African visa applicants face more severe restrictions compared with applicants from other regions, resulting in a disproportionately high rejection rate.

In 2022, Africa topped the list of rejections with 30% or one in three of all processed applications being turned down, even though it had the lowest number of visa applications per capita. Africa accounted for seven of the top 10 countries with the highest Schengen visa rejection rates in 2022: Algeria (45.8%), Guinea-Bissau (45.2%), Nigeria (45.1%), Ghana (43.6%), Senegal (41.6%), Guinea (40.6%) and Mali (39.9%). The situation has become worse over the years as economic instability and conflicts continue to rage in most African countries.

Some African countries have started calling for visa reciprocity against travellers from Europe and the US. The US and most European countries do not require visas to enter African countries. According to Justice Malala, a South African political analyst, in May, Namibia unveiled measures to impose entry visa requirements to more than 30 countries that have not reciprocated its open visa regime. Nigeria has threatened to impose the same measures. In the run-up to the French election earlier in July, a Chadian official told France’s Le Monde newspaper that if incoming leaders block visas for Chadians, “we will apply reciprocity”.

Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema recently raised the issue of non-refundable visa fees in his country, demanding the rules on non-refundable fees be re-examined and the visa application fees be refunded to Zambians whose applications are rejected. If his demand is accepted, this must apply to all African countries. According to European states, most rejections are based on "reasonable doubts about the visa applicants’ intention to return home". Many Africans believe otherwise. They claim that African visa rejections are weaponised against Africans to deprive them of voices at critical political and socio-economic gatherings on global matters such as climate change, artificial intelligence, human trafficking in Europe and the US. These discussions eventually become policies that affect Africa. An increased number of leading Africans on these subjects continue to have their applications rejected. These do not sound like people who present “reasonable doubts about the visa applicants’ intentions to return home”.

African News reports that African governments are building partnerships with Europe across sectors, trade, education, and technology. But the barriers to movement stand in stark contrast to the rhetoric of cooperation.

The rise of right-wing politics in many parts of the world has also further complicated matters for African visa applicants. Pressure from far-right parties who are in power in half a dozen member states in Europe are outdoing each other in introducing tough anti-immigration measures.

US President Donald Trump has just imposed travel bans on 12 countries, of which seven are African — Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia and Sudan. Travel restrictions will be imposed on people from Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
Even before this measure, Trump’s anti-migration political campaign and his subsequent extra-judicial expulsion of immigrants without due process now that he is in power has emboldened right-wing anti-migration politics throughout the world. The victory on Monday of the nationalist historian Karol Nawrocki in Poland's presidential election is one case in point. Nawrocki is an admirer of Trump who support by calling for tighter immigration controls and championing conservative social values in the EU.

The BBC reports that Trump's administration can temporarily revoke the legal status of more than 500,000 migrants living in the US, the US Supreme Court ruled recently. The ruling puts on hold a previous federal judge's order stopping the administration from ending the "parole" immigration programme, established by former president Joe Biden. The programme protected immigrants fleeing economic and political turmoil in their home countries. The new order puts roughly 530,000 migrants from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela at risk of being deported.

It is not just the rejection of visa applications that is troubling; the non-refundable visa application fees continue to negatively affect applicants’ financial status. According to the London-based research and arts organisation LAGO Collective, African countries have lost an estimated $67.5 million in non-refundable Schengen visa application fees since 2024. Africans find themselves going against the tide in a globalised world where mobility equates to opportunity. They are finding themselves locked out “not because they lack intention or preparation, but because the system increasingly seems stacked against them”.
This matter deserves a wider discussion, preferably at the African Union.

The visa rejections of Africans are not only about Africans overstaying their allowed time in Europe and the US. It is about Europe and the US continuing with business as usual, particularly at multilateral level, where binding discussions without the involvement of Africans are taken. This is particularly the case regarding rare earth minerals and other metals essential to new technologies.

President Cyril Ramaphosa is in the US after an invitation by President Donald Trump. The invitation coincides with one of the most important days in the political diary of South Africa. Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana is tabling a much-awaited budget on 21 May after two unsuccessful attempts.

Ramaphosa couldn’t risk postponing the invitation. South Africa has been isolated by the US for, among other reasons, taking Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for genocide of Palestinians in Gaza. The invitation of Ramaphosa to the White House certainly marks a change of attitude towards South Africa by Trump. And judging by the recent events aimed at isolating Israel, the invitation may form part of the decoupling of relations between Trump and Netanyahu.

First, when Netanyahu visited the White House on 7 April — the first head of state to do so after Trump introduced global tariffs — Trump announced that the US was having direct negotiations with Iran to the bemusement of Netanyahu.

Making the surprise announcement while sitting alongside Netanyahu in the Oval Office, Trump said: “The discussions would be ramped up to high-level talks.”

Israel has always insisted that Iran was funding terror in the region and has since been lobbying the US and others to join a campaign to suppress and eventually attack Iran.

Although Trump has said the US was against Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon, he has insisted on reaching a deal with Iran.

When Trump assumed office in his first term, he cancelled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deal between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) with Iran.

Trump said: “The Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”

The pressure to cancel the JCPOA came largely from Israel and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia at the time. Saudi Arabia later engaged in rapprochement with Iran leaving Israel alone in its calls to sanction Iran and a possible attack of Iran.

Direct talks have been continuing between the US and Iran in Zurich. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is heading the Iranian side and his counterpart, Wendy Sherman, is leading the US. These developments mean Israel will have to go it alone if it was to attack Iran at this point, something it was planning to do after Gaza.

What also came as a surprise to many, including Netanyahu, was the announcement by Trump that he had reached a deal with the Houthis; the US will stop bombing the Houthis in Yemen after the Houthis agreed to stop interrupting important shipping lanes in the Middle East — the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Oman said it had mediated the ceasefire, marking a major shift in Houthi policy since the start of Israel's war in Gaza. The deal between the Houthis and the US does not seem to include vessels to Israel.

The head of Yemen's Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, said the group will continue to support Gaza and that such attacks would continue. "To all Zionists from now on, stay in shelters or leave to your countries immediately as your failed government will not be able to protect you after today," Houthi-run Al Masirah TV cited him as saying.

Details of the deal between Trump and the Houthis are yet to emerge. Responding to concerns about direct talks between the Houthis and the US, the US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee retorted that “the US isn’t required to get permission from Israel to make some type of arrangement that would get the Houthis from firing on our ships”.

The deal with the Houthis was followed by yet another surprise announcement — the release of a US citizen, Edan Alexander, from Gaza. Alexander was freed on 12 May after having been captured by Hamas during its 7 October 2023 attack on Israel following direct negotiation between the US and Hamas.

The deal with the Houthis and the release of Alexander excluded Israel, leaving them isolated from regional political processes, something new in Israeli-US relations.
Although Netanyahu has visited the White House twice this year, Trump excluded Israel during his recent tour of the Middle East.
It could be argued that Trump did not want to conflate his visit to the region — which has been touted as a business tour — with the conflict in Gaza. Israel was hardly mentioned during the three-day tour while possible rapprochement between the US and Iran was mentioned over and over again.
The reception of Trump by the Gulf countries and financial pledges made in terms of investments to the US signals the significance of these countries to the economic prosperity of the US. Whereas Israel continues to benefit from the US in terms of aid ($3.8 billion this year), the Gulf states have pledged more than $700 billion to meet the economic objectives of the US without much aid coming into the Gulf region from the US.
According to the White House: “These deals lay the foundation for investment, innovation and good-paying US jobs, including in frontier technologies, aerospace, energy, and critical minerals.”
Last, perhaps the most significant development during Trump’s visit to the region was the announcement of lifting sanctions against Syria. Trump then accepted a meet-and-greet opportunity with the president of Syria, Ahmed al Sharaa the following day. These two decisions have further isolated Israel, which has been bombarding Syria notwithstanding Syria’s gesture to engage in peace and wanting to chart different relations with Israel.

The announcement by the United Kingdom, France and Canada that they would take “concrete actions”, including targeted sanctions, if Israel does not stop its renewed military offensive and continues to block aid from entering Gaza is significant. It could not have happened without a prior discussion between these countries and the US.

Trump is incensed by the disrespect Netanyahu has shown him over the past couple of days. Israel has relentlessly bombed Gaza, killing scores of Palestinians while Trump was in the region holding meetings with Gulf states. The actions of the US in the past couple of days, particularly extending olive branches to what have been enemies of Israel, is meant to drive a message to Netanyahu that the US is prepared to go it alone in terms of resolving the problem of the Middle East.

In the past the US tended to support Israel at all cost, but the tide seems to have changed. What has happened in recent days — whether in improving relations with Iran, lifting sanctions against Syria, achieving a truce with the Houthis and the invitation of Ramaphosa to the White House — suggests a new attitude from the US towards these countries, most of whom had previously earned the ire of the US because of Israel.